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1 Introduction 
We cannot understand the […] economy without having a 
theory of how humans make decisions. 
Herbert Gintis (2009), p. 2. 
 
Adam Smith, who is usually considered to be the founding father of microeconomics, is most 
frequently cited for his image of the “invisible hand“, which expresses that everybody should 
intend only his own gain: By doing so, an “invisible hand” lets people simultaneously promote 
the public interest (Smith, 1937 [1776]). According to this concept, the existence of social 
dilemmas, where a conflict between self-interest and public interest exists, is denied. This 
“selfishness axiom” (Henrich et al., 2004) has for a long time prevailed in economic research. 
Typically, the selfishness axiom was (or still is) combined with the assumption of rational 
behavior, leading to a simple and often useful theory of human behavior (known as the homo 
economicus model, the neoclassical model, or the standard model). However, representations 
of social dilemmas, such as the public goods game (PGG), prove that selfishness is not always 
in the public interest. The selfishness axiom predicts that people cannot solve such social 
dilemmas. In contrast, experimental research in the last decades has proven that people often 
act in the public interest even when it causes harm to themselves. This finding, which – 
according to his less frequently cited book “Theory of Moral Sentiments” – even Adam Smith 
was aware of, has brought the understanding of social preferences for economic interactions 
back into the spotlight. 
In addition, experimental research has discovered various deviations from the rationality 
assumption, which is an essential part of the homo economicus model. While giving up this 
assumption makes models more complicated, upholding it hampers attempts to gain important 
new insights. For example, an important finding of this dissertation is that social preferences 
and seemingly irrational biases in human thinking interact with each other. Therefore, they must 
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be considered in an integrated way. More generally, the goal of this dissertation is to contribute 
to a better understanding of human decision making in social dilemmas. 
To achieve this objective, we reject both the selfishness axiom and the rationality axiom. 
Instead, we modify the reciprocity model of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) (henceforth 
DK), and extend it by introducing biased and therefore irrational beliefs. We extract these two 
essential aspects of human decision making by using experimental methods: Indeed, people 
have reciprocal preferences, and they believe in more reciprocal behavior of others than is 
actually the case. We will call such people “reciprocal believers” in the following, and our 
results show that this belief bias only makes sense in combination with reciprocal preferences. 
Briefly, our findings can be summarized as follows. People  
1. cooperate because they (to some degree: wrongly) believe that others cooperate as well, 
2. trust because they (to some degree: wrongly) believe that others are trustworthy, and 
the fear of being betrayed does not diminish trusting behavior, 
3. behave in a fair way because they (to some degree: wrongly) believe that they will be 
punished if they do not. Furthermore, fair – meaning equal – payoffs are achieved 
because people want to be kind to others. Reciprocating kind behavior in one situation 
does not necessarily mean that unkind behavior in another situation will be reciprocated 
as well. 
The incorporation of these results into thinking about human decision making leads to a 
different way of designing corporations, institutions, and markets. Is it possible to auction goods 
anonymously and with little legal control via the internet? How much supervision is necessary 
to make people pay their taxes or for their bus tickets? Behavioral economists will come to very 
different conclusions compared to neoclassical economists: Reciprocal believers are much 
more successful in solving social dilemmas than homines economici, which is good news. 
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However, accepting that people are reciprocal believers is, at the same time, bad news because 
it implies that our economy is much more vulnerable than it would be if unbiased and selfish 
subjects were making economic transactions: Correct beliefs and selfishness are precisely 
defined. In contrast, biases are prone to framing. Akerlof and Shiller (2010) argue that people 
think with the help of “stories” (such as “house prices always rise”), and such stories can be 
significantly biased. Perceptions are influenceable or even manipulable positively as well as 
negatively (see Posten et al., 2014, to name only one example). With respect to social 
preferences, evolutionary analyses find oscillating or chaotic phases of cooperation and 
defection in social dilemmas (see Section 4.2). Thinking of people as reciprocal believers 
explains why economic developments can make sudden disruptions unjustified by “hard facts”. 
Three of the five irrational “animal spirits” which drive human behavior according to Akerlof 
and Shiller (2010) (trust, fairness, biased beliefs) are addressed in this dissertation (we do not 
address corruption and money illusion), and their link between economic decision making of 
humans and macroeconomic phenomena, such as financial crises, illustrates how important it 
is to understand human decision making in social dilemmas much better than has been the case 
up to now. 
2 Economic Experiments 
Economists (unfortunately)… cannot perform the controlled 
experiments of chemists or biologists because they cannot easily control 
other important factors. Like astronomers or meteorologists, they 
generally must be content largely to observe. 
Paul A. Samuelson and William D. Nordhaus, 
Principles of Economics 12th ed. McGraw-Hill, 
New York 1985, p. 8 
 
Experimental economics is an ‘exciting new development’. 
Paul A. Samuelson and William D. Nordhaus, 
Principles of Economics 14th ed. McGraw-Hill, 
New York 1992, p. 5 
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Science can be theoretical, observational, or experimental. In economics, research has for a 
long time not been experimental, and it was believed that it is not possible to conduct economic 
experiments. While other (natural) sciences began to conduct experiments much earlier (starting 
with physics in the time of Galileo, followed by chemistry, biology, and no more than about 
one hundred years ago, psychology, compare Friedman and Sunder, 1994), the first economic 
experiments were not made until the second half of the last century. Since the mid-1980s, the 
number of experimental papers has greatly increased, but still account for no more than about 
4 % of all the papers in economic top journals (Falk, 2009). Economic experiments are typically 
conducted in a computer laboratory, but they can also be made “in the field“, in a universitarian 
classroom, or in a clinic using neuroscientific devices. 
 
Experiments serve as a midpoint between theory and praxis: Elaboration of the theory, 
empirical phenomena, and laboratory experiments play complementary roles (Harstad and 
Selten, 2013): In contrast to empirical methods, experiments are able to allow tightly controlled 
variations of decision environments. “Controlled” means that “most factors which influence 
behavior are held constant and only one factor of interest (the ‘treatment’) is varied at a time“ 
(Croson and Gächter, 2010). This tight control allows to make causal inferences between the 
explanatory factor and the dependent behavioral impact. Factors of relevance are typically 
available choices, decision makers’ information sets, and the monetary incentive structure.  
Theory is useful for designing experiments, because it tells the experimentator which 
variables to control or to test and it makes predictions about the experimental outcome. 
(Harstadt and Selten, 2013). Like theories, experiments cover (only) the most important aspects 
of economic behavior. Furthermore, like theories, experiments are abstract and accept 
descriptive inaccurateness (Croson and Gächter 2010), which is sometimes criticized as lacking 
realism. 
5 
 
Experiments are ideal for testing existing theories: Smith (1962) showed that the neoclassical 
model of competitive markets can be reproduced in experiments. Similarly, in our third paper 
“Using the Carrot Like the Stick? Theoretical and Experimental Insights Into Positive vs. 
Negative Reciprocity”, henceforth UG-paper, we test the implication of the strong reciprocity 
model, which proposes that people who reward kind behavior also punish unkind behavior (we 
find this prediction to be not true). As in these examples, experiments allow theories an 
existence proof: If their predictions are not accurate in a carefully designed experimental 
environment, it is unlikely that they explain real phenomena in a better way. Testing theory 
with the help of observational data is not as easily done as using experiments, because the 
former approach jointly has to test whether the assumptions of the theory and its predictions 
hold. In contrast, in the lab, assumptions can be controlled very precisely, and only predictions 
have to be tested. Furthermore, experiments can measure and control all relevant variables, 
which observations cannot. Moreover, observational data can only prove comparative statics of 
a theory, while experimental data can serve to make point predictions (Croson and Gächter, 
2010). 
In turn, experimental results inspire new theories, such as the outcomes of UG experiments 
have led to the emergence of social preference models. In this way, on the basis of our 
experimental data, this dissertation supports the model of people as being reciprocal believers. 
Thus, theories are tested in experiments, and experiments provide new insights to formulate 
better theories. This dialectic process (Croson and Gächter, 2010, Friedman and Sunder, 1994) 
serves to capture relevant empirical phenomena. 
 
Falk (2009) claims that “lab experiments are a major source of knowledge in the social 
sciences”. First, experimental research can show how actual behavior deviates from 
neoclassical assumptions (which is especially of interest in German research, as most German 
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experimentalists have been inspired by Reinhard Selten, who dedicates his research to exploring 
bounded rationality). Thereby, experiments can measure preferences (to which degree are 
people considering the well-being of others?) and parameters (what is the discount rate in an 
agent’s time preference?). For the most part, this dissertation is dedicated to such questions. 
Second, experiments can test and improve institutions (so-called economic engineering): 
Aimone and Houser (2013) explain how well-functioning institutions can be built, bearing in 
mind that people may not trust others because they want to avoid the negative emotional 
feelings associated with the knowledge of being betrayed, known as betrayal-aversion. 
Andreoni and Samuelson (2006) show how formal and informal institutions can help to build 
up cooperation. Third, experiments can illustrate phenomena (people reward and punish, share 
equally, and their behavior depends on norms and culture). For that purpose, “standard” 
experiments have evolved which serve as behavioral models of basic social dilemmas: The 
public goods game (PGG) is the standard example of situations where collective self-interested 
behavior does not maximize the overall welfare; the trust game (TG) illustrates situations where 
contracts are incomplete; the ultimatum game (UG) displays how a social surplus is divided if 
one party has the whole bargaining power. 
 
Some scientists argue that results of laboratory experiments must be viewed critically, 
because they are derived in a “non-realistic” environment (Levitt and List, 2007). This 
skepticism towards the external validity of experiments is not new: Galileo’s critics did not 
believe that the motion of pendulums or balls had any relation to planetary motion (Friedman 
and Sunder, 1994). Experimental results can only offer inductive logic, meaning that one has 
to hope that behavioral regularities will persist outside of the lab as long as the relevant 
underlying conditions (formulated in theories) remain substantially unchanged.  
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To address concerns about external validity, experimentalists have started to compare 
behavior in the lab with behavior in the “real world” and found substantially consistent 
behavior. To name only a few: Baran, Sapienza and Zingales (2010) find that Chicago MBA 
students who return more to the sender in the proposer role of a TG played in their class at the 
beginning of their program also donate more to the university at the end of their program 18 
months later. Franzen and Pointner (2013) measure the external validity of giving in the dictator 
game by sending “misdirected” letters with money to the experimental participants some weeks 
/ two years after the experiment was conducted. Indeed, subjects who gave more in the dictator 
game were more likely to return the letter. Karlan (2005) finds that subjects who are more 
trustworthy in a TG are more likely to repay loans one year later. 
As well, external validity can be addressed by testing the parameters of concern within the 
lab. In this context, Falk (2009) proposes that more experiments should be made instead of 
fewer: If you are afraid that unexperienced students behave differently from experienced 
experts, then invite experienced experts to the lab. If you believe that small payoffs do not 
capture decisions over large stakes, then increase the payoffs. If you doubt that small samples 
have enough statistical power, then raise the sample size (and so on). Indeed, for example, for 
the UG, all these points have been addressed in experiments, and the experiments have proven 
that the basic outcome of the ultimatum game (most proposers offer fair splits, which are 
accepted; unfair splits are often rejected) is remarkably robust (Samuelson, 2005).  
 
When conducting economic experiments, certain rules of the economics discipline must be 
followed. These rules are different from those for psychological experiments because the 
questions that economists are interested in are different (Croson, 2005). Most importantly, 
economic experiments must establish a link between elicited decisions and monetary 
incentives. This means that subjects must be paid depending on their decisions, and they must 
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understand the incentive structure. There is evidence that behavior differs without incentives, 
and one does not want to measure what people say but what they do. From this claim, it follows 
that subjects must not be deceived: Participants must deeply believe that their behavior is linked 
to payoffs, as explained. This belief is a public good which experimental economists carefully 
prevent from being exploited by individual researchers. 
3 Game Theory and (Common) Belief in Rationality 
Und er kommt zu dem Ergebnis: 
“Nur ein Traum war das Erlebnis. 
Weil”, so schließt er messerscharf, 
„nicht sein kann, was nicht sein darf!” 
Christian Morgenstern, Die unmögliche Tatsache (1910) 
 
To understand and predict economic phenomena and to give advice, scientists build models. 
Models which describe behavior in social dilemmas necessarily use game theory, because 
“game theory is about what happens when people – or genes, or nations – interact” (Camerer, 
2003). In such models, one has to specify how outcomes are evaluated (preferences), how 
people process information, and how they view the world (beliefs), and how these assumptions 
translate into behavior (“solution concept”, compare Croson and Gächter, 2010). For example, 
the neoclassical model assumes that people maximize their (expected) utility, that they have 
correct beliefs, and that they use – for example – the Nash equilibrium concept to determine 
behavior. In this dissertation, it is also worth mentioning that the utility is assumed to only 
depend on the outcome of a game, not on the way players achieve these outcomes. 
Thus, the neoclassical model relies on extensive assumptions, which are made to simplify 
and to suggest normative appealing behavior. Nevertheless, even with such a “very rational” 
approach, the question of how to deal with irrationality cannot be avoided. For example, the 
subgame perfect equilibrium, which is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium, assumes that 
players will act rationally from a certain node in the game tree onwards, even if they have 
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reached that node by making irrational moves. Such an assumption can be justified by arguing 
that people make mistakes, i.e. irrational moves, with small probabilities (leading to the 
trembling-hand equilibrium). However, observing seemingly irrational behavior in experiments 
can almost always lead to a very different conclusion: Subjects may have different preferences 
or beliefs, or may use a different solution concept than assumed by the researcher. For example, 
contributing to a public good is irrational for a homo economicus, and much of the early 
research on public goods tested whether subjects who contributed were “confused” (compare, 
e.g., Andreoni, 1995). In contrast, the same behavior is fully rational if one assumes that 
subjects have reciprocal preferences and believe that others contribute as well. While the former 
approach asks whether people behave according to the researcher’s perception of rationality, 
the latter approach takes people’s decisions as given and asks how such decisions can best be 
rationalized. Rationalization of decisions has become an important part of game theory, and in 
many parts, this dissertation can be attributed to this branch of research. It is also interesting to 
note that Reinhard Selten himself views his development of the concept of subgame perfect 
equilibria as a philosophical inquiry with no a-priori relevance for describing human economic 
behavior (Dufwenberg, 2001). 
What is meant by being rational? Rational is often used in the sense of reasonable, leaving 
open how this is exactly defined (we also use the expression in the other sections of this 
Introduction in this unspecified way). In contrast, Perea (2012) differentiates between rational 
and reasonable choices, which will be useful to understand the modeling approach in our papers. 
Perea defines a choice as being rational if “there is some belief about the opponents’ choices 
for which [a decision] is optimal” (without putting any restrictions on this belief). A rational 
choice is not necessarily a reasonable choice, and Perea does not define reasonable because this 
is subjective and depends on the solution concept one has in mind (Perea, 2012, p. 6 and 29). 
Perea’s rationality definition is based on Aumann (1987), who calls such rationality Bayesian 
rationality. Aumann (1987) argues that the modern subjectivist, Bayesian view of the world is 
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that players have a subjective probability distribution over every prospect (Savage, 1954), 
including that of players choosing certain strategies in certain games. It follows that rational 
playing only implies maximizing one’s utility given these subjective distributions over the other 
players’ strategy choices, without demanding that these beliefs are correct. If all players behave 
in this way, and if this behavior is common knowledge, equilibrium behavior unfolds, which 
Aumann (1987) calls “correlated equilibrium”. This is obviously a more general equilibrium 
definition than Nash equilibrium.  
If one assumes that players are rational, one may also assume that players believe that the 
other players are rational (1-fold belief in rationality), leading to the assumption that players 
believe that the others believe that players are rational (2-fold belief in rationality), and so on. 
If such higher-order-beliefs are rational ad infinitum, one speaks of common belief in 
rationality. Again, note that common belief in rationality (in contrast to the informal use of the 
expression rationality) does not imply that the belief hierarchies are correct (compare example 
3.2 in Perea, 2012). Thus, common belief in rationality means that (everybody knows) that 
everybody maximize their utility, given their knowledge about the world. We assume such 
behavior in our papers. 
If belief hierarchies are correct, they are called simple. This is, for example, assumed in the 
Nash equilibrium concept. As already mentioned, common belief in rationality is a far less 
restrictive solution concept than the Nash equilibrium and may, in many cases, not restrict 
possible strategies at all, but we show in the next section how this caveat can be overcome. 
Perea (2012) argues that the Nash equilibrium is “not a very plausible concept to use […], even 
though Nash equilibrium has played a central role in game theory for many years” (p. 134). He 
proposes that common belief in rationality is a better alternative. We cite Perea: “In fact, it 
would be an absolute coincidence if [your co-player] were to be correct about your belief. […] 
There is nothing wrong with believing that some of your opponents may have incorrect beliefs 
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about your own beliefs. After all, your opponents cannot look inside your head, so why should 
they be correct about your beliefs?” (p. 146). We agree with Perea in the following way: While 
the concept of a Nash equilibrium may be a useful tool to provide a “benchmark case” and to 
make normative statements, our experimental data indeed show that severe descriptive mistakes 
can result from assuming simple belief hierarchies. 
3.1 Boundedly Rational Behavior 
The picture of rational decision making underlying most of 
contemporary economic theory is far away from observed behavior. It 
is therefore necessary to develop theories of bounded rationality.  
Reinhard Selten (1998), p. 414 
 
First, note that the expression boundedly rational (or limitedly rational) does not necessarily 
correspond to the definition of rationality presented in Perea (2012): According to Simon 
(1955), bounded rationality models include models which describe deviations from objectively 
optimal behavior by considering cognitive illusions (a behavior which Perea (2012) would still 
define as being rational), models which optimize under computational constraints, and models 
which consider that decisions must be made fast and simple (again, Perea’s definition of 
rationality does not capture these two points). Bounded rationality is understood as rationality 
exhibited by actual human economic behavior (Selten, 1998), and is used in that sense in the 
following. 
In this dissertation, we ask how observed behavior in experiments can best be understood. 
We present a model which assumes that players optimize, which is not self-evident: Instead, 
one can assume learning (reasoning-by-analogy), which includes trial and error (a survey on 
learning models can be found in Camerer, 2003, chap. 6; a learning model for the case of the 
public goods game is presented in Arifovic and Ledyard, 2012). At first glance, learning models 
may be more suitable to describe boundedly rational behavior, and some researchers indeed 
believe that such approaches may have the potential to become more successful than traditional 
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optimizing approaches (Harstad und Selten, 2013). Nevertheless, optimization models have 
many advantages: Such models provide rigor, which allows the identification of key economic 
forces (in our case: biased beliefs and reciprocity); they are applicable in a context-free way; 
and they may make correct predictions even if they do not capture how people really think (as-
if-approach). Rabin (2013) expresses this as follows: Such models reflect that people’s 
reasoning “whittles away all but a few […] disastrous things all of us could do in virtually every 
new situation we face in life“ (p. 536). Given an agent’s knowledge, optimizing captures 
compelling behavior. Therefore, Rabin (2013) proposes to keep the existing neoclassical 
models and extend them such that both the neoclassical model and the limited-rationality model 
are embedded with the help of parameter values. Having done so, “the models can be compared 
and judged, in a fair fight, by establishing point estimates and confidence intervals on the 
parameter values” (p. 530). Incorporating such rationality limitations currently leads to rapid 
improvements of microeconomic theory. Furthermore, by defining explicitly irrationality 
parameters, assuming common belief in rationality no longer means that all possible strategies 
are part of a subject’s strategy space. Instead, the models predict only one or only a few 
outcomes. The proposal of Rabin (2013) corresponds exactly to our proceeding, particularly in 
our first paper “Explaining Individual Contributions in Public Goods Games Using (only) 
Reciprocity and Overoptimism”, henceforth PGG-paper: We add a belief bias ε to an existing 
reciprocity model. Furthermore, the reciprocity model adds a reciprocity parameter Y to the 
neoclassical model. By setting ε and Y equal to zero (in our second paper “Trust, Reciprocity, 
and Betrayal Aversion: Theoretical and Experimental Insights”, henceforth TG-paper, ε must 
be set equal to one), our model collapses into the neoclassical one – and then makes clearly 
wrong predictions. 
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In line with the complementary role which theory plays in explaining experimental findings 
of irrational behavior, an increasing number of limited-rationality models have been built in 
recent years (compare Rabin, 2013, for examples). However, these models mostly refer to 
situations without a game theoretic context. In contrast, some game-theoretic models are 
presented in Crawford (2013), and in the following, we shortly want to comment on one of 
them, because it has striking similarities with our model. This especially holds for the PGG-
paper: We comment on the cursed equilibrium model of Eyster and Rabin (2005). 
Eyster and Rabin (2005) explain the winner’s curse in auctions by assuming that players 
correctly predict the distribution of other players’ actions, but underestimate the degree to which 
these actions are correlated with other players’ information. Accordingly, to some degree, 
players neglect the informational content in other players’ behavior. For example, a seller may 
know whether a used car is a worthless “lemon” or a valuable “peach”, and, for a predetermined 
low price, sell only lemons. A rational buyer will realize that the seller only offers lemons, and 
will not buy, but a “cursed” buyer does not fully capture this interrelation and believes that both 
lemons and peaches are sold. As in our model, players optimize in the sense that they play a 
best response to their beliefs. As well, by setting their irrationality parameter to zero, the model 
collapses into the Nash equilibrium. Similarly to us, Eyster and Rabin (2005) propose that a 
natural generalization to their model is to allow different players to be “cursed” to different 
degrees. As well, their model could be interpreted as a theory where players believe other 
players to play suboptimally given their private information, which Rabin and Eyster do not 
find compelling: “Rather than say that Player A figures out Player B’s optimal strategy but 
believes B does not figure this out, we say that A himself does not properly introspect about 
how B uses B’s private information” (p. 1629). As in our model, their model leads to 
inconsistencies, which cannot be avoided if bounded rationality is modeled. In Rabin and 
Eyster’s case, players underestimate the correlation between co-players’ actions and co-players’ 
information. In our case, players believe in too high contributions from their co-players, but do 
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not realize that their beliefs are wrong. Rabin and Eyster point out that their model is 
conceptually troubling, but they justify their approach by arguing that players do “not (fully) 
think through the logic of the [model]” (p. 1632). Finally, like us, Rabin and Eyster have to 
estimate different values of their irrationality parameter for different experiments and for 
different players to fit the model to the data precisely. 
However, with respect to modeling boundedly rational behavior in game-theoretic contexts, 
research is still in its infancy. As Rabin (2013) formulates: “Little has yet been done to integrate 
statistical errors, or models of how people are neglectful and irrational in extracting information 
from other economic actors in strategic and market contexts“. In that sense, this dissertation 
intends to contribute to a growing and fruitful research field. 
3.2 Biased Beliefs 
In the experimental data from the PGG and the TG, we find that subjects believe in too 
favorable outcomes, and we conclude that subjects show an overoptimistic, and therefore 
irrational, bias. However, believing in favorable outcomes induced by others may be an 
uncommon interpretation of overoptimism, as this expression typically refers to an 
overestimation of own capabilities and traits. In line with this skepticism, our UG-results raise 
doubt about the overoptimism interpretation: In the UG, subjects are pessimistic instead of 
optimistic. We propose in the UG-paper that all of these findings can be unified by assuming 
that people overestimate the reciprocity inclination of co-players instead of their own payoffs. 
We suggest in Section 4.2 that such an argumentation can be justified with evolutionary 
arguments. 
With respect to the belief bias, an analogy to the research regarding social preferences comes 
to mind: Altruism and reciprocity both predict cooperating behavior in cooperation games, but 
come to different predictions in punishing games (not punish vs. punish). While it is still 
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unknown how different social motives interact, experimentalists have started to research this 
question (compare the literature cited in the UG-paper). Analogously, overoptimism with 
respect to outcomes and with respect to reciprocal behavior are congruent in cooperation games, 
but make contrary predictions in punishing games. As far as we know, the relationship between 
these sometimes complementary belief biases has not been researched at all. 
4 Social Preferences 
No matter how selfish you think man is, it’s obvious that there are some 
principles in his nature that give him an interest in the welfare of others, 
and make their happiness necessary to him, even if he gets nothing from 
it but the pleasure of seeing it.  
Adam Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, 2000 [1759], p. 1 
 
While for a long time economists had forgotten that social preferences are a phenomenon 
worthy of consideration, their existence is undisputed nowadays. The relevance of social 
preferences has been shown in countless experiments. Moreover, researchers have started to 
decode how social preferences work in the human brain, a recent review can be found in 
Declerck, Boone, and Emonds (2013). Furthermore, a genetic basis for social preferences has 
been found, either with the help of evolutionary analysis (see below) or with twin studies 
(Sturgis et al., 2010). 
Social preferences (alternatively: other-regarding preferences) can formally be defined as 
follows: “Individual i has social preferences if for any given [physical resource] xi person i’s 
utility is affected by variations of xj, j≠i (Fehr and Schmidt, 2005). Therefore, social preferences 
are the opposed term to selfish preferences (being only interested in xi) and build the generic 
term for preferences such as altruism (costly acts that confer economic benefits on other 
individuals, Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003), inequality aversion (willingness to give up some 
material payoff to move in the direction of more equitable outcomes, Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), 
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quasi-maximin preferences (desire to maximize the minimal payoff in the group, Engelmann 
and Strobel, 2004), reciprocity (see below), or spiteful or envious preferences (always valuing 
the material payoff of relevant reference agents negatively, Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002). 
4.1 When Social Preferences Should Be Assumed, and When Not 
All models we are aware of capture social preferences by adding a social (in our case: 
reciprocal) utility component to a selfish (material) utility component. Both preferences are 
weighted against each other with the help of an additional parameter. Accordingly, social 
preferences need not be seen as a contradiction to selfish preferences, but as an extension. Given 
that – ceteris paribus – less parameters are better than more, the question arises when the social 
parameter can be set to zero, and when not. 
Ockenfels and Raub (2010) list three arguments, in which cases the homo economicus model 
is still useful: It is useful as an “as-if”-interpretation, as a “worst case” scenario, and as a 
benchmark.  
People may be socially orientated, but in markets behave like egoists, even if outcomes are 
highly unfair: In markets, several players compete for trade. Such situations are formally 
described in Fehr and Schmidt (1999), with the intuition being as follows: Accepting an unfair 
trade is better than making no trade, even with fairness considerations. Furthermore, making 
fair offers reduces inequality among all potential buyers only slightly, letting selfish 
considerations typically prevail. Smith (1962) showed that the neoclassical predictions are 
indeed precise if markets are competitive. Especially, a necessary condition for this result is 
that complete contingent contracts are traded (Schmidt, 2011): Incomplete contracts allow 
welfare-increasing actions after parties have agreed on a trade, making fair behavior beneficial 
even if players compete for trades. Contracts are obviously not complete in, for example, labor 
markets, making social preferences a relevant factor (Akerloff and Yellen, 1988, Fehr, 
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Kirchsteiger, and Riedl, 1993). Broadly speaking, social preferences are the less relevant the 
more perfect a market situation is: They are extremely relevant in our experiments, where 
market forces are not at work at all. It is an open question as to whether they are relevant at all 
in “almost” perfect financial markets: While, for example, Breuer, Felde, and Steininger (2014) 
find that stock prices of firms are positively affected by a withdrawal from “sin states” (which 
is presumably due to the moral preferences of investors), others do not find lower yields of 
investing socially responsible (Riedl and Smeets, 2014 give a short overwiew). However, the 
following hypothesis opens room for a slight effect of social preferences on prices of financial 
securities: Unethical companies may have higher costs of capital (and are therefore traded at 
lower prices) because social investors are reluctant to hold such stocks in their portfolios, 
implying that they are extensively held by non-social investors. Consequently, these investors 
will demand a premium for their restricted possibilities to diversify (Heinkel, Kraus, and 
Zechner, 2001). Unfortunately, we are not aware of any experimental proof for this hypothesis. 
Interestingly, Leibbrandt (2012) reports that sellers who are more pro-social in a laboratory 
experiment are also more successful in natural markets because they have superior trade 
relations and better abilities to signal trustworthiness to buyers. Henrich et al. (2005) discover 
a striking correlation between the degree of market integration in a society and its level of 
prosociality expressed in experimental games. These findings indicate that social preferences 
are a relevant factor in the real world even in market situations: Markets typically have a very 
limited degree of perfectness. 
The homo economicus model may also serve as a worst case scenario when it comes to 
designing institutions and making economic policy decisions. Research on social preferences 
shows how these preferences help to overcome social dilemmas, and if an institutional design 
is working well among selfish players, it will certainly do even better among socially orientated 
ones.  
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Third, using the prediction of the homo economicus model as a benchmark allows to quantify 
the relevance of social preferences. This may be important for evaluating economic modeling. 
As well, such a benchmark may be directly relevant for the reasoning of people: Note that in 
reciprocal theories, a reference point must be determined to distinguish kind from unkind 
behavior. While it is still unclear how this reference point is actually determined, selfish 
behavior is an obvious candidate: Actions leading to higher payoffs compared to this 
benchmark may be perceived to be kind, whereas lower payoffs could be perceived to be a 
punishment.  
4.2 Evolutionary Analysis 
Evolutionary game theory merges population ecology (population ecology deals with the 
dynamics of species populations and asks how these populations interact with the environment) 
with game theory. It re-interprets game theory by using inheritable traits instead of optimal 
strategies, fitness (average reproductive success) instead of payoffs, and population members 
instead of players (Sigmund and Nowak, 1999). In simulations, selection (by inheritance or by 
social learning) leads to an increase in the frequency of strategies which grant higher fitness. 
Typically, this fitness depends on the frequency of a trait, leading to (ongoing) changes in the 
structure of the population. Evolutionary analyses are used in economic research to prove which 
advantages certain preferences (meant as stable determinants of a person’s strategy) have. 
Preferences link economic and evolutionary analysis because “we can […] expect our 
preferences and our decision-making to have been the products of evolution” (Samuelson, 
2005). Evolutionary analysis can put findings in behavioral economics on more solid ground: 
The concept of maximizing (expected) utility can be criticized because it is basically a 
tautology: Utility is a theoretical construct, and it can only be operationalized by observing or 
measuring what people like and what not. Accordingly, utility maximization implies that such 
behavior maximizes utility which leads to the most preferable outcome. Evolutionary game 
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theory helps to define utility by arguing that preferences must have developed to let people 
survive. 
Accordingly, much of the early skepticism against the assumption of social preferences 
stems from the question of how such costly preferences should survive (or develop) in an 
environment where – according to Charles Darwin – only “the fittest survive”. Such skepticism 
was already expressed by Thomas Hobbes who argues that “homo homini lupus est”. 
Interestingly, experiments have revealed that Hobbes was wrong: People cooperate intuitively 
and are not predisposed towards selfishness (Rand, Greene, and Nowak, 2012). Moreover, 
socially oriented people seem to be more successful than selfish ones (Barr and Serneels, 2009, 
Dohmen et al., 2009). Evolutionary research supports such findings by identifying several 
plausible mechanisms which allow social preferences to increase “fitness” and to survive in 
human groups even without the existence of regulating institutions. We will briefly introduce 
such mechanisms in the following. 
Martin Nowak summarizes research by himself and his colleagues in Nowak (2006) and 
outlines five mechanisms which lead to cooperative behavior (typically measured in repeated 
prisoner dilemma games where either cooperation or defection is possible). Such mechanisms 
are kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, and group 
selection.  
Kin selection argues that behavior is determined by genes, and that a person’s genes also 
(partly) spread if a relative instead of the person survives. For example, two siblings share the 
same gene with a probability of 1/2.  
Among unrelated individuals, cooperation spreads if they behave in a reciprocal way 
(introduced by Trivers, 1971). Most famously, Axelrod (1984) found that reciprocal behavior, 
so-called tit for tat is the winning strategy in repeatedly played prisoners’ dilemmas.  
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While direct reciprocity is successful in repeated interactions between the same two persons, 
reciprocity can also work even if the same persons never meet twice: So-called indirect 
reciprocity captures behavior where people are (un)kind to others who are in turn (un)kind to 
third parties. Such a strategy depends on the possibility to build reputation and on conditions 
where such reputation spreads by the contents of gossip. 
The environments considered so far assume that people interact with each other equally 
likely. More realistically, one may assume that spatial structures exist, where some individuals 
interact more often than others. Such a possibility leads to clusters of subject types, where 
cooperation takes place in some networks and defection in others.  
Finally, one can assume that selection acts not only on individuals but also on groups: While 
individual selection strengthens the fitness of individuals, it reduces the average fitness of the 
population in prisoners’-dilemma-environments. Accordingly, successful groups are those 
which contain many cooperating individuals, and such groups can crowd out defecting groups. 
 
A typical finding in such evolutionary simulations is that the success of strategies is not 
constant (compare Nowak, 2004): Instead, it can oscillate or even be chaotic. The reason is that 
adaptions to environments also change the environment (in particular, the behavior of other 
people). For example, in repeatedly played prisoners’ dilemmas, tit for tat can invade a 
population of defectors. Once tit for tat has been established, “generous tit for tat” can invade, 
which forgives accidential defections by responding to defection with cooperation from time to 
time. Such a population can be invaded by “always cooperate”, which in turns makes “always 
defect” attractive, and so on. To analyze such situations, evolutionary game theory is a better 
framework compared to optimization techniques. 
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While the research mentioned above concentrates on the evolutionary advantage of 
reciprocal behavior in cooperative dilemmas, one may also ask with respect to our UG-paper 
how punishing unfair behavior can be evolutionary advantageous: Such an advantage may be 
less obvious, as cooperation makes the co-player better off, while punishments reduce payoffs 
for both parties. Nevertheless, preferences for fair outcomes can be explained in evolutionary 
ways. Gavrilets (2012) shows why third-parties, whose material payoff is first of all not affected 
by a game outcome, punish egalitarian norm violations, even if this is costly for themselves: In 
groups where individuals can take resources from others by force, interactions can be described 
by a hawk-dove-type game with either “do not fight” over the resource or “fight”. As stronger 
individuals take away resources from weaker individuals and, as a result, have higher 
reproductive success, hierarchies develop where strong individuals usurp a disproportionally 
large share. In such environments, it is beneficial for oneself if all others are more equal. This 
makes a preference to help the weak against the strong an evolutionary advantageous one, and 
lets norms of inequality aversion evolve. 
 
The papers we cited above assume that agents use simple and predefined strategies. It is 
more realistic to assume that strategies depend on beliefs, and as we find biased beliefs in our 
experiments, a natural question which arises is why these biases are evolutionarily 
advantageous. Typically, belief biases are justified as a heuristic which induces behavior that 
is almost optimal, but requires cognitively much less demanding calculations. The findings in 
this dissertation lead to a different idea: Among reciprocal players, belief biases can substitute 
reciprocity: The same forces that foster reciprocal preferences may lead to biases, which only 
make players believe that the co-player is a reciprocal type. Such beliefs induce welfare 
increasing, cooperative behavior even if the co-player is a selfish type. In the UG, biased beliefs 
with respect to the willingness of the responder to punish lead to fair behavior of the proposer 
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even if the responder actually engages in welfare-destroying, punishing behavior only rarely. 
In that sense, belief biases and reciprocal preferences are interrelated with each other, which 
should be worth further exploration. 
 
Although this dissertation does not use evolutionary game theory techniques, we have 
presented the excursion into this field for two reasons. First, we show that understanding the 
causes of social preferences is even more difficult than understanding their implications (which 
in turn are more difficult to understand than decisions in non-interactive environments). 
Interpreting human behavior in terms of “optimizing something” necessarily fails to capture 
feedback effects between environment and behavior, and will therefore not be successful in 
understanding the reasons for social behavior. While this dissertation primarily intends to 
discover how social behavior can be best described (and therefore relies on optimization 
models), subsequent research can ask why such behavior exists: Apart from the question of how 
biased beliefs about the social orientation of others can be advantageous, we also raise the 
question of among which circumstances a mixed strategy of sometimes acting reciprocally and 
sometimes acting selfishly performs better compared to a strict preference for both punishments 
and rewards. 
4.3 Reciprocity 
Tit for tat 
A proverb 
 
An individual behaves in a reciprocal way if “he responds to actions he perceives to be kind 
in a kind manner, and to actions he perceives to be hostile in a hostile manner. […] Thus, 
preferences do not only depend on material payoffs but also on intentions, i.e. on beliefs about 
why an agent has chosen a certain action” (Fehr and Schmidt, 2005). Strictly speaking, this 
definition refers to direct reciprocity, while indirect reciprocity means that a person is (un)kind 
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to another person because he expects that a third person is (un)kind to himself. Research has 
shown that much of subjects’ behavior in social dilemmas can best be described with the help 
of reciprocal preferences (see the Introductions of our papers), and for that reason we rely on a 
reciprocal theory in this dissertation to understand our experimental results. 
(Direct) reciprocity can either be modeled as being intrinsic or as arising indirectly from 
other preferences. The model of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) is an example of the indirect case, 
where reciprocal behavior stems from behaving according to inequity preferences. In a direct 
way, reciprocity is modeled by incorporating intentions into the utility functions: In that case, 
not only the outcome of a game becomes relevant, but also the beliefs on how these outcomes 
were achieved. Such games are called psychological games (Geanakoplos et al., 1989), and 
they add another layer of complexity to the analysis. Rabin (1993) developed a model of 
reciprocity where such intentions matter. DK and Falk and Fischbacher (2006) adapt Rabin’s 
model to extensive-form games, and among other models which intend to capture reciprocal 
behavior (Charness and Rabin, 2002, Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad, 2007, Levine, 1998, Segal 
and Sobel, 2007), these two are the most prominent ones. As Falk and Fischbacher (2006) 
capture both outcome concerns as well as intentional concerns, they need two parameters. In 
contrast, DK concentrate on purely reciprocal aspects and need only one parameter (if one 
abstracts from the fact that DK allow the modeling of the parameter co-player-dependent). This 
dissertation introduces two further parameters into the analysis (a belief bias parameter and a 
risk aversion parameter), and to not complicate the theory even further, we intend to capture 
social preferences with only one parameter. Accordingly, DK’s approach is used in this 
dissertation. 
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5 Remarks on the experiments 
All of our three papers have a joint experimental and theoretical basis: We always reproduce 
behavior in a well-known social dilemma in a control treatment and compare it to behavior in 
a second treatment, which modifies the standard game in order to gain insights about the 
motives which induce people’s decisions. Also for that purpose, subject’s beliefs are elicited.  
We find that in each experiment, behavior can be explained with the help of reciprocal 
motives, complemented by the insight that subjects’ beliefs are biased (in risky environments, 
risk aversion – of course – matters as well). Due to these homogeneous results, we can explain 
behavior in all three games in a very similar way. We have to make major adaptions to the 
model of DK because DK can neither explain UG results, nor PGG results, and they predict TG 
results only qualitatively. Interestingly, this is the case although reciprocal theories are the most 
powerful (and the most complex) models among the social preference models, and although 
experimental evidence is compelling that subjects’ decisions are indeed influenced by 
reciprocal motives. We propose different modifications in each paper: Some of them result from 
the desire to explain the results not only qualitatively but also quantitatively (e.g., normalization 
of the strategy space in the UG-paper), others are made to simplify (e.g., normalization in the 
PGG-paper) and to assure analytical solvability (e.g., squaring reciprocal utility in the UG-
paper). As well, some modifications are made to address questions which are relevant in one 
game, but play a minor role in other games (e.g., risk aversion in the TG vs. in the PGG). In 
Section 5.4, we present a summary of all modifications in this dissertation. This section also 
clarifies that the modifications of all three papers can be merged such that the results in all roles 
in all three games can be explained with the help of one theory. 
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5.1 Reciprocity in the Public Goods Game 
Jedermann hat die sittliche Pflicht, für das Wohl des Ganzen zu wirken. 
Preamble of the Constitution of the Free and 
Hanseatic City of Hamburg 
 
A good is defined as public if it “can be consumed by every group member regardless of the 
member’s contribution to the good” (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). A player who contributes to 
a public good cooperates because he “increases the sum of all payoffs” (MacCrimmon and 
Messick, 1976). In contrast, competitive players would maximize comparative payoffs, 
meaning that the difference between payoffs is maximized. A homo economicus would always 
free ride on the contributions of others and would never cooperate. Therefore, public goods 
have difficulty to be provided or not to be depleted. Thereby, they build the contrary pole to 
goods traded on markets, which are provided in an efficient manner. Dietz et al. (2003) mention 
the public good example that “the global ocean has lost more than 90 % of large predatory 
fishes, with an 80 % decline typically occurring within 15 years of industrialized exploitation” 
(p. 1907). The PGG is the canonical representation of such situations, where selfish-interest is 
not in line with collective-interest, and can therefore be used to study collective action 
problems. Such situations are all around us: Its scale ranges from two persons (a couple with a 
joint bank account) over small groups (working for the success of a team) and large groups 
(making people pay their taxes) to the whole of mankind (reducing ozone-depleting 
substances). 
Instead of endowing public goods with well-defined property rights such that they lose their 
public goods character, people are sometimes able to maintain informal institutions which are 
successfully able to govern the commons (Dietz et al., 2003). One aspect thereby is to appeal 
to the citizens to not deplete public resources, compare the Constitution of Hamburg. Finding 
mechanisms to solve the tragedy of the commons (Harding, 1968) substantially affects our way 
of life: Talhelm et al. (2014) argue that China has a more collectivistic culture than the West 
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because farming rice makes people more collectivistic than farming wheat: While wheat grows 
through rainfall and is less labor-intensive, rice farmers must commonly build irrigation 
systems and help each other to harvest, building out higher cooperative cultures.  
 
Typically, in the standard version of the PGG, subjects are initially willing to cooperate, but 
are not able to maintain high levels of cooperation. Our paper offers an explanation of why this 
is the case: We confirm that people want to cooperate, but only with a self-centered bias and 
only if others cooperate as well. As people’s overoptimistic beliefs in the cooperating behavior 
of others can compensate the self-centered bias to some degree, high contributions can initially 
be established. Learning that their beliefs have been biased, subjects reduce their contributions, 
and cooperation breaks down. 
5.2 Reciprocity in the Trust Game 
A definition of trust was given by Coleman (1990): “An individual trusts if she voluntarily 
places resources at the disposal of another party without any legal commitment from the latter. 
In addition, the act of trust is associated with an expectation that the act will pay off in terms of 
the investor’s goals. In particular, if the trustee is trustworthy the investor is better off than if 
trust were not placed, whereas if the trustee is not trustworthy the investor is worse off than if 
trust were not placed” (compare Fehr, 2009). The TG exactly captures this situation, where the 
receiver has no obligation to return money to the sender. As no contract is complete and fully 
enforceable in the “real world”, peoples’ ability to establish trusting relationships is essential 
for our welfare: La Porta et al. (1997) show that country measures of trust are favorably 
correlated with economic measures, such as GDP growth, inflation, or anticorruption (further 
studies with similar results are summarized in Nannestad, 2008, p. 429). 
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Thinking in the neoclassical framework, “to trust” means “to place a bet”. In that sense, 
Coleman (1990) specifies his definition of trust by arguing that rational (risk-neutral) players 
must “decide between not placing trust, in which case there is no change in his utility, and 
placing trust, in which case the expected utility relative to his current status is the potential 
[material] gain times the chance of gain minus the potential [material] loss times the chance of 
loss” (p. 99). However, assuming equivalently rational behavior on the receiver’s part, receivers 
would never turn out to be trustworthy, because there is no material gain from returning. Social 
preferences drive receiver behavior, and accordingly, the question follows as to how these 
social preferences shape the sender’s decision. This is also an empirically relevant question, as 
the success of economic interactions may depend on the degree to which an interaction is 
(framed as) a social one. For example, one might expect that people prefer to lend their money 
to friends and to relatives instead of lending it via financial institutions, because this saves 
transaction costs and reduces informational asymmetries. Instead, between 30 % (“30 % der 
Deutschen verleihen grundsätzlich kein Geld”, 2009) and 57 % (“Hört bei Geld die 
Freundschaft auf?”, 2012) of all people do not privately lend money at all, not even to friends. 
Researchers have introduced the expression “betrayal aversion” to indicate that subjects might 
rather prefer “gambling” to “trusting”. Understanding betrayal aversion is an important 
component of understanding economic exchange. Such an understanding can also be used to 
build well-functioning institutions: Institutions should offer the option to avoid knowing painful 
details of failed economic exchange (Aimone and Houser, 2013). Recent research also uses 
neuroscientific approaches to differentiate between gambling and trusting: There is evidence 
that risky decisions are processed differently in the human brain than trusting decisions 
(Aimone, Houser, and Weber, 2014). 
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In our TG-paper, we measure the effect of social preferences in the sender role if one controls 
for subjects’ beliefs and risk aversion. While our “social treatment” is identical to the standard 
version of the TG, subjects place a bet in our “non-social treatment”. A crucial point for the 
comparison of both treatments is that the probability distribution of receiver behavior is equal 
to winning chances in the lottery. In our design, we find no large behavioral differences between 
both treatments: Our results, if at all, contradict the idea of betrayal aversion. We model TG-
behavior with the help of our reciprocal theory and indeed find that reciprocal and selfish 
preferences lead to similar behavior in the sender role: Trust if you believe that trust is 
reciprocated, and do not trust if you do not. However, as an additional unit of successfully 
exchanged money does not necessarily add the same quantity of utility to the material utility 
account and the reciprocal utility account, small differences between selfish and reciprocal 
behavior can exist. Especially, the distribution of receiver types can matter, opening up the 
possibility to explain situation-depending occurrence of betrayal aversion. 
As in the two other papers, we find that beliefs about the behavior of co-players are 
significantly biased. Having a reciprocally-oriented pool of receivers is not sufficient to 
generate distinct proportions of trusting behavior. Additionally, senders must overestimate the 
receivers’ trustworthiness. As stated in Section 1, this makes the foundations of trust much more 
fragile than assuming correct beliefs, because wrong beliefs are somehow framed. Having this 
result in mind, disruptive developments in the economy may be easier to understand than 
assuming players with perfect foresight.  
5.3 Reciprocity in the Ultimatum Game 
According to Samuelson (1996), the fundamental economic problem is how to divide a 
surplus. Assume that the surplus can only be consumed if the players are able to agree on how 
to divide the cake. In the UG, the simplest possible form of negotiation is implemented: There 
are only two players, and player one makes a proposal which player two accepts or rejects. In 
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that sense, the UG displays situations where the division of welfare gains is not guided via 
market mechanisms but via social interaction, and, interestingly, standard economics “has 
virtually nothing to say about such situations” (Samuelson, 1996, p. 19). Nevertheless, non-
market situations can be observed in the economy all the time: For example, parties in integrated 
supply chains may not easily have the possibility to exchange the business partner, but must 
achieve agreement over the division of payoffs from efficiency gains via negotiation. In such 
situations, the threat of punishment becomes relevant: If people feel they are being treated in 
an unfair way, they often punish their counterpart, even if this is associated with own costs: 
Taking revenge can be observed in all kind of human institutions, from workers who sabotage, 
to countries which impose sanctions on each other. 
Our paper finds that punishing is a different character trait than rewarding (compare also 
Dohmen et al., 2009). This aspect has not been incorporated in models of reciprocal behavior 
so far, and it is also an open question why such “inconsistent” behavior can be observed. We 
show how punishing behavior can be modeled in a reciprocal way, and we outline some 
systematic differences between punishment and reward (men punish, while women reward; 
altruists reward, but do not punish). Again, both our experimental insights as well as our 
modeling approach show how important subjects’ beliefs are in understanding punishing 
behavior. First, beliefs determine which behavior is seen as kind and which as unkind: If 
responders believe that proposers believe that responders do not accept unfair offers, offering 
low proportions is even more unkind than if unfair offers are believed to be accepted. Second, 
we again find that beliefs are systematically biased, which can explain why so many proposers 
offer the equal split. 
5.4 An Integrated View of All Three Experiments 
In this section, we summarize the modifications which are made to the original DK-model 
in our three papers, and we explain how these modifications correspond to each other. A good 
30 
 
theory should be as simple as possible, as precise as possible, and as broad as possible. 
Obviously, trade-offs limit the achievability of these three goals. Our focal point is to describe 
observed behavior precisely, which comes with costs, at least in the domain of simplicity: We 
use an intention-based model instead of an outcome-based one, although this increases 
complexity. Furthermore, we assume uncertainty instead of certainty, and model biased beliefs. 
Third, we introduce curved utility functions to prevent corner solutions, which DK refrain from 
for the sake of simplicity. In turn, we get precise descriptions of observed behavior.  
DK define their model very broadly (with respect, for example, to the determination of 
reference points). This allows us to apply their model to virtually every game-theoretic 
situation. Thereby, they are aware that they will not make precise predictions in each case. In 
contrast, paying the tribute to the broadness of our model implications, we make game-specific 
assumptions. We do not unify all modifications over the three papers, because we want to make 
as little modifications to the original DK-model in each of the papers as possible. As each game 
has its specific modeling difficulties, game-specific modifications arise. Nevertheless, as 
Croson and Gächter (2010) consider it as one out of 10 “commandments” not to “develop 
models in vain – no one needs a new model for every experimental or observational result” (p. 
129), we show in the following that – accepting disadvantages at the domains of simplicity and 
preciseness – our experimental results can be explained in a unified way. Before, we summarize 
our modifications in Table 1. 
<<<Insert Table 1 about here >>> 
As just mentioned, we assume uncertainty instead of certainty, which induces several 
subsequent modifications (1.): First of all, utility maximization under uncertainty must be 
defined (1.1). We apply standard economics and assume that expected utility is maximized. 
Thereby, the only parameter which is uncertain is the reciprocity parameter of the co-player(s). 
With uncertainty, it is important to specify the curvature of the material payoff utility 
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component, because this curvature defines how players value risk (1.2). While the curvature is 
typically be assumed to be linear under certainty (because stakes which can be earned in the lab 
are small), we again apply standard economics in the TG-paper and assume constant relative 
risk aversion. Not knowing with which type of co-player one is matched also implies that 
kindness cannot be made dependent on the co-player’s personality (1.3), and, more importantly, 
that one’s reciprocal intentions cannot depend on the co-player’s reaction (1.4). In contrast, 
under certainty, it is consistent that DK assume that one takes the co-player’s reaction into 
account to determine one’s own kindness (because one can foresee this reaction). While this 
point need not be addressed in the PGG-paper (because kindness does not depend on the 
behavior of the co-player) and in the TG-paper (because it is not qualitatively relevant), it does 
become relevant in the UG-paper, where we assume that kindness is determined by using one’s 
belief about the average expected behavior of co-players. 
 
As well, modifications are made with respect to the determination of kindness (2.). 
Importantly, we ask where to set the reference point to separate kindness from unkindness (2.1), 
and we find that the suggestion of DK – simply use the average between the kindest and the 
unkindest efficient strategy – is not always applicable. We adopt the DK approach in the UG-
paper, but choose different reference points in the two other papers. Using game-dependent 
reference points reveals that research has not been able to determine generally valid reference 
points so far. Actually, we are not aware of any research on that question at all. The reference 
points chosen in our papers can be justified by the experimental results: Using different ones, 
theory and observation could no longer be reconciled. Unfortunately, our experimental data are 
not helpful in detecting the underlying causes of how to choose reference points. Different 
explanations are possible, which however partly contradict each other: One could argue that 
people consider it to be kind (unkind) if behavior of others in the game leads to positive 
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(negative) payoffs. In that sense, the “status quo” would determine the reference point, meaning 
that contributing in the PGG and sending money / returning more money than what one has 
received is kind in the TG. However, agreeing on an unfair division should then be seen as kind 
as well, which is contradicted by our finding in the UG-paper that unfair divisions are shrunk. 
In turn, one may assume that it is kind (unkind) if a player i’s strategy grants higher (lower) 
payoffs to a co-player j than the strategy which maximizes i’s material utility component given 
j’s expected reaction. In that way, selfish behavior can justify the reference points in the PGG 
and to some degree in the UG, but this definition comes with an interesting implication in the 
TG: Assume that senders believe that sending money is believed to result in a payoff loss (our 
data reveal that such a belief is not common). In that case, keeping the money as a sender would 
be selfish, and sending money would be kind. Such kindness would be reciprocated by 
receivers, meaning that sending money becomes a profitable strategy, which would also be 
pursued by selfish senders. In that case, sending money would no longer be kind. As selfish 
strategies would not be reciprocated by receivers, sending money would result in payoff losses 
again. Thus, no equilibrium behavior could be derived among reciprocal players. This 
consideration explains that Camerer (2003) robustly finds that “the return to trust is around 
zero”: If this were not the case, trust would no longer be trust. We summarize as follows: As it 
was not possible so far to find a simple, precise, and coherent definition of reference points 
across different games, more research is needed to solve this problem. 
 
In the PGG-paper, we normalize kindness with respect to the marginal per capita return 
(MPCR) and the group size. In the UG-paper, we normalize it with respect to the strategy space. 
In the former case, this is simply done to standardize the reciprocity parameter. In the latter 
case, such “fine-tuning” allows the capturing of full shrinking of close to zero offers (compare 
Section 5 in the UG-paper). This standardization has also been applied in Rabin (1993), which 
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is the basis for the DK-paper. However, the question of whether kindness somehow has to be 
normalized does not affect the qualitative predictions of our model. 
 
Third, we make important modifications with respect to belief formation (3.). In contrast to 
DK, we assume that beliefs can be wrong. We assume a systematic bias (3.1), meaning that 
players overestimate the reciprocal inclination of co-players. This systematic bias is modeled 
disproportionally in the PGG-paper, meaning that the degree of overoptimism depends on the 
actual kindness of the co-players. Simpler, overoptimism is assumed to be proportional to actual 
kindness in the TG. In the UG, the bias is only identified, and not modeled. 
As well, we allow for unsystematic errors (3.2), which are found to be shaped by the false 
consensus effect (Ross, Greene, and House, 1977). By eliciting actual beliefs instead of 
assuming modeled equilibrium-beliefs, behavior can be predicted much more precisely. In the 
TG-paper, these actual beliefs are used to determine subject-dependent overoptimism biases.  
 
Last, we make changes to the form of the reciprocal utility function (4.). DK multiply the 
players’ kindnesses (denoted as k, respectively their unkindness u, respectively their neutrality 
n). For example, player one being kind and player two being unkind results in the k/u-outcome 
with a reciprocal utility of u∙k. In the DK model, reciprocal utility is maximal if agents respond 
to the others’ (un)kindness with the most extreme reciprocal reaction possible. We prevent 
corner solutions in the PGG-paper and in the TG-paper by curving utility with the help of the 
root function, which is proposed by DK themselves (4.1). In the UG-paper, we deviate from 
this solution due to mathematical convenience. More importantly, the UG reveals that the 
preference order implied by DK’s assumption of multiplying kindnesses is implausible (4.2): 
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u/u-outcomes should not be preferred to n/(∙) ones. Again, this problem primarily concerns the 
UG, and we will show that it is solved by assuming gradual reciprocation. 
 
Table 1 shows that all game properties create their own modeling difficulties, but it also 
makes clear that all games can be explained in a unified way if one is willing to give up some 
accuracy which results from our game-specific modifications: Using the modifications which 
are printed in bold, all three games can be captured by a single set of modifications (abstracting 
from the issues we discussed above for modification 2.). These bold-printed modifications are 
explained in detail in the UG-paper. There, we also show that behavior in the TG can be 
explained with that set of assumptions (compare equations (11) and (12) in the UG-paper). To 
complete, we now show that behavior in the PGG can also qualitatively be explained by using 
these modifications. 
For illustrative purposes, we abstain from normalizing the reciprocal utility component in 
the following (modification 2.2). Accordingly, utility from playing the PGG is described by 
(compare Sections 2 in the UG- and in the PGG-papers) 
E(Ui) = E(Ui(πi )) − Yi ⋅ E ((𝜅𝑖𝑗 − 𝜆𝑖𝑗𝑖)
2
) 
     = 1 − (1 − MPCR)∙g
i
 + ∑ MPCR∙g
ij,o
J
j=1 − Yi ∙ E(∑ ((MPCR∙gi − grp) −
J
j=1
(MPCR∙g
ij,o
− g
rp
))
2
). (1) 
Thereby, grp denotes the contribution which defines the reference point. gi (gij,o) defines i 
contribution (i’s overoptimistic belief over j’s contribution). For simplicity reasons, assume in 
the following (as in the PGG-paper) that all other group members contribute the same amount. 
In that case, (1) simplifies to 
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Ui = 1 − (1 − MPCR)∙gi + J∙MPCR∙gij,o − Yi ∙ J ∙ (MPCR∙gi − MPCR∙gij,o)
2
. (2) 
Maximizing (2) over gi leads to  
1 − (1 − MPCR)∙g
i
− 2 ∙ Yi ∙ J ∙ (MPCR∙gi − MPCR∙gij,o) ∙ MPCR = 0  (3) 
⇒ g
i
 = {
                      0,                      if Yi = 0,
max {0; g
ij,o
−
1−MPCR
J ∙ Yi ∙ 2 ∙ MPCR
2} , if Yi > 0.
 (4) 
This captures behavior observed in PGGs: Selfish subjects do not contribute, while 
reciprocal subjects want to contribute like the others, but with a “self-serving” bias. Importantly, 
as Ui does not depend on grp in equation (2), the question of where to locate the reference point 
is irrelevant in the PGG. 
In sum, this dissertation shows that it is worth expanding the homo economicus model to a 
reciprocal believers model. This allows an understanding of the behavior observed in prominent 
social dilemmas much better than was previously the case. At the same time, new questions 
arise: How have such biased beliefs and reciprocal preferences emerged and how can they be 
influenced? What are the consequences for institutional designs and why is observed behavior 
not stable across games? These are interesting questions, which are worthy of future research.  
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Abstract: We explain contributions in public goods games with the help of the reciprocity 
model of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) by applying some plausible modifications: Most 
importantly, we assume that subjects overestimate the kindness of their group members. In 
combination with the finding that subjects are typically imperfect conditional cooperators, 
equilibrium contributions to public goods can be derived. We test our model experimentally 
and find robust evidence for our modifications: In the experiment, we directly link reciprocal 
preferences elicited in contribution schedules to beliefs and show that behavior is indeed 
primarily driven by reciprocity and overoptimism. Although we find distinctly heterogeneous 
behavior on the subject level, our model can predict such behavior if subjects’ reciprocal 
inclinations are known. Thereby, the false consensus effect additionally fosters cooperation 
because it lets conditional cooperators overestimate the level of reciprocity in the subject pool. 
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1 Introduction 
Why do people cooperate in public goods dilemmas? In recent years, researchers have made 
progress in explaining such behavior by assuming that subjects have social preferences. But 
how exactly do preference functions look like which describe behavior in public goods games 
(henceforth PGGs)? We shed light on these questions by using the reciprocal utility model of 
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004, henceforth DK) which we combine with the assumption 
that subjects’ beliefs have an overoptimistic bias. 
What do we know about subject behavior in PGGs? The most important stylized facts 
stemming from extensive research can be summarized as follows (compare Chaudhuri 2011 or 
Holt and Laury 2008 for reviews): 
1. Average contributions start at around 50 % of the social optimum and decline steadily 
with repetition. 
2. There are distinct types of players who differ in their social preferences and/or beliefs 
about their peers. Accordingly, individual contributions range from 0 % to 100 %. Many 
participants are conditional cooperators, who only want to contribute if the others 
contribute as well. 
3. Higher marginal per capita returns (henceforth MPCRs) from the public good lead to 
higher contribution levels.  
4. Increased group size leads to higher contribution levels, at least for low MPCRs and 
low-to-moderate group sizes. 
5. A surprise restart of the game at the end of a session induces an increase in contributions, 
known as the “restart effect”. Contributions thereby do not reach the initial levels. 
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While fact 1. and 3. to 5. refer to aggregated behavior, fact 2. can only be understood with 
the help of a theory which addresses the individual level. Applying such a theory, we are able 
to explain individual contributions. Other researchers have also tried to do this (Ambrus and 
Pathak 2011; Arifovic and Ledyard 2012; Chaudhuri 2011; Dijkstra 2012; Klumpp 2012; 
Ledyard 1995), but even those models which have been solely designed to explain behavior in 
PGGs cannot explain all the empirical findings mentioned above. Why are explanations so 
difficult? The standard assumption of selfish behavior obviously falls short because it predicts 
free riding for all subjects. Theories of learning, which may explain decreasing contributions, 
have trouble with the fact that there is also cooperation among experienced subjects and 
“unconfused” subjects. The assumption that people have social preferences cannot adequately 
account for declining contributions. Attempts have been made to explain contributions with the 
help of signaling strategies, but such models ignore the fact that there is also significant 
contribution in the strangers setting, where  in contrast to the partners setting  no signaling is 
possible, because subjects interact with the same partner only once. Based on recent findings 
that most subjects are conditional cooperators, reciprocal theories seem to be promising for 
solving the puzzle: Subjects contribute because others do so as well. However, more precisely, 
the experimental finding is that most conditional cooperation is imperfect, meaning that 
subjects try to cooperate less than others do (see, for example, Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr 
2001; Herrmann and Thöni 2009). As it is of course impossible for everybody to contribute less 
than the others, the only equilibrium strategy is to contribute nothing. It is this mechanism 
which results in an equilibrium of zero contributions in the reciprocity model of Falk and 
Fischbacher (2006). 
In this paper, we suspect that overoptimism, which is a commonly known bias in human 
reasoning, is essential for understanding contributions to public goods. Chaudhuri (2011) 
formulates this idea as follows: “Conditional cooperators with [we add: over]optimistic beliefs 
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regarding the contributions to be made by their peers will contribute to the public account.” 
Such overoptimism has already been found in PGGs: Andreoni’s conclusion that the decline of 
cooperation in his experiment is “due to frustrated attempts at kindness” (Andreoni 1995) 
implies that subjects are overoptimistic at the beginning of a game. Furthermore, overoptimism 
is reported in Croson (2007) for some subjects in the first game (albeit for zero subjects in the 
second one), in Neugebauer et al. (2009), in Fischbacher and Gächter (2010, henceforth FG), 
and in Ambrus and Pathak (2011) (compare their Table 4 on page 508). While all of these 
papers mention overoptimism, none of them incorporate it into a model. We do so and thereby 
pursue an argumentation similar to that of Orbell and Dawes (1991): Cooperators may establish 
high levels of cooperation simply by believing that others are cooperators as well, which can 
be evolutionary advantageous in certain circumstances. We test our theory by reducing the FG-
design of the PGG by one parameter: FG elicit conditional contribution preferences in so-called 
contribution schedules and compare these preferences with actual contributions and beliefs in 
the PGG. As the contribution schedule already links beliefs to contributions, requesting both of 
these parameters in the PGG results in “too much” data: Either many subjects answer 
inconsistently or they consider unknown – and therefore uncontrolled – aspects in their 
contribution decision. For example, subjects might intend to signal cooperativeness in the first 
rounds to induce higher conditional contributions of co-players in later rounds. We reduce such 
noise in our one-parameter design: In our PGG, subjects cannot contribute directly. Instead, 
they are only asked for their beliefs about the contributions of their co-players. Knowing these 
beliefs, and knowing the contribution schedule, we can compute preferred contributions 
directly. Due to the mechanism of imperfect conditional cooperation, contributions that are 
different from zero are inevitably linked to overoptimistic beliefs in this design. 
The contribution of this paper is threefold: Firstly, we propose a model which explains 
individual behavior in PGGs. Our model is based on that of DK, but extends their approach by 
allowing for overoptimistic, boundedly rational behavior. Secondly, we experimentally 
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demonstrate that our model does capture the relevant determinants of subject behavior. Thirdly, 
using our model to predict actual behavior, we find that predictions are precise for most 
subjects, and we explain why they are imprecise for some subjects. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we present our model and 
formulate hypotheses. In Section 3, we explain our experimental design in more detail. Section 
4 presents the experimental results and tests our hypotheses. In Section 5, we report how well 
our model can predict individual contributions. Section 6 concludes.  
2 The Model 
2.1 The Dufwenberg/Kirchsteiger Model 
The DK theory of sequential reciprocity assumes that people want to reciprocate kindness 
with kindness. Applying their model to a linear PGG, a player’s utility function is as follows: 
Ui = 1 − (1 − MPCR) ∙ gi + MPCR ∙ ∑ gij
J
j=1 +∑ Yij ∙ [MPCR∙(gi − 0.5)] ⋅ [MPCR ∙ (gij −
J
j=1
0.5)] . (1) 
DK assume that i’s utility function consists of two terms, weighted against each other with 
exogenously given non-negative reciprocity parameters Yij. If i is a free rider (Yij = 0 ∀ j), utility 
is equal to the monetary payoff (which we normalize to 100 % of the initial endowment). The 
monetary payoff is calculated given that own contributions to the public good have a negative 
yield of 1 – MPCR, whereas each of the J co-players’ contributions yield the MPCR to player 
i. Thereby, gi (gij) describes the percentage of the endowment that i is contributing (that i 
believes j will contribute). Free riders want others to contribute, but will not contribute 
themselves. In contrast, a reciprocal subject will contribute if Yij is sufficiently high and if he 
believes that gij > 0.5: Such co-players’ contributions are considered to be kind, because they 
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are higher than the reference point of 0.5, and will therefore be reciprocated: Being kind 
yourself then pays off in the form of reciprocal utility. In this case, reciprocal players will 
contribute their whole endowment. In turn, with gij ≤ 0.5, i will never invest into the public 
good. However, these predictions only qualitatively mirror behavior that is typically observed 
in the lab: Subjects contribute significant amounts if the contributions of the others are below 
50 %, and they typically do not contribute their whole endowment even when their beliefs are 
above that threshold.  
More importantly, DK assume that players’ beliefs are correct. However, this assumption 
does not fit the experimental finding that contributions are positive and that subjects only want 
to contribute a fraction of the others’ contributions (Fischbacher et al. 2001): In equilibrium, 
players cannot contribute less than the others. To be able to predict positive contributions, we 
make the following modifications to the DK model, whereby the model does not lose its 
predictive power for games other than PGGs. In contrast, for example, behavior in trust games 
can also be predicted more precisely if our modifications are used (Breuer and Hüwe 2014). 
2.2 Modifications 
1. To simplify, we model the reciprocity parameter Yij to be independent of j: Subjects in 
the lab play anonymously and have no possibility to condition their strategies on 
individual group members. 
2. To determine kindness, we use a different reference point than DK do, who themselves 
admit that their reference point was chosen without deep justification. DK measure the 
kindness of i to j by comparing j's material payoff with the average of the highest and 
the lowest material payoff that i can grant to j. Instead, our reference point relies on the 
status quo: We consider it to be kind if a co-player is made better off compared to his 
situation before the game starts. Accordingly, the reference strategy is to contribute 
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nothing, meaning that a small contribution is already regarded as (slightly) friendly. 
This is a plausible assumption, as each contribution is costly and comes with the risk of 
being exploited. Therefore, the kindness of i to a co-player j is κij = MPCR ∙ gi, and 
unkindness need not be considered in the following. 
3. Most importantly, we assume that players are overoptimistically biased. We suggest 
formally considering overoptimism by adding a factor ε, resulting in biased beliefs 
about j’s kindness. Accordingly, i’s belief about j’s contribution, gij, is no longer equal 
to j’s actual contribution, gj, We differentiate between the correct belief about j’s 
contribution, gij,c, and the overoptimistic one, gij,o (furthermore, i’s belief about j’s 
overoptimistic belief about k’s contribution is denoted as gijk,o), and we model gij,o as 
g
ij,o
 = g
ij,c
+ (1 −  g
ij,c
) ∙ ε = g
j
+ (1 − g
j
) ∙ ε, (2) 
with 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1. We formulate (2) such that ε increases g
ij,c
 dependent on the latter’s 
distance to the maximal possible contribution. This implies that overoptimism 
diminishes when contributions are already high, and it prevents beliefs from being larger 
than the maximal possible contribution. We model ε as identical for all subjects, which 
simplifies the formal analysis significantly. Assuming different degrees of 
overoptimism for different players would be a natural generalization of our approach. 
4. Whereas kindness has been linear in gi so far, we will assume in the following that it is 
concave. As suggested in DK, p. 291, the square root will therefore be used. Thus, i’s 
utility function now has the following form: 
Ui = 1 − (1 − MPCR) ∙ gi + ∑ MPCR ∙ gij,o+Yi ∙ ∑ √MPCR ∙ gi ⋅ 
J
j=1
J
j=1
√MPCR ∙ gij,o. (3) 
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5. While DK assume that the reciprocity parameters of co-players and their strategies are 
known, subjects typically remain anonymous in experiments. Therefore, i has to 
estimate gij,o. To keep the model simple, we only consider the average of co-players’ 
contributions to be relevant for i’s utility, 
Ui = 1 − (1 − MPCR) ∙ gi + J ∙ MPCR ∙ gij,o+Yi ∙ J ∙ √MPCR ∙ gi ∙ √MPCR ∙ gij,o, (4) 
whereas g
ij,o
 represents the overoptimistically expected average contribution level in the 
subject pool. This can be justified by assuming that all co-players contribute equally. 
More complexly, one might assume that subjects estimate a probability distribution of 
contributions within the subject pool, and that they maximize their expected utility. We 
show such an approach in Appendix A (appendices in this paper are available from the 
authors upon request), but will not apply it to our experimental data for simplicity 
reasons. 
6. Believing in only one (average) co-player type, maximizing (4) over gi results in (see 
Appendix B) 
g
i
 = (
J ∙ Yi ∙ MPCR
2 ∙ (1−MPCR)
)
2
∙ g
ij,o
. (5) 
Equation (5) implies that i c.p. contributes more in settings with higher MPCRs and 
more group members, which is typically the case (compare stylized facts 3. and 4.). As 
we vary none of these parameters, we simplify equation (5) by defining 
Ŷi ≔(
J ∙ Yi ∙ MPCR
2 ∙ (1−MPCR)
)
2
: 
g
i
 = Ŷi ∙ gij,o. (6) 
Ŷi will also indicate i’s reciprocity parameter in the following, because it is simply 
an MPCR- and J-dependent transformation of Yi. Equation (6) states that subjects want 
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to contribute a constant proportion of the believed overall contribution level. This 
coincides with the experimental results reported in the literature (FG; Fischbacher et al. 
2001; Fischbacher et al. 2012; Neugebauer et al. 2009), and with our own findings, see 
Section 4.2. To be more precise: It is found that people want to contribute with a selfish 
bias, meaning that Ŷi ≤ 1. Furthermore, Ŷi ≥ 0, because contributions cannot become 
negative. Subjects with Ŷi = 0 are free riders, whereas subjects with Ŷi = 1 are perfect 
conditional cooperators. Subjects in-between are imperfect conditional cooperators. 
2.3 Deriving Equilibrium Contributions 
Our equilibrium definition relies on Aumann (1987), who defines behavior as being in 
equilibrium if each player maximizes his expected utility, given his information. This does not 
necessarily imply that this information is correct, which allows the derivation of 
overoptimistically biased equilibria. In turn, in the following, we will refer to equilibria where 
players’ beliefs are correct as unbiased equilibria. In the biased case, the following is assumed 
to be known: First, players are optimists, compare equation (2). Second, as players have 
reciprocal preferences, utility-maximizing behavior is given by equation (6). Combining these 
two equations, a biased equilibrium can be found where overoptimism and imperfect 
conditional cooperation balance each other out. Note that we use the variable Ŷij  in the 
following to denote i’s belief about j’s reciprocity parameter. The index specifies that the 
variable refers to i’s belief, and does not, unlike DK do, define i’s co-player-dependent 
reciprocity parameter towards j. 
g
ij,o
 = g
ij,c
+ (1 − g
ij,c
)  ∙ ε = Ŷij ∙ gijk,o + (1 − Ŷij ∙ gijk,o)  ∙ ε = Ŷij ∙ gij,o + ε − Ŷij ∙ gij,o ∙ ε 
⇔ g
ij,o
 = 
ε
1−(1−ε) ∙ Ŷij
, (7) 
g
i
 = Ŷi ⋅ 
ε
1−(1−ε) ∙ Ŷij
. (8) 
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Equation (7) denotes i’s belief with respect to the contribution level of the group. All players 
have identical beliefs, which follows from the fact that all players have identical information. 
The higher the overoptimism parameter ε and the higher i’s belief with respect to the reciprocity 
parameter of j, Ŷij , the higher the perceived contribution level of co-players is. Subjects 
reciprocate this level dependent on their own reciprocity parameter Ŷi, compare equation (8). 
With ε = 0, our model collapses into the unbiased equilibrium of contributing nothing. We now 
want to comment on the properties of our model. 
First, it is essential that, according to equation (2), players overestimate contributions, not 
reciprocity, and that this is done in a disproportional way. In contrast, as Ŷi  and gij  are 
multiplied in equation (6), assuming the belief bias to be proportional to g
ij
 would have the 
same effect as overestimating Ŷj. However, only overestimating Ŷj does not lead to positive 
contributions as long as Ŷj  is believed to be smaller than one. We therefore assume that 
contributions are overestimated disproportionally. Overestimating contributions instead of 
overestimating reciprocity also implies that too high contributions can be observed even when 
players know the reciprocal inclination of their co-players. That is what is tested in Wolff 
(2013): His experimental design makes public the unbiased equilibrium, which results from the 
contribution schedules. Still, players believe that co-players will contribute more than is 
preferable according to the latter’s conditional contribution preferences. This overoptimistic 
bias appears although subjects themselves play a best response to their beliefs. Wolff (2013) 
emphasizes that subjects even believe those co-players will contribute who are, according to 
their elicited preferences, free riders. This also follows from our model, which can be seen by 
setting Ŷij = 0 in equation (7). 
Second, as subjects’ beliefs are wrong, our model necessarily comes with inconsistencies. 
This shortcoming must inevitably be accepted if one models equilibria in boundedly rational 
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models, compare, e.g., Eyster and Rabin (2005), who discuss inconsistencies in their “cursed 
equilibrium” model. In our case, players assume that everybody shares the same belief with 
respect to the contribution level (g
ijk,o
 = g
ij,o
), but simultaneously know that players want to 
contribute less than the others. In other words, players “hope” that co-players will contribute 
more than is optimal, but “know” that this will not be the case. This inconsistency appears in 
the first-order belief as well as in all higher-order beliefs. For example, i knows that j hopes that 
i will contribute too much, but knows that this will not be true. As mentioned above, the results 
of Wolff (2013) show that this logic does reflect how people think in PGGs. 
Third, as in Eyster and Rabin (2005), we justify our approach by arguing that players do “not 
(fully) think through the logic” of the model. Alternatively, our model may be seen as an “as-
if” model, which makes correct predictions, but captures human thinking in a conceived and 
therefore unrealistic way: For example, instead of assuming that players optimize but have 
biased beliefs, the same contributions as in our model can be derived by assuming that players 
have correct beliefs but somehow fail to optimize. As well, one may argue that players do not 
build higher-order beliefs in infinite depth. This opens room for proposing somehow unjustified 
but positive first- or second-order beliefs, inducing positive contributions: The findings of 
Nagel (1995) indicate that such considerations do play a role in human thinking. Arifovic and 
Ledyard (2012) and Dijkstra (2012) follow this path, which entails logical inconsistencies for 
sophisticated subjects as well. 
We claim that our model provides significant help for understanding the stylized facts. In 
contrast to Ambrus and Pathak (2011), who rely on signaling and therefore predict no 
contributions in the strangers setting, we can explain such contributions (our model is 
compatible with such strategic considerations, but must be extended in order to capture them). 
Our model also enables an explanation of both beliefs and contributions, even in the first round 
(in contrast to Dijkstra 2012, who assumes first beliefs to be given due to social norms or 
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introspection). Most importantly, we can make point predictions of individual behavior (in 
contrast to Arifovic and Ledyard 2012, who assume reactive learning by subjects based on a 
random “trial and error” process). Assuming a learning algorithm (compare Section 5.1), we 
can also explain typically decreasing contributions in repeated-round games. Summarizing, to 
our best knowledge, this is the first paper which reports the fit of individual point predictions 
to experimental data of PGGs. 
2.4 Hypotheses 
To prove our assumptions and to test the implications of our model, we formulate the 
following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Subjects are either (im)perfect conditional cooperators or free riders. 
Hypothesis 1 has already been supported by Fischbacher et al. (2001). Thus, we simply 
expect to replicate their findings. As Hypothesis 1 is essential to our model, we will nevertheless 
discuss our data with respect to this question. In a strict sense, Hypothesis 1 implies that nobody 
ever wants to contribute more than the others. We expect that this will not hold perfectly true. 
We will refer to contributions which exceed the believed average contribution level as hyper-
conditional contributions, and we are well aware of the fact that they justify unbiased 
contribution equilibria above zero. We will address this point with Hypothesis 4. 
Hypothesis 2: Subjects correctly predict the average reciprocal inclination of co-players. 
According to equation (8), i’s belief about average reciprocity in the subject pool determines 
his decision. In this context, we test whether Ŷij is built correctly or whether it is biased as well. 
Hypothesis 3: Subjects are overoptimistic with respect to co-players’ contributions. This is 
true even when subjects are not participating in the game.  
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Our second essential assumption is that subjects estimate in a systematically biased way. We 
will be able to measure overoptimism directly by comparing the beliefs of the participating 
subjects with the true contribution levels. Nevertheless, we introduce a robustness check for 
overoptimism in our experiment: We use a control treatment, where subjects take an outsider 
position and only estimate the others’ contributions without themselves having a stake in the 
game. In contrast to the so-called “participants”, one can be confident that these “estimators” 
are unaffected by any strategic considerations.  
Hypothesis 4: Subjects will contribute more than predicted by the unbiased equilibrium. 
Our modeling implies that any contribution is due to overoptimism. As already mentioned, 
some subjects may unconditionally (meaning: irrespective of beliefs) or hyper-conditionally 
contribute, justifying unbiased but positive equilibria. In that case, our overoptimism hypothesis 
will imply higher contribution levels than predicted with unbiased beliefs. Such a premium will 
be more meaningful in our one-parameter treatment (compare the introduction) than in the 
original FG-design because it can only be due to overoptimism. 
Hypothesis 5: Subjects will contribute in the one-parameter treatment to the same extent as 
in the original FG-design. 
Hypothesis 5 tests whether aspects other than overoptimism and reciprocity must be 
considered to explain contributions. Our model captures these two parameters only, and if we 
find no differences between the two treatments, we can conclude that these two parameters are 
the key determinants of PGG behavior. 
3 Experimental Design 
To test the hypotheses and to prove the predictive power of the individual model predictions, 
we conducted a PGG, the design of which we will present in the following (more details, such 
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as the experimental instructions and several screenshots, are available in Appendix D). For the 
experiment, we used instructions and parts of the design of FG as far as these were published 
in their paper and in the corresponding web appendix, which ensures comparability. 
Accordingly, we conducted a standard PGG played over 10 rounds with MPCR = 0.4 and group 
size of four in the strangers setting (thus, contributions to the public good are multiplied by 1.6 
and distributed among the four group members equally). Subjects received an endowment of 
20 tokens per round, which was worth 80 euro-cents. As in FG, in each round, subjects had to 
estimate the others’ average contributions. They also had to fill in a contribution schedule 
before the game started, which served to measure subjects’ reciprocal preferences (compare 
Fischbacher et al. 2001, or Fischbacher, Gächter and Quercia 2012). The contribution schedule 
is based on the strategy method of Selten (1967), which enables – rather than measuring single 
contribution decisions – the revealing of subjects’ complete strategies: For all possible average 
contribution levels of co-players (rounded to integers), subjects have to state how much they 
are willing to contribute. In contrast to FG, after contribution schedules had been completed, 
subjects were assigned to three different treatments: In Treatment 1 (called “standard treatment” 
in the following) subjects were confronted with a standard PGG, like that in FG. In Treatment 
2 (the “belief treatment”), subjects did not have the possibility to decide on contributions during 
the game. Instead, contributions were directly computed from their belief regarding the average 
contribution level in the respective round and contribution preferences according to their 
contribution schedule. This novel design inextricably connects beliefs and contributions: If 
subjects had stated that they were imperfect conditional cooperators in their contribution 
schedules on average and believed in positive contributions on average (which we expected), 
then positive contributions had to be due to overoptimism. In Treatment 3, subjects did not 
participate in the game. Instead, their only task was to estimate the others’ contributions, either 
in the standard treatment or in the belief treatment. We will now justify Treatment 3 in more 
detail. 
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In all treatments, we decided to incentivize beliefs regarding the co-players contributions in 
a noticeable form because there is evidence that incentivizing beliefs in PGGs significantly 
increases their accuracy, compare Gächter and Renner (2010). In each round, subjects were 
compensated with 50 euro-cents for each correct estimation. The compensation was reduced by 
1 euro-cent for each percentage point (computed in relation to the solution space) of deviation 
from the correct value. For example, if the correct answer was 1 and a subject had estimated 3, 
payments were reduced by 10 euro-cents (the solution space was 0 to 20). Payments could not 
become negative. We chose such comparably high incentives to be sure that any overoptimism 
which might be found is in fact a robust bias. However, there is concern that incentivizing 
beliefs might somehow affect subjects’ decisions: Being incentivized, beliefs themselves 
become part of the payoff-relevant action space (Armantier and Treich 2013; Blanco et al. 2010; 
Gächter and Renner 2010). For example, risk-averse participants might hedge lower than 
expected contribution levels with lower than true beliefs. Thus, even if subjects state their 
correct beliefs, their true beliefs might be overoptimistic. We therefore introduced Treatment 
3, where estimators’ beliefs served as a neutral benchmark for participants’ beliefs. Since 
estimators were not engaged in the game, we consider their beliefs to be unbiased by any 
strategic considerations. As they did not receive endowments, we compensated them with an 
additional payment of 5 euros each. 
FG conducted a “P-experiment” to give subjects an incentive to indicate their true 
preferences in the contribution schedule. In our design, all subjects were informed prior to the 
contribution schedule stage that they would be randomly assigned to one of the 3 treatments 
and that in Treatment 2 their contribution schedule would predetermine their contribution 
behavior. Thus, all subjects had an incentive to fill out the schedule correctly, because the 
schedule turned out to be irrelevant in Treatments 1 and 3, but was payoff-relevant in the case 
of a subject being assigned to Treatment 2. Proceeding as described, we did not ask for 
contribution preferences conditional on real contribution levels (unlike FG did) but on believed 
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ones. This procedure is incentive-compatible, and subjects should elicit their true preferences 
in the contribution schedule: The belief treatment restricts subjects’ strategy space, but, if the 
schedule is filled out truthfully, it only eliminates suboptimal strategies. For example, 
unconditional cooperators should enter the same number in each field of their contribution 
schedules, because this will result in constant contributions irrespective of their beliefs, which 
is exactly what unconditional cooperators want. Furthermore, as the belief elicitation was 
incentivized as well, it was optimal for subjects to state their true beliefs. 
There is much debate in the literature about the degree of confusion in PGGs. To test whether 
subjects had understood the incentive structure of the game, after explaining the PGG, we asked 
(due to time constraints) 6 out of 10 control questions presented in the appendix of FG. 
However, it might have been possible that subjects who had understood the incentives gave 
wrong answers because they miscalculated. Others with little understanding might have 
answered correctly. Thus, after contribution schedules had been completed, we asked subjects 
to explain their inputs in the contribution schedules in two or three sentences in written form. 
Afterwards, subjects had to estimate average values of the others’ contribution schedules. 
We incentivized these estimations, which we call the “belief schedule”, with up to 50 euro-
cents. This schedule thus directly asks for subjects’ beliefs about the average degree of 
reciprocity within the subject pool. 
Having completed the schedules, subjects were randomly assigned to their roles and the PGG 
started. In each round, estimators could see the history of their guesses and of the others’ 
average contributions. Participants could additionally see their own contributions, their money 
privately kept, and the repayments from the public good for all past rounds. Roles did not 
change between rounds, but group members did change within the two participant pools, and 
subjects were repeatedly made aware of that fact. We conducted four sessions with 30 or 29 
subjects each. 44 subjects were pooled to play the standard treatment and 48 played the belief 
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treatment; 13 subjects served as estimators in the standard treatment, and 14 estimators were 
assigned to the belief treatment, meaning that one to two estimators were assigned to each group 
of participants. All experiments were computerized, using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 
2007). The experiments were conducted in the Laboratory for Experimental Economics at 
RWTH Aachen University in August 2012 and March 2013. Participants were – apart from a 
few exceptions – students from various disciplines, with the majority studying business 
administration or business administration with engineering. 
4 Experimental Results 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
We start with descriptive statistics. Table 1 shows average parameter values and gives an 
overview of how the model variables translate into the experimental parameters. Fig. 1 displays 
average entries in the contribution schedules and in the belief schedules.  
<< Insert Fig. 1 and Table 1 about here >> 
The “contribution lines” in Fig. 1 show how much subjects are, on average, willing to invest 
into the public good, depending on the estimated average contribution of the co-players. We 
present average contributions both for all subjects and without “other” subjects (see below): 
Omitting the “other” subjects makes the contribution line steeper and displays much fewer 
hyper-conditional contributions at low contribution levels. The contribution lines are similar to 
those of Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Fischbacher et al. (2012), although their contribution 
schedules are dependent on actual average contributions, while ours are dependent on believed 
ones. We conclude that our method does not distort the results. Especially, on the individual 
level, we do not find serrated schedules. With such schedules, subjects could to some degree 
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undermine our one-parameter design and keep some control over their contributions, because 
in serrated schedules, different contribution levels are assigned to very similar beliefs. 
The “belief line” in Fig. 1 shows how much all subjects believe that others want to contribute 
(always on average), again depending on the estimated contribution level of the co-players. 
Qualitatively, it looks very similar to the contribution line. We will discuss this in more detail 
when testing Hypothesis 2. 
Figures 2A and 2B display average results of the PGG from rounds 1 to 10. They show 
contribution levels and beliefs of estimators and participants in the standard treatment (Fig. 2A) 
and in the belief treatment (Fig. 2B). 
<< Insert Fig. 2A and 2B about here >> 
Both figures replicate the typical behavior of subjects in PGGs: Average contributions start 
at around 50 % of the endowment and decline with repetition (although the decline is less 
pronounced than typically reported in the literature). At a first glance, behavior in both 
treatments seems to be very similar. Also note that the presentation of average behavior hides 
the large amount of disparity which can be observed between different subjects, groups, and 
even sessions: We find (average) contributions of 0 to 20, 1.5 to 17.8, and 5.38 to 11.8 tokens 
on the individual level, group level, and session level in round 1 and respective values of 0 to 
20, 0.75 to 16, and 1.0 to 10.2 tokens in round 10. This large variability underlines the necessity 
for explanations of individual behavior and its interaction on the group and session levels. 
4.2 Hypotheses Testing 
Hypothesis 1: Subjects are either (im)perfect conditional cooperators or free riders. 
We classify subjects according to the scheme proposed in Fischbacher et al. (2001). Hence, 
69 % of our subjects are conditional cooperators (their schedules are increasing und (weakly) 
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monotonic, or not strictly monotonic but show a highly significant and positive Spearman rank 
correlation coefficient between own and others’ contribution). 8 % are free riders (schedules 
contained ‘0’ in all 21 entries). Moreover, we find only 6 % “hump-shaped” patterns (increasing 
own contributions at low average contribution levels and decreasing contributions for high 
levels). The kink in the schedules of these hump-shaped subjects is on average at a believed 
contribution level of 12.3 tokens. No schedule kinks before a contribution level of 9 tokens. 
Thus, for typical contribution levels, hump-shaped subjects behave like conditional 
cooperators. 16 % of all subjects do not fall into these three categories, but show “other” 
patterns. Therefore, our results are very similar to those of FG and Fischbacher et al. (2001). 
We assert that equation (6), which defines conditional contribution preferences in our model, 
captures the most of the elicited contribution schedules. 
Most of the “other” patterns correspond to flat contribution schedules, which could be 
interpreted as a preference for unconditional cooperation. However, both our control questions 
and the written check of subjects’ understanding indicate that “other” subjects were not fully 
aware of the incentive structure of the game, meaning that their contribution and belief 
schedules contain little information: “Others” answered only 2.6 out of 6 control questions 
correctly (compared to 3.7 correct answers for the remaining subjects). Also, their written 
explanations revealed a limited understanding (typical answers were: “values are chosen 
arbitrarily”, “did not understand the task”, “always invested everything because this maximizes 
my payoffs”). Therefore, with respect to the proportion of meaningful preference elicitations, 
the proportion captured by our model might be even larger. 
Irrespective of classifications, Hypothesis 1 implies that subjects want to contribute less than 
the others. According to Fig. 1, this is on average only true for contribution levels above five 
tokens. At this point, “estimated contributions of the others” equal the average “own 
contribution”: Unbiased subjects should believe in average contributions of five tokens, 
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because by doing so, subjects will actually contribute five tokens on average. Thus, at a first 
glance, significant contributions are possible even without assuming overoptimistic beliefs. 
However, Fig. 1 also shows that most of the hyper-conditional contributions stem from “other” 
subjects: Excluding these, the unbiased contribution level is one token, which almost matches 
our zero-token prediction. We are therefore interested in whether the contribution schedules are 
precisely predicting actual contributions. To answer this question, we analyze behavior in the 
standard treatment in the following, as only this treatment allows deviations from the schedules. 
<< Insert Table 2 about here >> 
Contributions in the standard treatment have already been analyzed in FG. Regression (1) in 
our Table 2 replicates their results (with our R² being 26 percentage points higher), compare 
their model (3) in their Table 2, p. 549. FG conclude that subjects contribute a weighted average 
of “predicted contribution” (which is the contribution calculated from a subject’s “belief” and 
his contribution schedule) and “belief”, meaning that their willingness to conditionally 
cooperate is higher than predicted from the contribution schedules. In the following, we want 
to disentangle this result on the subject-type level. In Regression (2), we display how 
“contribution” actually depends on “belief”: “Contribution” is slightly smaller than “belief” 
plus the “constant”. Compared to the average contribution schedule in Fig. 1, we observe two 
differences: First, subjects do not contribute in a hyper-conditional way, even when beliefs are 
low. Second, “contribution” almost equals “belief”, meaning that subjects are almost perfect 
conditional cooperators. We find that this is not due to an increase in subjects’ willingness to 
conditionally cooperate. While it is true that subjects contribute more than stated in their 
contribution schedules (for conditional cooperators, the effect is 0.76 tokens per subject per 
round on average), this behavior is not conditional on “belief”: For conditional cooperators, the 
difference between “predicted contribution” and the actual contribution is not correlated with 
“belief” (Pearson, ρ = 0.024, p = 0.637). Instead, subjects with a high willingness to cooperate 
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also believe that others will contribute on high levels: “Belief” and Ŷi, measured as the “slope 
of the contribution schedule” (according to a linear regression without constant) are 
significantly correlated (Pearson, ρ = 0.239, p = 0.000). This “false consensus effect” (Ross, 
Greene and House 1977) explains why Regression (2) is steeper than the average contribution 
line in Fig. 1. This fosters cooperation: The higher Ŷi is, the larger the effect of overoptimism 
on contributions is. Regression (3) confirms that “others” do not contribute hyper-conditionlly. 
Instead, they behave like imperfect conditional cooperators – note that “contribution” is close 
to but below “belief” in Regression (3). Furthermore, the contribution schedules of “others” are 
meaningless – the coefficient of “predicted contribution” is small and insignificant. We 
interpret the results as follows: “Others” had not indicated that they were conditional 
cooperators in their schedules, but behaved as such in the PGG, either because they had not 
understood the contribution schedule, but did understand the intuition of the PGG, or because 
they were simply imitating the behavior of their group members. 
Regression (4) differs from Regressions (1) and (3) in the way in which we predict 
contributions: Instead of using “predicted contribution”, we simplify this variable to “pred. 
contribution slope”, which is calculated by multiplying “belief” by the slope in subjects’ 
contribution schedules. We propose such a simplification in our model, g
i
= Ŷi  ∙  gij. As the 
contribution schedule of “others” has been found to be meaningless, we replace their reciprocity 
parameters in the following: In such cases, we use Ŷi = 0.73, which is the average reciprocity 
parameter of all non-“other” subjects. As already mentioned, this can be justified by the 
observation that “others” contribute similarly to the rest of the subject pool. Doing so, 
Regression (4) underlines our main point of this section: Contributions of subjects can be well 
described by using only Ŷi  ∙  gij. Thus, our results support Hypothesis 1. 
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Hypothesis 2: Subjects correctly predict the average reciprocal inclination of co-players. 
As already mentioned, on average, subjects predict the average contribution schedule of the 
others quite precisely. On the individual level, the average absolute mistake per entry in the 
belief schedule is 3.28 tokens. While we do not discuss whether this is precise, we find that 
positive and negative mistakes do not balance out; on average, subjects overestimate each entry 
by 0.44 tokens. This is not significantly different from zero (t-test, p = 0.124). We are also 
interested in whether the slope of the contribution schedule is misestimated: While the average 
contribution schedule has a slope of 0.74, subjects believe in 0.81 (difference significant, t-test, 
p = 0.012; p = 0.002 if “others” are excluded). This is also visible in Fig. 1: The belief schedule 
is steeper than the contribution schedule. According to our model (compare equation (8)), this 
bias also fosters cooperation. 
Again, on the individual level, we detect a distinct false consensus effect: Ŷi and Ŷij are 
significantly correlated (Pearson, ρ = 0.595, p = 0.000). People believe others to be similar to 
themselves. While it does not matter for contributions whether free riders underestimate the 
reciprocal inclination of others, contributions rise if conditional cooperators overestimate 
others’ willingness to conditionally cooperate. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is not supported by our 
results, as systematic biases can be found. However, these biases foster cooperation, compare 
also Section 5.2. 
Hypothesis 3: Subjects are overoptimistic with respect to co-players’ contributions. This 
is true even when subjects are not participating in the game. 
Indeed, according to Figures 2A and 2B, subjects continuously overestimate contributions. 
Participants overestimate by 0.67 tokens per round in the standard treatment (0.62 tokens in the 
belief treatment); estimators overestimate contributions in their groups by 0.97 (0.60) tokens. 
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In all cases, estimation mistakes are significantly different from zero in all treatments (t-test, all 
p-values < 0.061) 
The estimator groups allow us to conduct a robustness test for our assumption that subjects 
have overoptimistic beliefs: First, one might be concerned that risk-averse participants in the 
standard treatment hedge lower than expected contributions of the co-players with lower than 
true beliefs. However, with respect to the numbers reported above, mistakes do not differ 
significantly between participants and estimators, meaning that hedging considerations play no 
important role in our design. In any case, the hedging argument implies that the incentivizing 
of participants’ beliefs, if at all, leads to an underestimation of their true overoptimism. Second, 
estimators may differ from participants, because participants are emotionally involved in the 
game, while estimators are not: As participants directly benefit from contributions of others, 
they hope that others will contribute and may, due to wishful thinking, believe in higher 
contributions than estimators do. This argument implies that estimators should have lower 
beliefs than participants, which is also not the case. Third, one may notice that estimators have 
beliefs about the average contribution of four participants in each round, whereas participants 
only estimate contributions of their three co-players. Therefore, it is easier for estimators to be 
precise on average contribution levels, as their estimations are less vulnerable to outliers in their 
groups. As estimators are overoptimistic as well, our overoptimism hypothesis is also robust 
with respect to this argument. We summarize that our data support Hypothesis 3. 
Hypothesis 4: Subjects will contribute more than predicted by the unbiased equilibrium. 
We defined an equilibrium to be unbiased if all players’ beliefs, connected to the 
contributions by the contribution schedules, are correct. Contributions depend on beliefs in a 
subject-specific way, resulting in group-specific equilibria. Knowing the group assignment 
mechanism, we can ex post derive all equilibria. Due to hyper-conditional entries in some 
contribution schedules, equilibria different from zero exist. In most groups, we find only one 
64 
 
equilibrium. In other groups, no exact equilibrium exists because none of the possible belief 
combinations is associated with its predicted contributions. In these rare cases, we define those 
beliefs to be in equilibrium which result in the smallest possible belief mistake. Furthermore, 
several equilibria per group are possible: For example, among solely perfect conditional 
cooperators, each contribution level can be in equilibrium. In such cases, we determine the 
smallest and the largest possible equilibrium in that group, and we will analyze both of them 
below.  
Proceeding as described, we can compare actual contributions to equilibrium ones. If we use 
the lowest possible equilibria, we find that subjects contribute 2.13 tokens more on average than 
predicted by the equilibrium (actual: 7.22 tokens; predicted: 5.09 tokens). The difference is 
significant (t-test, p = 0.000). However, with respect to the highest possible equilibria, subjects 
contribute 0.05 tokens too short (predicted: 7.27 tokens; difference not significant, p = 0.808). 
Thus, one could conclude that subjects do not estimate too high: Instead, they estimate too low, 
because with slightly higher beliefs, equilibrium contributions could be realized as well. 
However, requesting equilibrium play implies that subjects can always coordinate on the 
highest possible equilibrium. This is impossible, as neither the contribution schedules nor the 
random group composition was announced: In our data, we find group equilibria between 0 and 
20 tokens. Thus, simply increasing all beliefs by 0.05 tokens would of course not result in 
equilibrium play. Instead, it would increase belief mistakes: Computing contributions from the 
contribution schedules, subjects’ actual beliefs result in an overestimation of contributions by 
3.39 tokens on average (not coordinating on an equilibrium typically implies too high beliefs, 
as most entries in the contribution schedules are below the bisecting line). Increasing each belief 
(if the belief is not already at 20 tokens) worsens their average preciseness. Instead, lowering 
actual beliefs (if possible) improves the preciseness: Beliefs are most precise if lowered by 3 
tokens. This procedure indicates that subjects indeed have too high instead of too low beliefs. 
Thus, our results confirm Hypothesis 4. Also note that the discussed equilibria can be seen as 
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an upper bound for unbiased behavior: As it is impossible for subjects to predict contributions 
on the group level, one may assume that they try to reciprocate the contribution level of the 
whole subject pool, rather than the levels of their co-players. In that case, we can make a clear 
equilibrium prediction, visible in Fig. 1: Beliefs above five tokens are biased. With that 
benchmark, beliefs – and therefore contributions – are significantly too high. Furthermore, one 
may consider that high equilibria are almost always only realized because “other” subjects 
claim to contribute hyper-conditionally. However, the analysis of Hypothesis 1 has shown that 
such behavior does not appear, at least not in the standard treatment. Excluding “other” subjects 
from the analysis (almost) results in equilibrium predictions of zero, compare Fig. 1 again. 
Referring to the actual relationship between beliefs and contributions justifies an equilibrium 
of zero as well, because according to regression model (2), actual contributions match actual 
beliefs most precisely at a contribution level of zero. 
Hypothesis 5: Subjects will contribute in the one-parameter treatment to the same extent 
as in the original FG-design. 
Our data confirm Hypothesis 5: Subjects in both treatments start with average contributions 
of between 8 and 9 tokens and end up contributing between 5 and 6 tokens. In all ten rounds, 
contributions in both treatments do not differ significantly from each other (t-test, all p-values 
> 0.235). 
In the preceding analysis, we have identified effects which lead to differences between both 
treatments: In the standard treatment, subjects overcontribute (defined as contributing above 
the prediction of the contribution schedule), and “others” do not behave at all in the way that 
their contribution schedules had predicted. Such behavior is not possible in the belief treatment. 
However, these effects are small, or they balance each other out. Thus, both treatments are 
comparable with each other, and as overoptimism is the decisive cause for contributions in the 
belief treatment, we conclude that this is true for the standard treatment as well. Furthermore, 
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in the belief treatment, the fact that subjects cannot contribute less than the others is made more 
explicit. Unbiased subjects should therefore start contributions at a lower level and decrease 
them faster than in the standard treatment (note that most belief schedules demonstrate beliefs 
in imperfect conditional cooperation). In contrast, biased subjects can believe that they will 
contribute less than the others, making it irrelevant if they play the standard treatment or the 
belief treatment. Finding no difference between both treatments supports the idea of subjects 
being biased. Thus, our results confirm that contributions to PGGs can be explained using only 
reciprocity and overoptimism. 
5 Prognostic Power of the Model 
5.1 Model Application 
While we have presented statistical analyses to support our hypotheses, we will now report 
the prognostic power of our model that was presented in Section 2. Our model abstracts from 
phenomena such as overcontributions or hyper-conditional contributions. Therefore, the 
question is to what degree are we nevertheless able to capture individual behavior in PGGs. To 
answer this question not only for the first round, we have to clarify how we can capture the 
repeated-round structure of our PGG setting. As we use the strangers setting, each round can 
be seen as an independent game: Although this has not been perfectly true, we assume that 
subjects meet their co-players only once, meaning that no signaling and no repeated reciprocal 
exchange with the same person were possible. Rounds are independent, except that subjects 
learn about the reciprocity inclination of the subject pool as the game proceeds. 
Our model explains both beliefs and own contributions. Nevertheless, let us first assume that 
beliefs are given and that we only predict contributions: This is easily be done by applying 
equation (6). Therefore, in our Model (1), we multiply subjects actual beliefs by their 
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reciprocity parameter in order to predict contributions. This corresponds to Regression (4) in 
Table 2, but sets the constant of the regression to zero and replaces the coefficient of “pred. 
contribution slope” by one. We regard Model (1) as an upper bound for the predictive power of 
the following two model variants, because we have to expect that predictions will be less 
accurate if we do not use our information regarding subject’s beliefs. 
We also want to endogenize beliefs. To do so, we use our biased equilibrium concept as 
stated in equation (7). For an application, we must clarify how players determine ε and Ŷij. As 
we assume biased thinking, it is conceivable that these variables are subject-dependent 
parameters. Furthermore, with repetition, players may learn and reduce their biases over time. 
We will proceed as follows: We will hold ε constant for all subjects and all rounds. In turn, we 
will use subject-dependent Ŷij-values, which are derived from i’s belief schedule prior to the 
first round. In later rounds, Ŷijwill be updated, which we will explain below. We do not update 
ε because this would complicate results and we could not disentangle it from the updating 
process of Ŷij. Allowing individual parameters for Ŷij, we automatically incorporate our finding 
that the false consensus leads to a correlation between Ŷi and Ŷij, especially at the beginning of 
the PGG. While holding ε constant simplifies the model application, we are aware of the fact 
that it may be more realistic – but more complex – to let Ŷij converge towards the true reciprocal 
inclination of the subject pool, and to let ε decline simultaneously. In any case, since Ŷij ≤ 1 
must be assumed in order to avoid implausible equilibrium beliefs, we lower Ŷij  for some 
subjects to 1. This affects 15 (out of 92) participants. 
From FG, we know that after round one, i builds his belief by taking the average of his 
previous belief and the observed contribution level of the previous round. By reproducing their 
regression analysis, we confirm their finding (results not displayed). Accordingly, we use this 
belief building process in the following. We also report our observation that contribution levels 
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prior to the last round actually do not additionally affect beliefs significantly (regression not 
displayed). In our model context, with ε being known, the belief building process can be 
interpreted as follows: Observed contributions from previous rounds are used to calculate co-
players’ believed reciprocity inclination of the subject pool. This is done by solving equation 
(7) for Ŷij. Thus, if i observes lower than expected contributions, he will conclude that the others 
believe in less reciprocation than he himself does and will partly adopt their belief. Using this 
procedure, Ŷij does not converge towards the true reciprocity inclination of the pool: Instead, as 
subjects always observe lower than expected contributions on average, Ŷij will converge to 
zero, corresponding to the minimum expected contribution level of gij = ε. Contributions cannot 
increase in the whole subject pool, but single subjects will increase their contributions if these 
subjects were matched with highly reciprocal subjects before. 
We will apply this belief building process in Models (2) and (3). In Model (2), we will use 
actual contributions from the experimental data to update i’s belief. Thus, Model (2) will make 
round-to-round predictions. In contrast, in Model (3), we will use no actual subject data from 
the PGG. Instead, we will update beliefs by using the modeled previous contributions. Thus, 
we will predict contributions for all rounds with the information given before round 1 starts: 
We will only use the contributions schedules, the belief schedules, and the group assignment 
mechanism. 
We assess the preciseness of our model variants by reporting “R²” (1 minus quotient of 
average squared prediction mistakes to squared variations of all contributions). R² can be 
computed for the whole subject pool, but also for subgroups of four individual subjects: In the 
latter case, for example, “average squared prediction mistakes” refers to the prediction mistakes 
with respect to the 10 contribution decisions of a subject. “All contributions” is defined as 
contributions of all participants in both treatments: As we find both treatments to be very 
similar, we merge the data. R² (of all participants) will also be used to calibrate ε: We determine 
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ε such that R² in Models (2) and (3) is maximized. We will show below that our results are not 
driven by this optimization procedure. 
5.2 Results 
We present our results as follows: Table 3 displays a summary: For all three models, we 
present R² on an aggregated level, and on the treatment level. Additionally, we explain the 
results of Model (2) in more detail. Here, we show which subjects can be well explained, and 
which not. A complete survey of model results and its determinants for each subject can be 
found in Appendix C. 
<< Insert Table 3 about here >> 
Calibrating ε as described above, we get ε = 0.225. We will comment on the calibration 
process below, and start the analysis of the results by discussing Table 3: It shows that Model 
(1) explains contributions of all participants with an R² of 0.68. R² of the standard treatment is, 
with 0.54, only slightly smaller than R² in Regression (4) in Table 2. Accordingly, omitting the 
constant from Regression (4) and setting the regression coefficient to one almost does not affect 
the results. In the belief treatment, R² is higher because subjects cannot deviate from their 
schedules. This result defines an upper bound for our model: 20 % (100 % − 80 %) of the 
predictive power is lost because subjects do not exhibit strictly proportional contribution 
schedules. Another 26 % (80 % − 54 %) is lost if subjects can deviate from their schedules. 
Comparing R² in Model (2) with that of Model (1), we find that the predictive power drops 
by 25 percentage points (0.68 − 0.43) if beliefs are endogenized. Another 9 percentage points 
(0.43 − 0.34) are lost if contributions are not predicted on a round-by-round basis, but, as done 
in Model (3), for all 10 rounds in one go. We will now turn to Fig. 3, where we present Model 
(2) predictions and actual contributions of selected subjects graphically. The subjects are 
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selected such that the factors which drive our outcomes can be exemplarily explained. The 
results hold similarly true for Model (3). 
<< Insert Fig. 3 about here >> 
Fig. 3 immediately makes it clear how heterogeneous the contribution patterns are. 
Contributions can be high, low, increasing, decreasing, or constant. Our model explains these 
patterns by using subjects’ reciprocal inclination, their beliefs with respect to the reciprocal 
inclination of others, and their information with respect to previous contribution levels. The 
diagrams in Fig. 3 are sorted downwards by R². We start with subject 26, who is a free rider 
assigned to the standard treatment. As she sticks to her contribution schedule, our predictions 
perfectly match her actual contributions. Only one of our seven free riders contributes, leading 
to bad predictions in that case (not displayed). Subject 73 is that non-selfish subject, whose 
behavior we can predict most precisely. This example demonstrates that contributions only 
decline on average. Single subjects can considerably increase their contributions if they are 
unexpectedly matched with others who contribute on high levels. Such increasing contributions 
are also visible for subject 111. Subjects 25 and 101 are examples that contributions on both 
low levels as well as high levels can correctly be predicted. Subject 1 is classified as “others”. 
We already pointed out in Section 4 that “others” do not stick to their schedule if they are 
allowed to: In the standard treatment, “others” behave like conditional cooperators. Subject 1 
is an example of the fact that behavior of such subjects in Treatment 1 can be well-predicted by 
using Ŷi = 0.73, which is the average reciprocity parameter of non-“other” subjects. 
Subjects 111 and 58 demonstrate nicely that subjects react on previously observed 
contribution levels. We do not display beliefs, but contributions are always predicted to be a 
subject-dependent fraction of beliefs; thus, contributions only change if beliefs change. 
According to the updating process of beliefs, contributions rise (decrease) if beliefs in the 
previous round were below (above) the actual contribution level. Subject 111 was pessimistic 
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in rounds 7 and 8, leading to increasing contributions in rounds 8 and 9. More typically, subjects 
are optimistic, which induces declining contributions: Subject 58 is a perfect conditional 
cooperator, who believes in a contribution level of 20 tokens in round 1. Four times in a row, 
he has do adapt his overoptimistic beliefs, leading to a rapid decline of his contributions (in the 
comment field at the end of the experiment, this subject actually expresses frustration with his 
co-players). Subject 77 has hump-shaped preferences. As long as these subjects estimate 
contribution levels within the increasing part of their schedule, contributions can be predicted 
quite precisely. As the linear regression underestimates the slope of this schedule part, 
contributions are underestimated. Subject 101 is an example of some subjects overcontributing: 
His actual beliefs fluctuate between 10 and 16 tokens, meaning that contributions of 20 tokens 
cannot be predicted. 
Subject 107 is categorized as “others”: Like many “other” subjects, subject 107 entered a 
flat contribution schedule; in this case, at 20 tokens. The graph shows that such subjects do 
have to contribute 20 tokens in the belief treatment. But we predict belief-dependent 
contributions, which lead to high prediction mistakes. Similarly, there are cases where 
conditional cooperators stick to their schedule, but their predictions are bad because these 
schedules are not linear: Subject 46 wants to contribute everything if the others do so as well, 
but wants to contribute zero for beliefs below 10. However, none of her beliefs exceed 10 
tokens, and consistently, subject 46 contributes nothing. Due to the proportional relationship of 
beliefs and contributions in our model, we instead predict positive contributions. Two other 
features can be observed for subject 46: First, we predict too high beliefs in the first two rounds. 
This happens if subjects state high ?̂?𝑖𝑗, but do not actually believe in high initial contributions. 
Second, we always predict gij ≥ ε, compare equation (7). Therefore, with ε being positive, we 
will never predict zero contributions for conditional cooperators. The last but one graph shows 
that contributions can be explained very precisely on an aggregated level. This is true for Model 
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(3) as well, compare the last graph. This is not surprising: If individual contributions can be 
predicted, aggregated results are precise as well. 
Also note that our results are quite robust with respect to the calibration of ε: Calibrating 
single sessions, we get 0.125 ≤ ε ≤ 0.375. First of all, this indicates that ε fluctuates from session 
to session, occurring from the fact that the subject pool is very inhomogeneous and that we only 
have between 20 to 24 participants per session. However, our results do not react sensitively on 
ε: With R² being optimized over all sessions, R² equals 0.384 in Models (2) and (3). Using ε = 
0.125 (0.375), R² only drops to 0.365 (0.297). Thus, our results do not depend on an exact 
determination of ε. Finally, note that the calibrated ε is, with 0.225, much higher than the ε, 
which can be computed from actual contributions and beliefs: This value equals only 0.05, 
compare Table 1. Thus, the calibration process captures the fact that the contribution schedules 
underestimate subjects’ willingness to cooperate. 
Table 3 summarizes our results: Generally, we can group our subjects as follows: In the 
standard treatment, those subjects can be predicted who do not deviate from their contribution 
schedules very much: In Table 3, we filter such subjects who deviate from their schedule by 
less than three tokens on average. In turn, predictions for the remaining subjects are bad. In the 
belief treatment, as subjects cannot deviate from their schedule, predictions are precise if 
subjects have linear conditional preferences (meaning that the regression which determines ?̂?𝑖 
is precise with R² ≥ 0.8), and if they express more or less precise beliefs (belief mistake < 4 
tokens on average). 
Model (3) can also serve to disentangle the sources of contributions. As already mentioned, 
ε > 0 is a necessary condition for positive contributions in our framework. However, 
contributions would be lower if Ŷij was not positively biased. This effect is reinforced by the 
fact that due to the false consensus effect, this bias particularly occurs for subjects with high 
reciprocal inclinations. We now want to report how contribution levels change if these 
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parameters are ceteris paribus varied. In round 1 (10), participants are predicted to contribute 
11.1 (4.5) tokens on average. With ε = 0, zero contributions will be predicted. Therefore, in 
what follows we take subjects’ overoptimism ε > 0 regarding the other players’ contributions 
as given. Now reducing each Ŷij by 6 %, which retains the dispersion in individuals’ beliefs 
with respect to the reciprocity of others, but conforms to the true reciprocity level of Ŷi = 0.75 
on average, reduces contributions from 11.1 (4.5) tokens to 9.8 (4.2). With all subjects having 
identical but biased beliefs about reciprocity, Ŷij = 0.80 ∀ i, we abstract from the dispersion in 
reciprocity beliefs and focus on the corresponding pure overoptimism component. This 
decreases contributions from 11.1 (4.5) tokens to 8.9 (4.0). Assuming that each subject correctly 
estimates ?̂?𝑗 – which eliminates both biases – 8.1 (3.8) tokens are predicted. Thus, while the 
false consensus effect and overoptimism with respect to Ŷij do foster contribution, they are not 
the main drivers. Instead, contributions are primarily induced by an overestimation of the co-
players’ contributions. 
6 Conclusion 
This paper has shown that empirically observed contributions to a PGG can formally be 
explained with the help of the reciprocity model of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) if the 
reference points are changed and if overoptimism with respect to the contributions of others is 
incorporated. Such overoptimism leads to the prediction of positive contribution levels, which 
are then reciprocated. Learning that their beliefs were overoptimistic, subjects adjust them, and 
their contributions decline. We are thereby able to explain prominent stylized facts. Especially, 
we can explain individual contributions within an equilibrium framework. 
Our experimental design confirms the assumption of overoptimistic subjects. We observe 
two effects: First, subjects overestimate contributions of others, which allows us to model 
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equilibrium beliefs at positive contribution levels. Additionally, reciprocal subjects 
overestimate, on account of the false consensus effect, the degree of reciprocity in the subject 
pool. We build two control treatments to test the robustness of our model. Subjects in the 
estimator treatment are only estimating beliefs and are not playing. In spite of this, they display 
overoptimism as well. Contrary to the standard treatment of the public goods game, subjects in 
our belief treatment have to stick to their contribution plan because contributions are directly 
calculated with the help of subjects’ beliefs and contribution schedules. Nevertheless, 
contributions in the belief treatment are about the same as in the standard treatment, and the 
contribution level in the belief treatment can only be explained with the help of overoptimism. 
In our setting, we assume that all subjects are equally overoptimistic. However, it might be 
interesting to research whether overoptimism develops only in certain strategic situations, how 
it is influenced by framing, and on which personal character traits and cognitive capabilities it 
depends. For example, the concept of the social exchange heuristic used in Dijkstra (2012) 
proposes that reciprocal subjects are overoptimistic as opposed to free riders, who should have 
unbiased beliefs, and this prediction could be tested experimentally. 
Our theory covers the most relevant factors which drive cooperation. These are: reciprocity, 
overoptimism, and the false consensus effect. Additionally, more aspects could be regarded: 
Our formal game-theoretic approach allows the incorporation of signaling effects into the 
analysis. It may also be expanded to cover a preference for indirect reciprocity (i.e., being 
(un)kind to a player if this player is (un)kind to a third party) or for unconditional altruism. 
Nevertheless, our findings based on reciprocity and overoptimism are challenging enough: 
Merely switching from the concept of homo oeconomicus to homo reciprocans will not solve 
the puzzle of the cooperation dilemma unless a cognitive overoptimism bias is considered as 
well. 
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Fig. 3: Actual contributions and model predictions 
 
 
26, free rider, stand. treat., 
   = 0.00, R² = 1.00, Model (2)
73, cond. coop., belief treat., 
   = 0.63, R² = 0.99 , Model (2) 
25, cond. coop., belief treat., 
   = 0.28, R² = 0.91, Model (2)
1, "other", stand. treat., 
   = 0.73, R² = 0.91, Model (2) 
111, cond. coop., belief treat., 
   = 1.00, R² = 0.86, Model (2) 
58, cond. coop., stand. treat., 
   = 1.00, R² = 0.79, Model (2)
77, hump shaped, stand. treat., 
   = 0.58, R² = 0.71, Model (2)
101, cond. coop., stand. treat., 
   = 0.99, R² = 0.64, Model (2)
107, "other", belief treat., 
   = 1.46, R² = 0.02, Model (2)
46, cond. coop., belief treat., 
   = 0.91, R² = -0.63, Model (2)
All participants, R² = 0.43,
Model (2)
All participants, R² = 0.34,
Model (3)
Actual contributions Predicted contributions
Variable Meaning Experimental representation Average value
g i i 's contribution contribution 7.2 tokens
g ij
i 's belief over average contribution 
of other subjects
belief 8.0 tokens
ε overoptimism parameter
difference between gij and gi, as 
defined in equation (2)
0.05
Yi i 's reciprocity parameter slope of the contribution schedule1) 0.74
Yij
i 's belief over the average reciprocity 
parameter of other subjects
slope of the belief schedule1) 0.81
# Subjects: 119
   # Participants: 92
   # Estimators: 27
Table 1 - Definitions and descriptive statistics
1) Slope, according to a linear regression without constant.
 ̂ 
 ̂𝑖𝑗
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Dependent variable
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4)
Included subjects all all "others" all
Predicted contribution        0.291**        0.009
      (0.075)       (0.040)
Pred. contribution slope       0.941***
      (0.084)
Belief        0.717***        0.974***        0.960***
      (0.093)       (0.042)       (0.132)
Constant      -0.415**       -0.473       -1.241        1.282
     (0.120)      (0.225)      (0.975)      (0.854)
Observations           440           440           50           440
R²        0.597        0.554        0.542        0.564
Significant at the 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), 10 percent (*) level.
Notes: OLS regressions with robust standard errors (clustered on sessions) in parentheses.
Table 2 - Contributions in the "standard treatment"
Contribution
Model
Treat-
ment
Grouping N R²
Standard - 44  0.54
Belief - 48  0.80
92  0.68
avg. deviation from schedule < 3 27  0.70
remaining subjects 17 -0.04
44  0.42
R² of schedule regression ≥ 0.8 and 
avg. belief mistake < 4
29  0.70
remaining subjects 19 0.05
48  0.44
92  0.43
Standard - 44 0.32
Belief - 48 0.36
92 0.34
(1)
Table 3 - Simulation results
(2)
(3)
Standard
Belief
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Appendix – not for publication, only for referees’ information 
A: Optimal Behavior Under Uncertainty 
If co-players contribute unequally, risk aversion with respect to reciprocal utility becomes 
relevant because utility from the co-players’ kindness is curved concavely. Thus, i should not 
reciprocate the expected kindness of the group members, but reduce it by a risk discount which 
depends on the variance of the co-players’ uncertain kindness. Cheung (2013) provides the 
experimental proof for this implication by showing that subjects indeed want to contribute less if 
the others contribute more unequally. Therefore, we show the following extended modeling 
approach (which is not relevant for explaining our experimental results in the paper because we do 
not vary the diversity of the subject pool).  
Based on the probability distribution of Ŷj, g̃j denotes the uncertain contribution of group 
member j (depending on her type) and g̃
ij,o
 denotes the corresponding probability distribution 
of i’s belief regarding j’s behavior. If subjects maximize expected utility, with MPCR = 0.4, the 
following equation holds (compare equation (3)): 
E(U
i
) = E (1 − (1 − MPCR) ∙ g
i
+ ∑ MPCR ∙ g̃
ij
+ Yi  ∙  ∑ √MPCR ∙ gi ∙ MPCR ∙ g̃ij,o
J
j=1
J
j=1 ) 
 (A.1) 
with Yi set to 
2∙(1−MPCR)
J ∙ MPCR
∙√Ŷi, compare Appendix B, (A.1) simplifies to 
E(U
i
) = 1 − (1 − MPCR) ∙ g
i
 + MPCR ∙ ∑ E (g̃
ij,o
)+
2∙(1−MPCR)
J
∙√Ŷi ∙ gi ∙ E(∑ √g̃ij,o
J
j=1 )
J
j=1  
 (A.2)  
dE(Ui)
dg
i
 = 0 
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⇒ (1 − MPCR) = 
2 ∙ (1−MPCR)
J
 ∙  √Ŷi ∙ E(∑ √g̃ij,o
J
j=1 ) ∙  
1
2 ∙ √gi
  
⇒ g
i
 = Ŷi  ∙  
1
J2
 ∙ E2 (∑ √g̃ij,o
J
j=1 ) = Ŷi  ∙  ((E√g̃ij,o)
2
− Var (√g̃ij,o))  (A.3) 
Thus, i does not reciprocate the expected kindness of the group members, but reduces its 
squared value by its variance. In the following, we will denote 
1
J2
 ∙ E2 (∑ √g̃ij,o
J
j=1 ) as EQ, such 
that (A.3) can be simplified to 
g
i
 = Ŷ
i
 ∙ EQ. (A.4) 
EQ can be determined (numerically) in such a way that equation (A.4) is fulfilled and no 
subject has an incentive to deviate. For exemplary reasons, assume the following: The 
population solely consists of free riders and perfect conditional cooperators in equal parts, 
meaning that E (Ŷij) = 0.5; furthermore, ε = 0.2 and J = 3. While free riders will not contribute, 
perfect conditional cooperators will choose to contribute gi = 0.3125, which can be proven to 
be optimal by using equations (A.3) and (2): 
g
i
 = 1 ∙ 
1
9
 ∙  (
1
8
 ∙ 3 ∙ √0.2 +
3
8
 ∙  (1 ∙ √0.3125 ∙ 0.8+0.2+2 ∙ √0.2)+
3
8
 ∙  (2 ∙ 
√0.3125 ∙ 0.8+0.2+1 ∙ √0.2) +
1
8
 ∙ 3 ∙ √0.3125 ∙ 0.8+0.2)
2
 ≈ 0.3125.  (A.5) 
As an approximate solution, equilibrium contributions can be derived analytically if subjects 
are assumed to reciprocate expected average contributions, E (g̃
ij,o
), instead of EQ, compare 
equations (7) and (8): E (g̃
ij,o
) equals 
1
3
 in our example and thus is almost identical to the true 
equilibrium outcome of 0.3125. Equations (8) and (A.4) predict the same contribution if all 
subjects contribute equally. The less exactly i can reciprocate the contributions of the group 
members (contributions may be known, but they are unequal), and the less i knows about the 
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contributions (the variance increases), the less he will contribute. However, both aspects are not 
varied in our experiment, and the difference between EQ and E (g̃
ij,o
) can to some degree be 
compensated by adapting Ŷi. Furthermore, according to our example, the mistake of equation 
(8) does not exceed 2 % of the solution space in PGGs with group size of four. 
B: Maximizing (4) Over gi  
Ui = 1 − (1 − MPCR)  ∙  gi + J ∙ MPCR ∙ gij + Yi ∙ J ∙ √MPCR ∙ gi  ∙  √MPCR ∙ gij,o, (B.1) 
dUi
dg
i
 = 0 
⇒ 1 − MPCR = Yi ∙ J ∙ √MPCR  ∙  √MPCR ∙  gij,o  ∙  
1
2 ∙ √gi
  
⇔√gi = 
J ∙ Yi ∙ MPCR
2 ∙ (1−MPCR)
 ∙  √gij,o  
⇔ g
i
= (
J ∙ Yi ∙ MPCR
2 ∙ (1−MPCR)
)
2
 ∙  g
ij,o
  (B.2) 
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C: Modeling Results and Modeling Determinants  
 
    
Sub-
ject1) R² 2)
Treat-
ment3)
Ses-
sion
Classifi-
cation4) Y
Inconsis-
tency5)
R² schedule 
regression6)
Belief 
mistake7)
Sub-
ject1) R² 2)
Treat-
ment3)
Ses-
sion
Classifi-
cation4) Y
Inconsis-
tency5)
R² schedule 
regression6)
Belief 
mistake7)
26 1.00 1 1 2 0.00 0.0 1.00 0.2 21 0.57 2 1 0 1.00 0.0 1.00 0.6
57 1.00 1 2 2 0.00 0.0 1.00 1.1 81 0.51 2 3 4 0.46 0.0 - 0.5
18 1.00 2 1 2 0.00 0.0 1.00 0.7 94 0.50 2 4 1 1.00 0.0 1.00 2.4
47 1.00 2 2 2 0.00 0.0 1.00 0.7 17 0.48 1 1 1 0.72 0.6 0.83 0.7
49 1.00 2 2 2 0.00 0.0 1.00 0.4 32 0.39 1 2 4 0.73 5.9 - 0.4
53 1.00 2 2 2 0.00 0.0 1.00 1.2 50 0.36 2 2 1 1.07 0.0 1.00 0.0
73 0.99 2 3 1 0.63 0.0 0.91 2.2 93 0.34 1 4 1 0.91 4.3 0.98 0.9
54 0.98 1 2 1 0.24 0.9 0.94 2.7 55 0.33 1 2 1 1.31 5.4 0.75 1.7
72 0.97 2 3 1 0.79 0.0 0.94 1.3 119 0.30 1 4 1 1.17 2.2 0.96 4.6
7 0.96 2 1 1 0.29 0.0 0.90 0.4 108 0.30 2 4 3 0.21 0.0 0.07 1.9
74 0.95 1 3 1 0.47 1.8 0.10 0.6 24 0.29 1 1 1 0.87 0.6 0.99 0.2
113 0.94 2 4 1 0.74 0.0 0.99 0.1 31 0.27 2 2 0 1.00 0.0 1.00 1.4
90 0.93 2 4 1 0.86 0.0 0.87 3.5 104 0.25 1 4 1 1.14 3.6 0.96 0.7
59 0.93 1 2 1 0.20 0.0 0.36 2.7 6 0.24 1 1 1 0.98 3.0 0.79 2.4
25 0.91 2 1 1 0.28 0.0 0.90 0.7 12 0.17 2 1 4 0.73 0.0 - 0.1
1 0.91 1 2 4 0.73 7.4 - 1.7 34 0.16 1 2 1 1.13 3.6 0.97 1.6
109 0.91 1 4 0 1.00 0.8 1.00 1.7 79 0.16 1 3 1 0.88 2.3 0.83 1.2
43 0.89 1 2 4 0.73 2.4 - 0.3 80 0.12 1 3 1 0.48 3.8 0.55 3.5
103 0.89 2 4 1 0.82 0.0 0.94 3.0 115 0.12 1 4 1 1.02 4.8 1.00 1.3
23 0.88 1 1 1 0.06 2.0 0.75 1.2 29 0.10 2 1 0 1.00 0.0 1.00 1.5
71 0.88 2 3 0 1.00 0.0 1.00 0.5 15 0.09 2 1 4 0.40 0.0 - 4.1
60 0.88 1 2 1 0.86 1.2 0.98 2.7 38 0.09 2 2 1 0.93 0.0 1.00 1.5
114 0.88 1 4 1 0.65 1.4 0.78 1.1 107 0.02 2 4 4 1.46 0.0 - 2.3
30 0.86 1 1 0 1.00 0.2 1.00 1.0 78 0.01 2 3 4 1.04 0.0 - 1.7
111 0.86 2 4 0 1.00 0.0 1.00 0.5 117 -0.16 1 4 1 0.67 5.3 0.79 1.3
51 0.86 2 2 1 1.01 0.0 0.96 3.0 116 -0.17 1 4 1 0.85 4.7 1.00 2.3
9 0.86 1 1 1 0.37 0.9 0.83 0.8 56 -0.26 1 2 1 1.25 6.2 0.91 0.3
52 0.86 1 2 1 0.90 0.8 0.96 0.5 39 -0.27 1 2 1 0.54 8.0 0.75 2.0
84 0.84 2 3 4 0.32 0.0 - 2.4 61 -0.39 1 3 4 0.73 11.7 - 1.9
14 0.84 2 1 4 0.37 0.0 - 1.0 67 -0.39 2 3 1 0.93 0.0 0.79 5.6
66 0.82 1 3 1 0.93 1.6 0.99 0.1 106 -0.41 2 4 4 1.46 0.0 - 3.0
27 0.81 1 1 1 0.78 0.9 0.99 0.1 82 -0.43 1 3 1 0.91 4.5 0.33 1.9
58 0.79 1 2 0 1.00 1.3 1.00 2.2 46 -0.63 2 2 1 0.91 0.0 0.82 1.6
28 0.79 2 1 0 1.00 0.0 1.00 2.8 20 -0.64 1 1 1 0.97 1.3 0.95 0.7
22 0.78 1 1 1 0.48 2.5 0.99 1.0 105 -1.03 2 4 3 0.70 0.0 0.00 0.7
97 0.78 1 4 4 0.73 7.1 - 0.0 112 -1.04 2 4 1 0.97 0.0 0.95 9.1
65 0.78 2 3 4 1.10 0.0 - 0.3 91 -2.67 1 4 2 0.00 11.6 1.00 1.8
42 0.76 2 2 4 0.37 0.0 - 0.9 102 -3.35 2 4 0 1.00 0.0 1.00 9.8
75 0.76 2 3 1 0.91 0.0 0.98 0.5
19 0.75 1 1 3 0.66 2.0 0.38 1.3 Avg. 0.43 1.49 0.86 1.6
76 0.75 2 3 4 1.46 0.0 - 1.1
83 0.75 2 3 1 1.19 0.0 0.95 2.9
85 0.75 2 3 1 1.07 0.0 0.96 2.0
41 0.73 2 2 1 0.72 0.0 0.83 0.2
37 0.72 2 2 1 1.01 0.0 0.99 3.3
77 0.71 1 3 3 0.58 2.2 0.16 0.6
110 0.70 2 4 4 0.87 0.0 - 1.3
16 0.68 2 1 1 0.64 0.0 0.75 0.5
45 0.65 2 2 0 1.00 0.0 1.00 0.8
101 0.64 1 4 1 0.99 2.2 0.96 0.7
70 0.64 1 3 1 0.86 2.8 0.98 0.3
13 0.63 2 1 4 0.44 0.0 - 0.1
5 0.61 2 1 1 0.87 0.0 0.95 2.0
118 0.57 1 4 1 0.93 1.7 1.00 0.4
̂i ̂i
7) Average absolute difference between beliefs and actual  contributions of 
    the three co-players.
4) 1: Perfect conditional cooperator. 2: Imperfect conditional cooperator. 
    3: Free rider. 
1) 92 Participants. Missing subjects to N=119: Estimators. Subjects printed
   in bold are displayed in the paper.
2) R²: 1 - average(prediction mistake)²/average(contribution variation of 
   participants)².
6) R² of a regression of entries in the contribution schedule on the 
    believed contribution level; regression without constant. R² of "other" 
    subjects cannot be computed.
3) 1: Standard treatment. 2: Belief treatment.
5) Average deviation from the contribution schedule per round, in tokens.
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D: The Experiment 
In the following, we present a translation of the most important extracts of the experiment, 
which was conducted in German originally. 
Remark: Note that the experiment presented in the paper was preceded by a question part, which 
intended to measure subject’s individual overoptimism, respectively overconfidence, in a 
framework independent of the public goods context. As this part turned out to deliver little 
insight with respect to the model and the analysis of the hypotheses presented in the paper, we 
abstained from presenting its design and the corresponding analysis in the paper. However, both 
is available from the authors upon request. 
 
General Information 
Welcome to the experiment. You participate in a study about individual decision making in the 
context of experimental economics research. The experiment will last about 60 minutes. You 
can always ask questions to the instructor. However, you are not allowed to communicate with 
other participants until the experiment ends. 
During the experiment, you decide completely anonymously and the results of this session will 
only be used anonymized for research purposes.  
The experiment is divided into two part: In the first part, you will be asked to forecast several 
future events and to estimate their probabilities. You will also be asked to assess some personal 
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skills and to solve three small brain teasers. In the second part, you will interact with other 
participants (anonymously). Further information on this will follow later. 
In this session, you can earn between 3.20 and 25.60 euros. Your actual earnings will depend 
on your answers, on your decisions and on the decisions of other participants. Detailed 
information about the payment structure will follow. The money will be paid to you in cash at 
the end of this session. 
[…] 
Questions On Future Life Events (Questions Taken From Weinstein, 1980) 
Thank you. We now ask you to estimate how your own chances of experiencing the following 
events deviate from the chances of the other participants in this room. For example, if you 
believe that the probability to experience the event named in the following is 40 % higher for 
you than for the other participants, you should click on the 40 %-button. 
[Possible answers (in comparison to the average probability of the subjects pool): -100 % 
(impossible), -80 %, -60 % -40 %, -20 %, 0 (same probability), +20 %, +40 %, +60 %, + 80 %, 
+100 %, +200 %] 
1. Being in a hospital in the next 5 years 
2. Like postgraduation job 
3. Victim of burglary within the next five years. 
4. Dying in an accident. 
5. Owning your own home within the next 10 years 
6. Having mentally gifted children 
 
Assessing Own Character Traits and Skills 
Thank you. You are now asked to assess some character traits and personal skills. With the 
sliders, you can define how much you agree with the following statements. Please position the 
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slider in the middle if you believe that you are as good as the other participants in this room. 
Accordingly, move the slider to the left or to the right if you believe to be worse or to be better. 
1. I can predict a person’s trustworthiness. 
2. I am a cooperative person. 
3. I can tell if someone is lying to me. 
[…] 
Explanation of the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
With the following question, subjects are asked to solve a dilemma: [The two] subjects can 
either choose “cooperate” or “not cooperate”. If both, subject A and subject B choose 
“cooperate”, they receive payments of 2 euros each. If, on the other hand, both subjects choose 
“not cooperate”, they receive 1 euro each. If one subjects chooses “cooperate” and the other 
subject chooses “not cooperate”, the first subject receives 3 euros and the co-player receives 
nothing. Thus, because no matter what the other subject does, “not cooperate” is better 
than “cooperate”, many subjects choose “not cooperating” and only receive 1 euro. The 
reason is: 
Assume, the co-player “cooperates”. If you choose “not cooperate”, you will receive 3 euros, 
which is more than 2 euros in the case of “cooperation”. Instead, assume that the co-player 
chooses “not cooperate”. In this case, you receive 1 euro, which is still better than receiving 0 
euro in the case of “cooperating”. Thus, “not cooperate” is always the best choice. Despite this 
incentive scheme, there are subjects who choose “cooperate” because they hope that the other 
subject is doing the same. 
How much is the proportion of subjects who choose “cooperate”? (in %) 
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[…] 
 
Third Brain Teaser 
3. Question 
You and 49 other readers participate in a contest, carried out by a newspaper. The task which 
the readers have to solve is the following: “Please send a number between 0 and 100 to the 
editorial office (inclusive 0 and 100). The winner of the contest is that reader, who sends the 
number which is closest to two third of the average of all numbers which have been sent in. If 
several readers send the correct answer, the winner will be chosen among them by lot. Which 
number should you choose if all other participants (and you) solve the puzzle? (You have two 
minutes time.) 
The number is:  
[…] 
 
Public Goods Game Instructions 
Thank you. We will now start the interactive part of the experiment. We explain it first and 
ask some control questions to be sure that you understand the experiment. The amount of money 
you can earn depends on your own decisions and on the decisions of your co-players. Regard, 
that we will not calculate with euros in the following but with “play money” because divisibility 
will be better. One “play money unit” (PM) will be worth 4 euro-cents. 
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The experiment, which we will describe on the next page, will be conducted 10 times, 
meaning, that you will play 10 rounds. Before the experiment starts, different variants of the 
experiment will be assigned to you by lot, detailed information will follow within a short time. 
The experiment will be conducted in groups of four, theses groups will be reassigned in 
each round arbitrarily. 
[next page] 
The experiment will be conducted as follows: In each round, you (and the other group 
members as well) will receive 20 units of “play money” (corresponding to 80 [euro-]cent). You 
can keep this money or invest it (fully or partially) in a project. Every unit which you do not 
invest, remains with you in your so-called “private account”. 
The “play money” from your “private account” will be paid out to you at the end of the 
experiment (converted into real euros). No one except you earns something from your private 
account. 
On the other hand, if you (or another group member) invest into the project, the instructor 
will multiply this money by 1.6. Afterwards, the money will be paid out to each of the four 
group members equally. For example, if three group members invest 2 units and one member 
20 units, altogether, 26 units are invested which are increased to 41.6 units. Accordingly, each 
group member receives 10.4 units back. Thus, the other group members profit from the amount 
you invest into the project, on the other hand, you profit from contributions of the others 
(irrespective of your own payment). 
Furthermore, before each round, you are requested to estimate the average contributions of 
the other group members. For precise estimations, you will, as before, be rewarded with 50 
[euro-] cent. 
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Thus, your total income is the sum of your income you kept on your “private account”, of 
payoffs from the project, and of rewards for your estimations. 
Click on “next” to see the control questions. If you want, you can click on according buttons 
to use a calculator or to see these instructions again. I will not receive any money for this task. 
Nevertheless, please take care in answering the questions correctly. 
 
Control Questions 
Each group member has 20 units of “play money”. Assume that none of the four group 
members (including you) contributes anything to the project.  
What will your income (from the “private account” and the project) be?  
What will the income (from the “private account” and the project”) of the other group 
members be? 
[next page] 
The correct answer is: Each group member will earn 20 units (20 units from the “private 
account” and 0 units from the project). 
[next page] 
Each group member has 20 units of “play money”. You invest 20 units in the project. Each 
of the other three members of the group also contributes 20 units to the project.  
What will your income (from the “private account” and the project) be? 
What will the income (from the “private account” and the project) of the other group 
members be? 
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[next page] 
The correct answer is: 4 group members times 20 units = 80 units. 80 * 1.6 = 128. Thus, 
128/4 = 32 will be paid out to each group member from the project and 0 units are in the “private 
accounts”. 
[next page] 
Each group member has 20 units of “play money”. The other three members contribute a 
total of 30 units to the project.  
What will your income (from the “private account” and the project) be, if you invest 10 
units?  
What will your income (from the “private account” and the project) be, if you invest nothing?  
[next page] 
1. question: (30+10)*1.6 = 64. 64/4 = 16. Thus, 16 units are paid out to you. As you kept 10 
units, your total income is 16+10 = 26. 
2. question: (30+0)*1.6 = 48. 48/4 = 12. Thus, 12 units are paid out to you. As you kept 20 
units, your total income is 12+20 = 32. 
 
Explanation of the Different Treatments 
Thank you. Now, we will explain the different variants of the experiment, which you will be 
assigned to by lot within a short time in detail: 
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1. variant: “estimator” 
In the “estimator” variant, you will not participate in the experiment actively. Instead, you 
are asked to estimate the contributions of the other participants. 
2. variant: “participant” 
As a “participant”, you will on the one hand estimate the contributions of your group 
members. On the other hand, you will participate in the experiment and in every round you can 
invest any amount of money from your “private account” into the project you want. 
3. variant: “contribution schedule” 
In the third variant, you will estimate the contributions of the others as well. Your 
investments to the project will be calculated automatically afterwards with the help of both, 
your estimation and a so-called contribution schedule, which you will determine before starting 
the experiment. We will explain the functionality of the contribution schedule on the next page. 
In each of the 10 rounds, new group members will be randomly assigned to you. For sure, 
your group members will participate in the same experiment variant like you. Your variant 
will be determined shortly. Afterwards, you can be sure that your group members will be 
assigned to the same variant. 
Click on “next” to see the explanation of the contribution schedule. 
 
The Contribution Schedule 
If you are assigned to the 3. variant, your contribution schedule which you are requested to 
fill in on the next page, will be applied in the experiment. In the schedule, you determine how 
much you want to invest in the project depending on the estimated average contributions of 
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the other three group members. For example, if you always want to contribute 20 units 
irrespective of the estimated contributions of the others, you should enter “20” into all input 
boxes of the schedule. More general, if you want to contribute irrespective of the actions of the 
others, you should enter the same number into all input boxes. In contrast, if you want to 
contribute about as much as the other group members, your entries should increase in the boxes 
0 to 20. For example, if you always want to contribute 2 units more than the average of the 
others, then enter a 3 next to the 1, a 4 next to the 2, and so on. You can also contribute less if 
the others contribute more. If this is the case, your entries should decrease from 0 to 20. Of 
course, all other entries are possible as well, the examples above were chosen randomly. You 
are not informed about the schedules of the others, accordingly, your schedule remains secret 
as well. 
An example: You state in your contribution schedule that you want to contribute 18 units if 
your group members contribute 15 units. If you estimate that the other three group members 
contribute 15 units on average in a certain round, 18 units will be taken from your “private 
account” automatically and will be invested in the project. 
You will fill in your contribution schedule only once; it will be applied for all 10 rounds. In 
contrast, you can make new estimations after each round. 
You will be informed whether you are assigned to the 3. variant after you filled in the 
contribution schedule. Please think about your decisions carefully because the contribution 
schedule will predefine your behavior in the experiment decisively. 
Please click on “next” to fill in your contribution schedule. 
[next page] 
95 
 
 
[next page] 
Thank you. Please explain in two or three sentences, why you filled in the contribution 
schedule specifically in the chosen way. Please use the sheet of paper lying on your desk. Of 
course, these data will only be analyzed anonymously as well. 
 
The Belief Schedule 
Thank you. Please now estimate the average contribution schedule of the other 
participants in this room. Thus, for each of the 21 input boxes, you should estimate what the 
other participants in this room filled in on average just now. For example, start with the first 
input box: Consider, what the others entered into this box. Meaning: How much does the others 
want to contribute on average, if the other group members want to contribute 0? 
For a correct estimation of the average contribution schedule, you will receive 50 [euro-] 
cents at the end of this experiment. For each percent which you deviate from the correct answer, 
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the 50 cent are reduced by 2 percent. Your estimation will be kept secret and has no effect on 
the course of play! 
[next page] 
 
[subjects are assigned to the different treatments now] 
 
Instructions Before Round 1 of the Public Goods Game 
“Participants” in the “Standard Treatment” 
The “participant” role was assigned to you and your contribution schedule will not be 
applied! 
Accordingly, you will determine in each round how much you want to invest in the project, 
your group members will be doing the same. Units which remain on your “private account” and 
which you earn from the project will be credited to you. Additionally, you will estimate the 
contributions of your group members, for each estimation you will receive up to 50 [euro-] 
97 
 
cents. The estimation will be kept secret. In contrast, you will be informed about the average 
contribution of group members (anonymously). Afterwards, new group members will be 
assigned to you and the next round starts. 
Your potential group members have received exactly the same information. 
Please click on “next” to start with round 1! 
 
“Participants” in the “Belief Treatment” 
The “participant” role was assigned to you and your contribution schedule will be applied! 
Accordingly, you will estimate the contributions of your group members. Based on your 
contribution schedule, your own contribution will be determined. Units which remain on your 
“private account” and which you earn from the project will be credited to you. Additionally, for 
each estimation you will receive up to 50 [euro-] cents. The estimation will be kept secret. In 
contrast, you will be informed about the average contribution of group members 
(anonymously). Afterwards, new group members will be assigned to you and the next round 
starts. 
Your potential group members have received exactly the same information. 
Please click on “next” to start with round 1! 
 
“Estimators” in the “Standard Treatment” (“Belief Treatment”) 
The “estimator” role was assigned to you, accordingly, your contribution schedule will not 
be applied. Likewise, (in contrast,) for “participants” in your group, the contribution schedule 
will (not) be applied. 
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Accordingly, in each round, “participants” in your group will state how much they want to 
invest in the project (estimate how much the other group members will contribute. Based on 
this estimation and based on their contribution schedules, contributions of each “participant” 
will be determined”). Now, it is your task to estimate the average of these contributions. Each 
of your estimation will be rewarded with up to 50 [euro-] cents. The estimation will be kept 
secret. Therefore, you will not be able to influence the course of play. You and the “participants” 
will be informed about the average contribution of group members. Afterwards, new 
“participants” will be assigned to you and the next round starts. 
As you are in the “estimator” role, you will probably earn less than the “participants”. 
Therefore, you will now receive a fixed payment of 5 euros. 
Please click on “next” to start with the first round! 
[…] 
Screenshot of Round 2, “Standard Treatment” 
 
“Participants” in the “belief treatment” cannot state own investments (second box). 
Additionally, “estimators” do not see the lowermost box. 
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Abstract:  
We propose that there are three determinants of sender behavior in trust games: Beliefs 
regarding the amounts returned, risk aversion, and reciprocity. Particularly, we are interested in 
the role of reciprocity because the possibility of negative expected reciprocal utility may lead 
to betrayal-averse sender behavior, i.e. to a situation where reciprocal subjects send less money 
than solely selfish ones. In our experiment, most subjects show distinct social preferences in 
the receiver role, but in the sender role they do not distinguish between a standard trust game 
with a human partner and a non-social, lottery-like setting, where a computer plays the role of 
the receiver. This means that the relevance of reciprocity considerations under uncertainty 
might be fundamentally different from those when no uncertainty is present. Furthermore, we 
find that sendings are mainly driven by overoptimistic beliefs. We use a modified version of 
the reciprocity model of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger [Games Econ. Beh. 47 (2004) 268] to 
explain our results and thereby show why reciprocal and selfish subjects almost do not differ in 
their sending behavior if one controls for beliefs and risk aversion. For other experimental 
settings, our model does predict differing behavior, which is in line with findings reported in 
the literature. 
Keywords: investment game, trust game, reciprocity, overoptimism, betrayal aversion, false 
consensus effect 
JEL classification: C72, C91, D03, D81, D84 
 
* Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Breuer 
Chair of Business Administration and Finance 
RWTH University 
Department of Finance 
Templergraben 64 
52056 Aachen 
Germany 
Phone:  +49 241 8093539  
Fax:  +49 241 8092163  
E-mail: wolfgang.breuer@bfw.rwth-aachen.de 
 
** Dipl.-Ing. Anselm Hüwe 
Chair of Business Administration and Finance 
RWTH University 
Department of Finance 
Templergraben 64 
52056 Aachen 
Germany 
Phone:  +49 241 8093505  
Fax:  +49 241 8092163  
E-mail: anselm.huewe@bfw.rwth-aachen.de 
  
101 
 
1 Introduction 
In this paper, we analyze whether reciprocal motives play a role for senders in the trust game. 
Despite a large body of literature on this question, it is still not fully clear what drives sender 
behavior. Probably, subjects send money to receivers because they expect at least some of them 
to return money. These sendings may on the one hand be selfishly motivated, as they can yield 
a positive return. On the other hand, sendings may be influenced by reciprocal preferences, as 
they offer the possibility of making both players better off. Which of these motives prevails is 
an important question, because human interactions following the incentive scheme of trust 
games can be observed ubiquitously in economic life. Knowing the motives of senders allows 
us to better understand when such welfare increasing interactions can be established. For 
example, reciprocally oriented business people might prefer a “hand-shake”-environment to a 
formal and contractually secured one, even when the monetary consequences are identical. 
People might prefer to lend money to acquaintances instead of putting it into a bank account, 
even when the yields are the same. However, preferences might be exactly the other way round, 
because a failure of an investment hurts particularly if it comes along with reciprocal 
interaction. If the latter view is true, people might also be willing to pay more for insurance 
against risks if these risks are believed to have reciprocal elements. Up to now, the findings of 
the experimental literature answering such questions are not consistent: Several papers 
conclude that reciprocally oriented senders act in a betrayal-averse way, suggesting that they 
send less money than if they were purely selfishly oriented (Aimone and Houser 2012; Bohnet 
and Zeckhauser 2004; Bohnet et al. 2008; Hong and Bohnet 2007). In contrast, other researchers 
state that sendings in social environments are higher than in non-social ones (Fetchenhauer and 
Dunning 2009 and 2012), which corresponds to the finding that subjects with distinct social 
preferences send higher amounts than selfish subjects (Altmann et al. 2008; Ashraf et al. 2006; 
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Cox 2004). Such comparisons of the literature are hindered by the fact that researchers have not 
agreed on a formal definition of trust and betrayal aversion yet. Trust may be associated with 
certain levels of sendings (which is a behavioral definition based on Coleman 1990) or with the 
belief that the sender has about the receiver’s reaction (see, e.g., Cox 2004). Kazuhiro (2009) 
has suggested a formal definition of betrayal aversion, which introduces a betrayal discount on 
the sender’s utility if the monetary payoff stems from a social interaction. This definition 
however has not been adopted by other researchers so far. In this paper, we derive betrayal 
aversion from the reciprocity model of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), DK henceforth, 
and propose that subjects act in a betrayal-averse way if expected reciprocal utility from an 
interaction is negative. Betrayal-averse behavior is thus a consequence of negative reciprocal 
marginal utility, as risk-averse behavior is a consequence of decreasing monetary marginal 
utility. 
To measure betrayal-averse behavior, we use an experimental design which allows us to 
compare sending decisions in the standard version of the trust game (trust game, henceforth) 
with investments in a computer setting, where the distribution of returns to the sender is known 
to be identical, but is determined by a non-social computer draw (investment task, henceforth). 
As well, we precisely control for senders’ beliefs, risk aversion, and social preferences. 
Typically, previous studies have not done so (see Fehr 2009, for an overview), but have only 
focused on one or on two of these three factors: Researchers have controlled for trust and social 
considerations, but not for risk aversion (Cox 2004), for risk and social preferences, but not for 
beliefs (Houser et al. 2010), or for risk and beliefs, but not for social preferences (Eckel and 
Wilson 2004). In contrast, Ashraf et al. (2006) address all three parameters mentioned above 
and find a small positive influence of social preferences. However, they do not have a non-
social setting which would allow them to precisely disentangle social from non-social motives. 
Other studies have compared behavior in social and in non-social settings and have thereby 
taken care to ensure that results cannot be biased by beliefs about different return distributions: 
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A design using minimal acceptable winning probabilities (MAPs, see Bohnet and Zeckhauser 
2004, or Fetchenhauer and Dunning 2012) only allows the elicitation of a subject’s switching 
point with respect to the average expected payoff, eliminating distributional concerns. 
However, in this paper, we propose that such concerns are an important determination of 
betrayal aversion. Aimone and Houser (2012) use a design very similar to ours, but do not 
measure intentions with the help of monetary payoffs. Instead, they concentrate on 
informational aspects: Subjects seem to prefer not to trust “their” co-player, but choose to be 
paid according to the decision of another receiver. 
The contribution of our paper is as follows: First, we show how the reciprocity model of DK 
can be applied to explain experimentally observed behavior in trust games. Thereby, a formal 
definition of betrayal aversion unfolds. Second, we present a new, graphical way of eliciting 
beliefs and decisions, which allows us to use the strategy method (Selten 1967) in the receiver 
role, even when senders have a continuous strategy space. Third, as we control for beliefs and 
risk aversion, we have precise information on senders’ selfish motives, and we can use these 
data to justify why reciprocity and betrayal aversion play only a very limited role for senders’ 
decisions. However, we will also show that our model offers the possibility to explain 
seemingly opposed literature results by accounting for the different experimental parameters 
which have been used. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we adapt the DK model to make 
it applicable for trust games. In Section 3, we describe our experimental setting, followed by a 
presentation of the results in Section 4. Therein, we also test our theoretical predictions. Section 
5 concludes. 
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2 Model and Research Hypotheses 
The experimental setting we are interested in is a trust game similar to that of Berg et al. 
(1995): A sender is matched with an anonymous receiver and can send him any fraction of her 
endowment (which we denote as si  in the following, 0 ≤ si ≤ 1), where it is tripled by the 
experimenter. Afterwards, the receiver can return any amount, which is characterized by kj (0 ≤ 
kj ≤ 3∙si ). Rational selfish senders will choose si = 0  if they anticipate that rational selfish 
receivers will return nothing. The typical experimental finding, however, is that many subjects 
do send money and many receivers do return money. While it is yet unclear how to model 
sender behavior, receiver behavior can be explained with the help of social preferences (for 
example, with the help of the outcome-based theory of Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), and, more 
specifically, by using models of reciprocal behavior: McCabe et al. (2003) find that receiver 
behavior in the trust game can be better understood with the help of reciprocity (intention-
based) models than inequality (outcome-based) models (see also Dunning et al. 2012). 
Accordingly, we assume that subjects are driven by reciprocal motives, and we adopt the 
reciprocity model of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) to predict behavior in trust games 
both in the sender and the receiver role.  
DK propose that people want to reciprocate kindness with kindness (and unkindness with 
unkindness accordingly), where i’s kindness to j at a specific node h of the game, called 
κij (ai(h), (bij(h))
j≠i
), is measured by the surplus of monetary payoffs that i expects j to have 
gained by the end of a game (given her belief about his strategy bij(h)), if i departs from a 
certain reference strategy by choosing ai(h) from her strategy space. Accordingly, κij will be 
negative if i is unkind to j (for further details, we refer to DK themselves). The belief of i about 
j’s kindness to herself is denoted as λiji (bij(h)). DK assume that utility is created in two 
different mental accounts – one for utility from money and one for utility from reciprocity. 
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Thus, a utility function of person i consists of two terms, weighted with an exogenously given 
non-negative reciprocity parameter Yij: 
Ui (ai(h), (bij(h))
j≠i
)  = πi (ai(h), (bij(h))
j≠i
)  +  
∑ (𝑌𝑖𝑗 ⋅ 𝜅𝑖𝑗 (𝑎𝑖(ℎ), (𝑏𝑖𝑗(ℎ))
𝑗≠𝑖
) ⋅ 𝜆𝑖𝑗𝑖 (𝑏𝑖𝑗(ℎ)))j∈N\{i} .  (1) 
The first term πi represents i’s direct monetary payoff and the second term (after weighting 
with Yij) reflects i’s reciprocal utility expressed in monetary units as well. Multiplying κij by 
λiji, the model displays reciprocal preferences: If λiji is positive (negative), i can raise her utility 
by increasing (decreasing) κij, if it is not too costly. Moreover, i will dislike situations where 
she is friendly and j is unfriendly (and vice versa). 
This model is able to qualitatively predict receiver behavior in trust games (see Section 4.1 
and Appendix A; Appendices are available from the authors upon request). However, DK 
propose an arbitrary definition of kindness, which is not suited for the trust game, and which 
we will therefore modify below. Furthermore, DK assume that the reciprocity parameter of the 
co-player, and thereby her strategy, are known. Such an approach cannot capture the fact that 
receiver behavior is diverse and that the sender faces a situation with incomplete information. 
Without modifications, DK are not able to make predictions for sender behavior under 
uncertainty. Therefore, we will use a modified and generalized version of the DK model, which 
has also been proposed in Breuer and Hüwe (2014) in the context of public goods games: 
1. To determine (un)kindness, we use a different reference point than DK, who themselves 
admit that their reference point has been chosen without deep justification. DK measure 
kindness of i to j by comparing j’s material payoff with the average of the highest and the 
lowest possible material payoff of j that is compatible with i choosing an efficient strategy. 
Instead, our reference point relies on the status quo: We consider it to be kind if the co-
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player is made better off compared to his situation before the game starts. Therefore, in the 
trust game, the sender’s kindness to the receiver is κij = 3∙si − kij, meaning that the sender 
has to determine the receiver’s profit, which depends on her action, si, and on her belief 
about the receiver’s reaction, kij. Accordingly, senders cannot be unkind in the trust game. 
The receiver’s kindness is determined by the difference between the returned amount and 
the received amount, meaning that receivers can be both kind and unkind. This is in line 
with the definition of trustworthiness (kj > si) of Berg et al. (1995), which they adopted from 
Coleman (1990). Accordingly, j’s kindness to i is κji = kj − si. We will also justify these 
reference points with the help of our experimental findings in Section 4.1.  
2. As suggested in DK, p. 291, as a potential modification of their original approach, the square 
root is used in order to have concave utility from kindness. This is consistent with the 
assumption that utility from direct payments is concave as well (see below). Therefore, κij = 
√3∙si − kij. For the receiver, κji = √kj − si if kj ≥ si, and if kj < si, κji is convex with κji = −
√si − kj. 
3. Not knowing the co-player, we can introduce a simplification: Instead of using the 
reciprocity parameter Yij, we will write Yi in the following, meaning that Yi is independent 
of j: Subjects in the lab play anonymously. Thus, they have no possibility to condition 
strategies on their co-players. 
4. We want to capture the fact that first players have imperfect information about a second 
player’s reaction. The situation might even be seen to be ambiguous, as probabilities of 
specific reactions are not known either. For modeling purposes, we will however assume 
that i knows the probability distribution of Ỹj in the subject pool, but she does not know 
with which player she is matched. Furthermore, it is assumed that all subjects will maximize 
their expected utility. 
107 
 
5. We allow for biased beliefs, meaning that the first player can systematically misestimate a 
second player’s behavior: We assume that senders anticipate the receivers’ optimizing 
calculus, but we allow this anticipation to be biased: This modification reflects the typical 
experimental finding that subjects’ beliefs are distorted (compare, for example, Breuer and 
Hüwe, 2014). In our model, a factor εi is introduced, which distorts the believed return from 
receiver j as follows: kij = min{kj∙εi; 2∙si}, with εi ≥ 0. A sender with unbiased beliefs, as in 
DK, thus has εi = 1. When applying the model to our experimental data, we will use an 
upper limit 2∙si for beliefs in order to avoid that very optimistic reciprocal subjects send less 
money than pessimistic ones: The reciprocal utility component is decreasing for kj∙εi > 2∙si 
(see equation (7) below) because very high amounts returned come along with very low 
payoffs for the receiver, implying that the sender perceives herself to be not very kind. To 
shorten, we will denote i’s belief as kj∙εi in the following, but keep the limitation in mind. 
6. As it is important under uncertainty to account for risk aversion preferences, we do so by 
assuming constant relative risk aversion with respect to monetary payoffs, which is a 
common assumption. More specifically, the utility from money is set to 
𝑈(π) = {
   (π)1r   if r < 1,
ln(π)       if r = 1,
(π)1r   if r > 1.
  (2) 
Subjects with r < 0 are risk-seeking (i.e. risk aversion is negative in this case), whereas 
subjects with r = 0 are risk-neutral, and r > 0 implies risk aversion. In standard trust games, 
believed profits are πi = 1 − si + kj∙εi  in the sender role, and πj = 3∙si − kj in the receiver 
role. 
With r = 0, εi = 1, and known Yj, the model collapses into the version suggested in DK 
(except the fact that different reference points are used). As well, with r = 0, it is basically 
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identical to the version used in Breuer and Hüwe (2014). Section 4 in this paper proves that 
actual subject behavior can be better explained by giving up these simplifying assumptions. 
We will now present subject behavior derived from the model in order to formulate 
hypotheses which enable us to test the model predictions empirically. 
2.1 Receiver role 
Receivers are assumed to maximize the following utility function: 
Uj = (3∙si − kj)
1−rj
{
 
 +Yj ∙ √(3∙si −  kj) ∙ (kj − si), if kj ≥ si,
−Yj ∙ √(3∙si −  kj) ∙ (si − kj), if kj < si.
  (3) 
In contrast to the sender role (see below), we only allow for rj{0; 0.5} in the receiver role. 
We do so for a number of reasons. First of all, this enables us to investigate situations with risk 
neutrality regarding money, rj = 0, as well as with risk aversion, i.e. rj > 0 . Risk-seeking 
behavior with respect to money is not common according to our experimental data. Moreover, 
the choice rj= 0.5 mirrors our assumption concerning the curvature of the reciprocal utility 
component, and rj{0; 0.5} makes it possible to present analytical solutions which qualitatively 
capture results for other values rj > 0 as well. 
If rj = 0 and kj ≥ si, Uj has a maximum at 
kj
*
 = (2 −
1
√1 + Yj
2
)  ∙ si,  (4) 
meaning that kj
*
 is linear in si (proofs for statements in Section 2 are presented in Appendix 
B). In contrast, a convex response function is derived if rj is set to 0.5: For kj ≥ si, Uj then has 
a maximum at 
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kj
*
 = 2∙si −√
si
4∙Yj
2  + 
1
64∙Yj
4  + 
1
8∙Yj
2 .  (5) 
With rj < 0, kj
*
 would become concave in si, but as already mentioned, we leave this case 
apart. For kj < si, (4) and (5) have no local maximum (see Appendix B again), making responses 
between 0 and si suboptimal. Thus, subjects have to decide between returning kj
*
 and kj = 0: If 
Yj is large (small), reciprocal utility is given more (less) weight then utility from money, and kj
*
 
(kj = 0) is chosen. In the case of rj = 0, the according threshold is independent of si: It can be 
shown that the threshold value is Yj ≈ 0.51, meaning that receivers start to return money when 
they perceive being trustworthy to be at least about half as important as receiving money. In the 
case of rj = 0.5, the threshold depends on si and can numerically be determined if the utility 
from returning nothing is compared to the utility from returning kj
*
: 
Uj(kj = 0) = √3∙si − Yj ∙ √3∙si = √3∙si −  kj
*
 + Yj ∙ √(3∙si − kj
*) ∙ (kj
* − si) = Uj(kj = kj
*).  (6) 
Based on these derivations, our model makes the following predictions: Receivers either (1) 
never return money, (2) have a response function which is linearly increasing in si, or (3) have 
a response function which is zero at small sendings, and increasing at increasing rates for larger 
sendings. If receivers return money, then si < kj
*
 < 2∙si. Although receiver behavior is not our 
primary interest, we test whether our model is able to explain it more precisely than existing 
theories can, and we formulate:  
Hypothesis 1: Prediction mistakes in our model with respect to receiver behavior are 
smaller than in the original model of DK or in the Fehr-Schmidt model. 
For the receiver, no uncertainty is present, and therefore risk aversion is irrelevant. However, 
risk aversion is typically seen as an implication of a concave utility function. Such a utility 
function creates wealth effects in situations without uncertainty, meaning that risk-averse (risk-
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seeking) senders should typically show a convex (concave) response function as a receiver. 
Nevertheless, with r being restricted to {0; 0.5}, we can determine r in both roles for each 
subject in our data, and we will find no statistical evidence for a correlation between roles. We 
will therefore not require r to be identical across both roles, which allows a more precise 
description of receiver behavior (or, in turn: risk aversion in the sender role). Thus, we assume 
that the elasticity of substitution between direct monetary utility and reciprocal utility can be 
separated from the elasticity of substitution between safe and risky choices. A similar separation 
has been proposed in the literature before with regard to the disentanglement of risk preferences 
and time preferences (see Epstein and Zin 1989). 
2.2 Beliefs 
What returns do senders expect from receivers? Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2009) are not 
aware of any literature support on overoptimistic beliefs. Instead, the authors mention support 
for either accurate or pessimistic beliefs, and find distinct pessimistic beliefs in their own 
experiment. However, Breuer and Hüwe (2014) find significant overoptimism in the context of 
public goods games. Furthermore, the literature on trust games typically reports that many 
subjects send money (compare Johnson and Mislin 2011). This is the case, although Camerer 
(2003) can summarize that “the fact that the [monetary] return to trust is around zero seems 
fairly robust.” We suppose that subjects are typically not aware of such low returns from trust. 
Instead, we propose: 
Hypothesis 2: Beliefs about average amounts returned by receivers are overoptimistically 
biased. 
2.3 Sender Role 
Utility for the sender is set to 
111 
 
Ui = 
{
 
 
 
   (1 − si + k̃j
* 
∙εi)
1−ri
, if ri < 1
ln (1 − si + k̃j
*
∙εi)       , if ri = 1 
− (1 − si + k̃j
*
∙εi)
1−ri
, if ri > 1
{
 
 + Yi ∙ √(3∙si − k̃j
*
∙εi) ∙ (k̃j
*
∙εi − si) , if k̃j
*
∙εi ≥ si,
−Yi ∙ √(3∙si − ?̃?j
*∙εi) ∙ (si − k̃j
*
∙εi) , if k̃j
*
∙εi < si.
  (7) 
Additionally to high utility from money, reciprocal senders gain utility from successful 
interactions with the responder, and vice versa, if the interaction fails, senders suffer from small 
utility from money and from reciprocal disutility. Having agreed on a utility function for 
reciprocal senders, betrayal aversion can now be formally defined: We suggest that in trust 
games, a reciprocal sender acts in a betrayal-averse way if she ceteris paribus sends less money 
than a purely selfish-oriented sender. Such a behavior is a consequence of expected reciprocal 
(marginal) utility being negative. This definition implies that the extent of betrayal aversion 
depends in particular on a subject’s overoptimism parameter and on the perceived probability 
distribution of different receiver types. In Sections 4.4 and 4.6, we will show how these 
dependencies connect betrayal aversion to specific experimental settings, which can explain 
why findings in the literature are seemingly opposed to one another. 
Although an explicit solution for optimal behavior according to equation (7) cannot be 
derived analytically, some general implications regarding sender behavior can nevertheless be 
provided. These implications will be presented in the following, with purely selfish senders 
being considered first and reciprocal senders being analyzed afterwards. 
Obviously, the optimal selfish sending decision (denoted as ŝi
*
 in the following) is zero if 
?̃?j = 0 ∀ j (money will never be returned) or εi ≤ 0.5 (it is believed that k̃j
*
∙εi ≥ si will never be 
returned). Furthermore, ŝi
*
 = 1 if only friendly receivers are believed to be in the subject pool 
(k̃j
*
(si = 1) ∙ εi > 1 ∀ j). However, these are not typical parameter values. If linear and convex 
response functions as well as zero returns are common in the receiver pool, i’s expected profit 
function is convex (already compare the “average model prediction function” in Fig. 3). 
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Ei(π̃i(si)) always equals 1 for si = 0. If a receiver pool with limited size is considered and si is 
gradually increased, Ei(π̃i(si)) jumps upwards whenever equation (6) is fulfilled for a single 
receiver in the pool. Sendings at the left limit of such a saltus can never be optimal, because 
switching to the right limit increases returns from at least one receiver, and increases costs in 
the form of higher sendings only infinitesimally. We will find that Ei(π̃i(si)) is decreasing for 
small sendings, and increasing for larger ones. If it is believed to increase above 1, a positive 
yield from sending that amount of money is expected. Accordingly, risk-averse subjects will 
never choose “small” sendings, which are associated with Ei(π̃i(si)) < 1: These sendings are 
associated with less profits and higher risks than a sending of zero. In contrast, with sufficiently 
high beliefs and sufficiently low risk aversion, a “large” sending might be chosen. As the 
variance of payoffs increases in si (note that, by definition, 𝑘𝑗∗̃ is linearly or convexly increasing 
in si with 𝑘𝑗∗̃
′
> 1, or 𝑘𝑗∗̃ equals zero), the sending will typically – if not being zero – increase 
for a subject that is less risk-averse. Risk-seeking subjects value the variance of returns mirror-
invertedly: If E (k̃j
*
(si = 1)∙εi)  > 1) , ŝi
*
 = 1  will be chosen, because this maximizes both 
expected returns and the variance of payoffs. With lower beliefs, “small” sendings on the 
decreasing part of the expected profit function may be optimal, depending on the specific 
parameters. 
The following statements hold true as well: The more money is sent, the more receivers will 
start to return money. Also, remember that receivers always return more than what they 
received. Thus, believing in higher returns – meaning with εi increasing –, higher sendings will 
become more attractive (when being matched with a reciprocal receiver), or yield the same 
utility as before (when being matched with a free rider). Accordingly, ceteris paribus, higher 
overoptimism will – if having any effect – increase the optimal sending. Furthermore, higher 
sendings are always associated with a larger spread of returns. Thus, we propose 
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Hypothesis 3: Sendings in the trust game (1) increase with more optimistic beliefs, and 
(2) decrease with higher risk aversion. 
We now ask whether and how reciprocity considerations affect our findings presented so far. 
We have to state that this is parameter-dependent. Consider the following properties of the 
reciprocal utility component: 
1. If the receiver has a linear response function, the reciprocal utility component depends 
on si in a linear way. The slope is positive if the receiver is believed to play friendly, 
and negative if he is believed to play unfriendly. 
2. If the response function is convex, the reciprocal utility component of the sender is 
convex in si as well, starting in the origin with a slope of 0 in the friendly case and with 
a negative slope in the unfriendly case. 
If ?̃?j = 0 ∀ j or εi ≤ 0.5, it is also optimal for senders with both monetary and reciprocal 
preferences (optimal sendings in the trust game are denoted with si
* in the following) to send 
nothing, because with sendings, reciprocal utility is negative if returns smaller than si  are 
expected. As well, if k̃j
*
(si = 1) ∙ 𝜀𝑖 > 1 ∀ j , reciprocal utility is again maximal at si
* = 1 . 
Regarding a mixed receiver pool, 1. and 2. imply that the expected utility from reciprocity is 
also convex, meaning that it decreases at small sendings (if one does not consider a saltus, 
where utility jumps upwards), and increases at large sendings if the receiver pool is believed to 
be sufficiently reciprocal.  
If expected reciprocal utility is increasing (decreasing) at the selfishly optimal sending 
decision, reciprocal senders will either increase (diminish) the sending compared to the selfish 
solution, leave their decision unchanged if they are stuck at a saltus, or the sending will jump 
to si
* = 0  ( si
* = 1 ) if Yi  is large enough and expected reciprocal utility at si = 1  is smaller 
(greater) than zero. A more concrete definition of “small” and “large” cannot be given: Due to 
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the curvature of the reciprocal utility component, the distribution of returns matters. While the 
distribution of receivers in our subject pool will turn out to be such that positive reciprocal 
utility is expected if the monetary return is expected to be positive as well, this implication does 
not necessarily hold true (a proof can be found in Appendix B). 
As already mentioned, risk-averse subjects choose a sending on the increasing part of the 
expected profit function if they believe in positive yields. Such a sending is always associated 
with increasing expected reciprocal utility, because if amounts returned are expected to be 
positive, they are also expected to increase. Accordingly, including reciprocal considerations, 
the sending should be slightly increased compared to the selfish case. However, if (the 
uncertain) reciprocal utility is unfavorably distributed, the absolute value of expected reciprocal 
utility can be negative, meaning that si = 0 can become optimal. Also, as expected reciprocal 
utility is convex, si = 1 can be optimal from a reciprocal point of view. Accordingly, it is 
possible that si jumps to one of these extrema. Similar considerations can be made for risk-
loving subjects. Without knowing the model parameters, we cannot make a clear prediction as 
to whether subjects will behave betrayal-aversely or not, and therefore we build no hypothesis 
on this issue at this point. In contrast, we will derive a hypothesis after we have calculated the 
model parameters with the help of our experimental data, meaning that we make the hypothesis 
contingent on found receiver behavior, on belief distortions of senders, and on their risk 
aversion. As a consequence, Hypothesis 4 will be presented at the end of Section 4.4. 
3 Experimental Design and Procedures 
3.1 Experimental Tasks 
Following our argumentation presented above, careful controlling for the sender’s beliefs 
and risk aversion is essential if the influence of reciprocal motives on the sending decision is to 
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be researched. We controlled for these factors in our experiment by using the following design 
(see also screenshots and the experimental instructions, which are available upon request): 
Subjects had to play the standard trust game, in both the sender and the receiver role. In the 
receiver role, the strategy method was used. Senders were equipped with 10 currency units (CU, 
henceforth, worth EUR 3.33 or approximately USD 4.51). Subjects also had to decide about 
the amount sent in the non-social investment task, which had the same (but unknown) return 
distribution as the trust game, because the receiver decision was drawn from the selfsame 
subject pool. To control for beliefs, we asked subjects to estimate the average expected amount 
returned by the receiver in the trust game conditional on si , denoted as  Ei(k̃j(si))  in the 
following. For that task and for inputs in the receiver role, we programmed a novel graphical 
interface, which will be explained in more detail below. To determine subjects’ risk aversion in 
the sender role, we asked them to state certainty equivalents in the investment task, again 
conditional on the sending. The proceeding was incentive-compatible, similarly to the approach 
of Holt and Laury (2002). All of these tasks were incentivized. Additionally, several control 
questions were asked: We wanted to know demographic data (gender, age, country of birth, 
course of study if a student, wealth status, number of siblings), and asked questions taken from 
the World Values Survey that are associated with trust and risk (“Generally speaking, would 
you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with 
people?”, “Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, 
or would they try to be fair?”, “Living in secure surroundings is important to this person; to 
avoid anything that might be dangerous.”, “Adventure and taking risks are important to this 
person; to have an exciting life.”). 
3.2 Procedure 
Subjects arrived at the lab and were randomly assigned to their places. After the participants 
had been welcomed, the written instructions were distributed, and subjects were given plenty 
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of time to read them and to ask any questions. The experiment itself started with a lottery task 
which measured risk aversion in a situation where the probability distribution of returns was 
known: Subjects had to choose between safe amounts and the risky lottery, where they could 
win any amount between CU 0 and CU 10, each with equal probability. For each safe amount, 
which could take values of CU 1, 3, 4, 4.5, 4.75, 5, 5.25, 5.75, 6.5, and 8, subjects had to indicate 
whether they preferred the lottery or the safe amount. Consistently playing subjects chose the 
safe amount if it was high and the lottery if the safe amount was low; the crossover point thus 
determined a subject’s certainty equivalent within (typically) close boundaries. Subjects were 
not informed about any outcomes during the experiment in order to avoid wealth effects and 
interdependencies across decisions. 
After the lottery task and between the following stages, a total of six control questions were 
asked, so that we could check whether subjects had understood the experimental design. Such 
questions were incentivized with EUR 0.1 each (we converted EUR into CU only within the 
game itself). Then, subjects found out that they had been assigned to the sender role: At that 
stage of the experiment, subjects did not know that they would play both roles (and – at least in 
the “standard” treatment (see below) – they did not know about the investment task setting so 
far, either). Instead, they were only informed that they would be randomly matched with an 
anonymous co-player, one of them taking role A (which was the sender role) and the other one 
role B (the receiver role). We did so to ensure that decisions in the sender role were not 
distorted, as there is evidence from the literature that knowing about playing both roles affects 
subjects’ decisions (Burks et al. 2003). Our formulation allowed us to assign all subjects to role 
A first and to role B later on, without deceiving them. Having been informed about their role, 
subjects had to decide about the amount to be sent. At the subsequent stage, subjects were 
unexpectedly told that they had to repeat the experiment in the sender role, but that this time 
they would not be matched with a real receiver, but would be sending the money to the 
computer. We explained that the computer would determine the amount returned by randomly 
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drawing a decision from one of the human receivers in the lab. Furthermore, we explicitly made 
clear that compared to the last sending decision, the situation had not changed with regard to 
the sender’s own earnings. The difference from the prior situation was the fact that now the 
sending decision was not affecting another person’s payoffs. We were aware of the 
disadvantage that these explanations framed both treatments as being similar, but nevertheless 
included these sentences to ensure that senders understood that the distribution of returns was 
unknown but equal in both treatments. To avoid hedging considerations, only one of the two 
sending decisions was selected randomly and paid out at the end of the experiment. 
As explained so far, a within-subject design was used. To check whether a between-subject 
design would lead to different results and to test for any sequence effects, we conducted two 
different treatments. The “standard” treatment has just been explained above. Our second 
treatment, the “inverse” treatment, differed only regarding the fact that subjects were told on 
their computer screens directly before being asked for their first sending decision that they 
would not be participating in the experiment as explained in the instructions. Instead, the 
investment-game version was presented to them. Since subjects had not known that a decision 
in the trust-game version would follow, the two treatments represent a between-subject design. 
The “inverse” treatment proceeded with the subjects being told unexpectedly that the sending 
decision would have to be repeated, this time in a setting as explained in the instructions. 
In the next stage, the estimation task followed, in which subjects had to estimate, conditional 
on si, how much they expected the receiver to return, and they had to enter their estimation into 
a diagram (see also Fig. 1). 
<<< Insert Fig. 1 about here >>> 
For sendings of CU 1.67, 3.33, 5, 7.5, and 10, respectively, subjects had to position five dots 
in the diagram and thereby make their decisions. On the abscissa, the amount sent (and – in 
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parentheses – the tripled amount which B would receive) was plotted. To make the dots appear, 
subjects first had to click into the diagram and they could shift the dots along the vertical lines 
afterwards. We chose a graphical input mechanism to allow subjects to easily express their 
beliefs and preferences consistently: In the diagram, subjects could sketch the function 
Ei(k̃j(si)). Values between the dots were interpolated linearly. EUR 2 could be earned for a 
correct estimation of all five points; earnings were proportionally reduced by EUR 1 for an 
average estimation mistake of CU 1. Payments could not become negative. According to 
Hypothesis 2, we expected that subjects would show overoptimistic beliefs, and we provided 
this comparably strong incentive to be sure that results were reliable (see also Gächter and 
Renner 2010, who find that beliefs are expressed more precisely if they are incentivized). 
<<< Insert Fig. 2 about here >>> 
The estimations having been completed, we explained the following lottery tasks (see Fig. 
2): For the same sendings as in the estimation task, subjects had to decide 10 times whether 
they preferred to receive a safe payment (Option 1) or to participate in a lottery (Option 2). 
These lotteries mirrored the investment task, and offered earnings dependent on the return 
decision of a responder who was randomly chosen from the subject pool. Again, we explicitly 
made clear that this draw would not have any monetary consequences for a person B. Both one 
of the five lotteries (each one reflecting a different sending), and one of the ten lines in the 
options tables (receive CU z or participate in the lottery) were randomly chosen at the end of 
the experiment and the payment was disbursed accordingly. Thus, the way of eliciting subjects’ 
certainty equivalents was incentive-compatible. The safe payment option varied for each 
subject depending on his or her expected amount returned: The upper five safe payments were 
computed with CU  z = [1  s + Ei(k̃j)(s) + (3∙s  Ei(k̃j)(s))  ∙ x] ∙10 , with x representing a 
fraction of 60 %, 30 %, 15 %, 5 %, and 0 % of the maximal possible markup on the expected 
profit (s is denoted without an index to indicate that the sending-dependent variable does not 
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refer to a sending of a specific subject). The lower five options accounted for CU z = [1  s + 
Ei(k̃j)(s)∙x]∙10, with x = 95 %, 90 %, 80 %, 60 %, and 20 % reducing the expected amount 
returned. The reason for the subject-dependent calibration was the following: We wanted to 
offer small intervals between the safe payment options close to the individually estimated 
amount returned in order to be able to precisely measure the crossover point for typical degrees 
of risk aversion, even if beliefs were distorted. Information was again presented graphically, 
with the dark bar in Fig. 2 representing the amount that subjects would at least receive in that 
lottery, the line showing the individually expected amount returned, and the top of the light bar 
indicating the maximum possible profit for that sending. 
Finally, subjects were told that they would have to take part in the experiment again, this 
time in the B-role, i.e. as a receiver. Inputs had to be entered graphically into a diagram similar 
to the one in the estimation exercise explained above. At the end of the experiment, we matched 
subjects, ran the lotteries, and informed subjects about their earnings. 
All experiments were computerized, using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). The 
experiments were conducted in the computer lab of RWTH Aachen University in August and 
November 2013. In two sessions with a total of 58 participants, the “standard” treatment was 
played; another two sessions with 44 participants used the “inverse” treatment. Participants 
were – with a few exceptions – students from various disciplines, with the majority studying 
business administration or industrial engineering and management. 
4 Experimental Results 
Results for the receiver role are presented first, followed by an analysis of subjects’ beliefs. 
Afterwards, the sender behavior in the trust game and in the investment task is analyzed, and 
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our hypotheses are tested. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1, and will be analyzed 
throughout Section 4. 
<<< Insert Table 1 about here >>> 
4.1 Reciprocity in the Receiver Role 
Consistent with the literature, we find that only a minority of subjects (12.7 %) always 
behaves according to the selfish prediction and never returns money. Alternatively, 24 % (24 
subjects) are counted as being free riders in Table 1 because Yj = 0 is also attributed to subjects 
who return only very small amounts (see below). Most responders (81.4 %) return money, and 
never reduce “amount returned” if the sending is increased. Only a very small fraction (5.9 %) 
shows “other” patterns. The first two observations are in line with our model predictions. We 
conclude that our method of eliciting preferences graphically yields a very consistent dataset. 
Our model predicts that either kj = 0 or kj > si should be chosen, and indeed this is true in 
many cases: Roughly between 81 % (for  si = 0.17 and si = 1) and 55 % (for  si = 0.33) of the 
receivers’ reactions are in line with this prediction (due to the graphical interface, subjects could 
only enter values with an accuracy of about 0.2 CU). We suspect that our model is least precise 
at  si = 0.33, because (only) at this sending, inequality-averse receivers who want to be better 
off than the sender must return less than what they have received (see below). Furthermore, 
almost all “amounts returned” (about 95 %) are smaller than 2∙si, which is also in line with our 
model. 
Indeed, receivers typically answer higher sendings with either a linear or a slightly convex 
increase in “amount returned”. In some cases, subjects choose linear profiles with kj ≈  si or 
kj ≈ 1.5∙si . While such behavior is in line with our model, it cannot be predicted with the 
reference points which define kindness in the original model version of DK (we show a 
derivation of receiver behavior according to DK in Appendix A) because DK consider small 
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sendings to be unkind and therefore predict that they are answered with no returns. Furthermore, 
many subjects establish equality in payments by returning kj ≈ max{0; 2∙s − 0.5} . Such 
behavior is predicted by inequality aversion theories, such as that of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) 
(see Appendix C), but is captured with our convex response function (equation (5) with 
Yj = 0.39) quite precisely as well. 
To exactly evaluate the fit of our model, we minimize the mean squared error (MSE) for six 
equally distributed, “amounts returned” per subject (at  si = 0.17, 0.33, 0.5, 0.67 (interpolated), 
0.83 (interpolated), 1). Thus, either equation (4) or equation (5) is applied, and Yj is determined 
in such a way that it results in the best fit. This procedure attributes Yj = 0 to 24 % of all subjects, 
and positive reciprocity parameters to the large majority of the subject pool (compare Table 1). 
Doing so, returns can be predicted with an accuracy of CU 1.7 (root of the average MSE). This 
is slightly more precise than the original model of DK, which predicts behavior with an 
accuracy of CU 1.9. The difference between the MSEs is significant (Mann-Whitney-U-test, p 
< 0.05). We also calculate the fit of the Fehr-Schmidt model: While, as described above, some 
subjects play exactly according to their prediction, others do not, leading to an average accuracy 
of CU 2.2. Although the Fehr-Schmidt model is less precise than the DK model according to 
the root of the average MSE, a Mann-Whitney-U-test finds no significant difference to the 
preciseness of our model. 
To summarize, with respect to the receiver role, our modifications of the DK model result 
only in small improvements of the accuracy. Thus, little support is found for Hypothesis 1. 
However, note that we modified the DK model not to describe the receiver role, but to describe 
behavior in the sender role, which cannot be captured by DK at all. Thus, we conclude that our 
modifications do not worsen predictions for the receiver role and simultaneously enable us to 
capture the sender role, which we will describe in more detail in Sections 4.4 and 4.5. 
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<<< Insert Fig. 3 about here >>> 
We also display average model predictions for decisions in the receiver role graphically, see 
Fig. 3 (presented as “amount kept” by the sender + average “predicted amount returned”): The 
graph reveals that most convex predicted response functions jump right before or after one of 
the six “amounts returned” which enter the MSE calculation. This effect is driven by the 
optimizing process with respect to Y𝑗: In order to assure high (low) return predictions at high 
sendings without having to predict a positive (zero) “amount returned” at a lower sending, Y𝑗 
is chosen in such a way that the function jumps just before or after one of the six data points. 
Fig. 3 also reveals that at  si = 1, actual “amounts returned” are significantly higher than 
predicted ones: This is due to the fact that returns from receivers who strive for equal payments 
are systematically underestimated at large sendings. Furthermore, as reported above, some 
subjects chose kj ≥ 2∙si, which we cannot predict and which is especially the case at  si = 1. 
The line of actual “average profits” in Fig. 3 reveals that at small and medium sendings, 
receivers return on average less than what they received. Only if senders risk almost their entire 
endowment, can they expect a small profit of up to 8.1 %. This finding is consistent with 
previous results from the literature. One could also say: The multiplier of three in standard trust 
games is chosen in a such way that many senders should be unsure which sending decision is 
the best (as will be revealed later on, this is not only true with respect to direct monetary 
consequences but under reciprocal considerations as well). Next, we are interested in the issue 
whether senders are aware of this fact. 
4.2 Beliefs Regarding “Amounts Returned” 
As shown in Fig. 3, senders show significant overoptimism regarding their expected profits 
(according to t-tests, p = 0.04 at  si = 0.17 and p < 0.01 for higher sendings): While CU 5.1 are 
returned on average over all data points, senders expect that CU 6.0 will be returned (compare 
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Table 1). Accordingly, Hypothesis 2 is supported, which is good news because it implies that 
cooperation is fostered even when senders are selfish. Furthermore, a distinct false consensus 
effect (Ross et al. 1977) can be found (see Table 2). 
<<< Insert Table 2 about here >>> 
Regression (1) in Table 2 shows that the mistake that senders make when estimating the 
average “amount returned” depends on their own deviation from average behavior in the 
receiver role. We control for s to capture the tendency that overoptimism is higher for larger 
sendings. These variables can explain 19 % of the variance of subjects’ beliefs. The false 
consensus effect thus explains the literature finding that the “reciprocal [subject types] trust 
[i.e., send] more” (see Altmann et al. 2008): At least to a substantial degree, this is only 
indirectly true: The own social preferences increase beliefs, which in turn raise sendings, as will 
be shown later on. 
Despite the fact that the belief elicitation was incentivized, subjects may want to justify their 
sendings by stating adapted beliefs. We test this by determining the influence of |s  si|, which 
is the absolute difference between the sending to which i’s belief refers and i’s own sending. 
This variable allows the measuring of whether overoptimism is more pronounced if returns 
have to be estimated which correspond to sendings being close to one’s own sending. Indeed, 
according to regression (2) of Table 2, we do find such an effect. This result also holds if a 
dummy variable is used instead of |s  si|, see Regression (3): The dummy “own sending” takes 
the value 1 if i’s own sending is equal to the sending that the belief refers to, and takes the value 
0 otherwise. Regression (4) shows results if both aspects of regressions (1) and (2) are 
combined. 
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4.3 Risk Aversion in the Lottery Tasks and Decision Consistency 
As explained in Section 3.2, in the lottery tasks, it is reasonable to “sell” the lottery for a 
high price, but “keep” it if the price is too low. Only 9 % (9 subjects) did not fill out all tables 
consistently; these subjects will be excluded from the data set in the following. To arrive at 
exact certainty equivalents, we assume that the crossover point between the choice of the safe 
amount and the lottery is the average of the lowest chosen and the highest non-chosen safe 
amount. If subjects never (always) chose the safe amount, certainty equivalents of the lottery 
were computed using x = 80 % of the maximum possible markup on the expected “amount 
returned” (x = 10 % of the expected “amount returned”). On average, subjects discount the 
expected “amounts returned” by 12 %, which is a finding almost independent of s. Thus, across 
all data points, subjects believe in total uncertain payoffs (payoffs consist of “amount kept” + 
expected “amount returned”) of CU 10.53, which is on average considered to be as valuable as 
a certain payoff of CU 9.98. Interestingly, in the introductory lottery task with known 
probabilities, the average discount is only 3 %, showing that ambiguity has – as typically 
reported in the literature – a utility decreasing impact. 
By choosing crossover points in the lottery tasks, it was possible to play inconsistently 
compared to one’s decision in the investment task: It is rational to send that amount of money 
in the investment task (denoted as ŝi in the following) which also yields the highest certainty 
equivalent in the lottery tasks (denoted as ŝi
*
 in the following). As subjects had to make their 
sending decision without knowing about the lottery tasks in detail, and as this relationship might 
not be obvious to subjects, consistent play could not be taken for granted. We find that, on 
average, the absolute difference between ŝ𝑖  and ŝi
*
 is CU 3.4. We also analyze the loss of 
certainty equivalent CUs resulting from these differences. Again, if ŝi lies between two data 
points, we interpolate the corresponding certainty equivalent linearly. For 31 % of the subject 
pool, ŝi equals ŝi
*
. Many of these subjects play ŝi = 0 or ŝi = 1. Another 46 % display certainty 
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equivalent differences between ŝ𝑖 and ŝi
*
 of between CU 0 and CU 2 (which is up to 20 % of 
the endowment). The remaining 23 % are classified as playing inconsistently, as their loss in 
certainty equivalents is greater than CU 2. 
For most subjects, ŝ𝑖 is too low compared to ŝi
*
, the average value of ŝi
* − ŝi is CU 1.5. Of 
course, the opposed point of view may be true as well: Certainty equivalents as elicited in the 
lottery tasks may be systematically too high, compared to sendings in the investment task. We 
suppose that the second view is more plausible, because (1) if subjects are explicitly requested 
to determine prices for lotteries, the endowment effect may let subjects claim to “sell” their 
lotteries only at high prices and (2) wishful thinking or a misunderstanding of the determination 
of the lotteries’ “selling” prices may induce subjects to demand high prices. These distortions 
are relevant for the determination of the highest certainty equivalent, because they depend on s 
(with no sendings, the certainty equivalent is fixed at CU 10, while higher sendings lead to a 
greater spread of possible outcomes, thus rendering the determination of certainty equivalents 
more prone to mistakes). 
As explained, for rational decision makers, ŝi should be equal to ŝi
*
. Instead, we only find a 
correlation between ŝi  and ŝi
*
 of 0.41. Both decisions are distinctively correlated, but the 
correlation is low given that there is no rational reason for a deviation. The result can be 
explained by remembering that (1) there is a bias of stating too high certainty equivalents in the 
lotteries and (2) utility from money in the investment task depends on ŝ in a u-shaped form: In 
the extreme case, i’s utility function has two maxima with Ui(ŝi = 0) = Ui(ŝi = 1). If these 
subjects (rationally) randomize, sendings cannot be predicted at all. Indeed, eight of our 
predictions err by the whole strategy space of CU 10, which accounts for 25 % of the total 
prediction error. Furthermore, we are not the only ones who find that subjects to some degree 
behave inconsistently in experiments, compare for example Erner et al. (2013). 
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4.4 Modelling of Sendings in the Trust Game, and Betrayal Aversion Hypothesis 
In this section, we specify how our model can be applied to determine sender behavior in the 
trust game. Furthermore, as pointed out in Section 2.3, we analyze the distribution of receiver 
behavior, of beliefs, and of risk aversion in our subject pool to formulate a hypothesis with 
respect to the role of betrayal aversion. 
To determine sender behavior, utility from money must be correctly weighted against utility 
from reciprocity. We have already pointed out that modeling risk-averse behavior implies 
wealth effects even in certain situations. This may affect trade-offs between utility from money 
and utility from reciprocity. The risk coefficient r could be computed from the risk discount 
(premium) subjects express when stating certainty equivalents, but it can also be derived from 
the curvature of the response function in the receiver role. Furthermore, we mentioned that – 
opposed to the theoretical prediction – both methods do not yield consistent results. Therefore, 
when modeling sender behavior, we have to choose between two possible risk aversion 
coefficients. At the five data points, we proceed as follows: 
Ui = CEi,s
1−r
{
 
  + Y ∙√(3∙si − k̃j
*
∙εi) ∙ (k̃j
*
∙εi − si) , if k̃j
*
∙εi ≥ si,
 −Y ∙√(3∙si − ?̃?j
*∙εi) ∙ (si − k̃j
*
∙εi) , if k̃j
*
∙εi < si.
  (8) 
with r being i’s coefficient in the responder role (r ∈ {0; 0.5}), and CEi,s being i’s certainty 
equivalents elicited in the lottery tasks (which capture risk aversion in the sender role). 
Modeling of the amounts returned has already been explained in Section 4.1. We calibrate εi by 
predicting i’s five elicited beliefs with the help of optimized values for εi and modeled receiver 
behavior. Again, we optimize by minimizing average squared errors of all five belief 
predictions. For sendings between the five data points, CEi,s  is chosen again as a linear 
interpolation (the linear interpolation is a simplification, because it, for example, does not 
capture jumps in the belief function, but still we think that by this procedure, subjects’ 
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preferences are measured in a sufficiently precise way). Thus, CEi,s reflects i’s substitution 
considerations between safe and risky choices as elicited in the lottery tasks. In contrast, r 
derived from the receiver role in combination with Y (also determined in the receiver role) is 
used to weight utility from money against utility from reciprocity. This r will, with r = 0 or r = 
0.5, typically take less extreme values than if we would derive it from the lottery tasks, and is 
therefore the appropriate one: As we have already pointed out, wealth effects should only play 
a minor role for weighting money against reciprocity. 
Doing so, we find that in 88 % of all cases (for 82 subjects), the reciprocal utility component 
does not change the predicted sending decision. For seven subjects, predicted sendings in the 
trust game slightly increase by an average of CU 3.1, compared to predictions for the investment 
task. For two subjects, predictions jump from CU 0 to CU 10. In contrast, only in two cases the 
sending decision should be reduced (by CU 3.3 on average). Thus, while 82 subjects should 
make the same decision in the trust game and in the investment task, nine subjects should 
increase their sending, and only two should reduce it. We propose 
Hypothesis 4: The effect of betrayal aversion is very limited, meaning that sendings in 
the trust game do not differ much from sendings in the investment task. If at all, the effect 
will be positive instead of negative, meaning that sendings in the trust game are higher 
than in the investment task. 
The intuition behind Hypothesis 4 is as follows: Often, there is no tradeoff between the 
monetary and the reciprocal utility components. Therefore, si = 0 (if beliefs are pessimistic and 
senders are risk-averse) or si = 1 (if beliefs are unbiased or overoptimistic and senders are not 
too risk-averse) is optimal due to both monetary and reciprocal considerations. For example, if 
ri < 0 and εi > 1.01 , si
* = 1  is optimal both with monetary and reciprocal considerations. 
However, in cases where reciprocal gains must be balanced against monetary utility losses due 
to risk aversion, our model can predict increased sendings in a social setting. Also note that 
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only experimental data from the belief elicitation stage, from the lottery tasks, and from receiver 
behavior are used to derive Hypothesis 4. Sending decisions in both the trust game and the 
investment task have not entered our calculations yet. This is important, as differences between 
these decisions will be tested with Hypothesis 4. 
4.5 Determinants of Sender Behavior 
In this section, we will test Hypotheses 3 and 4: What drives sending behavior in the trust 
game, and how does it differ from behavior in the investment task? First of all, a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test cannot reject the hypothesis that sendings (the same is true for the investment task 
and for differences in sendings between both games) are equally distributed between the 
“standard” and the “inverse” treatment (p > 0.9). In the “standard” treatment, senders had to 
make their sending in the social environment first, and then the non-social setting was 
introduced. In the “inverse” treatment, the sequence was the other way round. As we find that 
such framing does not influence the sending decision, both treatments are merged in the 
following analyses. We will first analyze our experimental results statistically, and then 
comment on the accuracy of the corresponding model predictions. 
<<< Insert Table 3 about here >>> 
With regression (1) in Table 3, we test whether “amount sent” in the trust game depends on 
a subject’s average “amount returned” in the receiver role, on her average “belief”, and on her 
average “certainty equivalent” (we always use the average over the five data points). Regression 
(1) first of all reveals that sendings are mainly influenced by “avg. certainty equivalent”. 
Furthermore, we have already shown that, due to the false consensus effect, social preferences 
as measured in the receiver role influence beliefs. Beliefs of course influence certainty 
equivalents (both are correlated with ρ = 0.62; however, as the highest value for the variance 
inflation factor is 2.1 in all of our regressions, there are no problems of multicollinearity 
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throughout the empirical part of this paper), and thereby predict sendings. As there is noise in 
the data, “avg. amount returned” and “avg. belief” as part of this line of thought retain some 
influence (all three corresponding regression coefficients are positive in regression (1); 
p = 0.085 for “avg. amount returned”, p = 0.120 for “avg. belief”). In addition, there might be 
a direct link between sender and receiver behavior that explains the weak significance of “avg. 
amount returned”, meaning that reciprocal subjects ceteris paribus might send (to some degree) 
more than selfish ones.  
Regarding the influence of risk aversion on sendings, we add that univariate regressions 
which test the relevance of risk measures, such as the average difference between “certainty 
equivalent” and “belief”, or the certainty equivalent in the introductory lottery with known 
probabilities, only show an insignificant influence on si. The same result is found in Ashraf et 
al. (2006), Houser et al. (2010), and Eckel and Wilson (2004). Accordingly, the latter conclude 
that there is little evidence for considering trust to be a “risky decision“. However, in a 
multivariate regression containing “avg. belief”, “avg. certainty equivalent” is significant 
(compare model (1) again), suggesting that the risk discount, defined as the average difference 
between “belief” and “certainty equivalent”, may be significant as well if it replaces “avg. 
certainty equivalent” in model (1). In fact, this is the case. Eckel and Wilson (2004) find this 
effect as well. Therefore, while the effect of risk aversion on the sending may be fairly small, 
it nevertheless exists, as should intuitively be the case. Accordingly, we state that Hypothesis 3 
is supported. 
Models (2) to (5) serve to test Hypothesis 4. Interestingly, the coefficients shown in model 
(1) become insignificant and substantially smaller in model (2), where the sending decision in 
the investment task is regarded as well. Now, ŝi is the only significant independent variable, 
which, on its own, explains si
* with R² = 0.57, see model (3). In contrast to model (1), model (2) 
implies that the sending decision in the trust game does not (directly) depend on subjects’ social 
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preferences. The result of model (2) is verified with the help of regression models (4) and (5), 
where influences on the differences between both sending decisions are analyzed: “Avg. 
amount returned” on its own cannot explain the difference, see model (4). As well, trust-related 
control questions have no additional explanatory power, see model (5). In that model, the 
answer to “Trust” (“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that 
you need to be very careful in dealing with people?”) was coded with 2 for “Most people can 
be trusted”, with 1 for “No answer” / “Don’t know”, and with 0 for “You can never be too 
careful”; answers on “Exploitation” (“Do you think most people would try to take advantage of 
you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?”) were given on a scale from 1 (take 
advantage) to 10 (try to be fair) ); Sex was coded as 1 for male, and 0 for female. 
Additionally, some further descriptive statistics are informative: On average, CU 5.0 are sent 
in the trust game, and only slightly less (CU 4.7) is sent in the investment task, see also Table 
1. Most subjects send exactly the same amount in both treatments (61 %). In this group, there 
are 10 (out of 11) free riders who therefore behave consistently. From the remaining subjects, 
23 % show an absolute difference between both decisions of less than or equal to CU 2. We 
also asked subjects at the end of the game to explain in writing why they had differentiated 
between both sending decisions (if they had). Many of them, and not only selfish ones, 
mentioned that they “did not care if the co-player was a real person or a computer (because the 
return to oneself was the same)”. Some mentioned that they “did not want to harm Person B”, 
or “played fair”, and therefore sent more in the trust game. Only very few subjects responded 
somehow consistently to the idea of betrayal aversion, for example, by stating that “the 
computer can be trusted more than human beings, […that] person B might be greedy, […and 
that] you can send more money to the computer [than to the human co-player] without having 
a guilty conscience.” (Answers paraphrased, originally in German). 
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We compute model predictions for the trust game as described in the previous section. 
Compared to actual behavior, the predictions err by CU 3.2 on average. This is slightly more 
precise than predicting decisions in the investment task with the help of certainty equivalents 
from the lottery task, where the estimation mistake was CU 3.4 (the mistake of CU 3.2 
corresponds to a correlation of actual and predicted decisions in the trust game of 0.46). Again 
– like utility from money, reciprocal utility is typically U-shaped – there are predictions which 
differ from the actual decision by 10 CU (9 cases), which has a maximal effect on the accuracy 
of the sending prediction, but typically only very little impact on the accuracy of predicted 
utility levels. Thus, inaccurate sending predictions in both the investment task and the trust 
game may not be due to a wrong model or a lack of understanding of subjects, but may be 
caused by an irrelevance of the sending choice (however, we once again point out that this 
conclusion is only true for standard trust games, as different believed responder behavior and 
different risk aversion, for example caused by different multipliers or by framing, can make 
sendings more or less attractive). This result makes it difficult to test hypotheses with respect 
to betrayal aversion, which might explain that the literature has not agreed on the effect of 
betrayal aversion so far. Unfortunately, it is also not possible to compare the accurateness of 
our predictions with that of other models, because to our best knowledge, we are the first who 
define betrayal aversion and test this definition with experimental data. 
Based on this analysis, we state that most subjects have reciprocal preferences, but that they 
are almost not relevant in the sender role. If at all, they are in disfavor of the theory of betrayal 
aversion. Accordingly, Hypothesis 4 can be supported. 
4.6 Prediction of Sender Behavior with Literature Data 
As already mentioned in Section 2.3, we propose that it depends on the experimental setting 
whether reciprocal preferences have a positive or a negative effect on sendings. For those 
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studies in the literature, which compare social with non-social settings and report sufficient 
data, we test whether sender behavior can be explained with the help of our model. 
In the design of Aimone and Houser (2012), the sender makes a binary decision between 
“keeping” and “sending”, and the receiver either answers with “returning a bit” or with 
“returning half of the amount”. As the multiplier is 6 in their setting, we propose senders to 
have the following utility function: 
Ui= 
{
 
 
 
   (1 − si + k̃j
*
)
(1−ri)
 , if ri < 1
ln (1 − si + k̃j
*
)          , if ri = 1 
− (1 − si + k̃j
*
)
(1−ri)
 , if ri > 1
{
 
 +Yi ∙ √(6∙si − k̃j
*
) ∙ (k̃j
*
− si) , if k̃j
*
 ≥ si,
−Yi ∙ √(6∙si − k̃j
*
) ∙ (si − k̃j
*
) , if k̃j
*
 < si,
  (9) 
with USD 5 being 100 % of the endowment, si  {0;1}, and kj  {0.4; 3}. If the sender 
chooses si = 1 and if the receiver returns little, reciprocal utility is equal to 1.83; in the 
cooperation case it is 2.45. If senders have unbiased (slightly overoptimistic) beliefs, and expect 
66 % (not more than 57 %) of receivers to be free riders, the expected reciprocal utility is equal 
to 0.39 (below zero), meaning that senders can increase their reciprocal utility by choosing to 
send nothing. Nevertheless, due to the high multiplier, senders can expect to earn an attractive 
yield of 28 % of their endowment. Accordingly, many senders will cooperate, but fewer 
subjects will cooperate in a social setting than in a non-social one, some of them thus exhibiting 
betrayal-averse behavior. Moreover, if senders are allowed to choose the setting, most subjects 
will opt for the non-social one (and cooperate) and some subjects (our model predicts: 
overoptimistic ones with a positive expected reciprocal utility (which we are not able to verify)) 
will choose the social setting (and cooperate). The results of Aimone and Houser (2012) 
precisely confirm our predictions. 
For the experimental structure of Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2009 and 2012), we compute 
a reciprocal utility of 1.41 if the receiver cooperates and 2 if he defects. Therefore, when the 
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probability of meeting a cooperator is higher than 59 %, we predict more frequent cooperation 
in social settings than in non-social ones, and vice versa. Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2009) 
elicit an average belief in cooperative outcomes of only 45 %, meaning that an average subject 
should have a slight tendency to behave betrayal-aversely. In contrast to our prediction, the 
authors find that many senders (64 %) cooperate, although, given their beliefs and compared to 
their decisions in the non-social lottery, only 30 % are assumed to cooperate because of 
monetary motives. Thus, the social setting increases cooperation rates. While these average 
numbers look like evidence against the betrayal aversion hypothesis, the results may support 
the contrary on the subject level: Due to the false consensus effect, many cooperative senders 
may believe in a cooperation level of greater than 59 %. These subjects should cooperate in the 
social setting to maximize their reciprocal utility, and they may not invest their stake in the 
lottery if they are risk-averse. In contrast, subjects with low beliefs should neither send money 
in the lottery nor in the trust game. However, as individual belief data are not reported in the 
paper, we are not able to test this prediction. 
In Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2012), senders are informed about the probability of being 
matched with a cooperator, allowing the clear prediction that fewer subjects should send money 
in the trust game than in the investment task in the low (46 %) probability treatment, and more 
subjects should send money in the high (80 %) probability treatment. While the authors do not 
find a significant difference in the 80-%-treatment, the effect in the 46-%-treatment is 
significant, and it is opposed to our prediction: Subjects send money in the investment task less 
frequently than in the trust game. We explain our contradicting prediction as follows: Some 
senders may have altruistic preferences (see also Cox 2004, Ben-Ner and Halldorsson 2010, or 
Sapienza et al. 2013), which especially surface in the low probability treatment, because in the 
non-social setting, participating rates are of course very low if senders know that a negative 
return is to be expected (only 28.6 % participate, compared to 54.3 % in the trust game). Also 
note that, like us, Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2012) do not endow the receiver at the beginning 
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of the experiment, which is generally associated with higher sendings due to social concerns 
such as distress and guilt (see Johnson and Mislin 2011). In settings where both parties are 
endowed equally (Bohnet and Zeckhauser 2004; Bohnet et al. 2008; Hong and Bohnet 2007), 
which increases the “threat” for the sender to end up with a smaller payoff than the receiver, or 
in settings which offer the possibility of not knowing that one has been betrayed (Aimone and 
Houser 2012), betrayal-averse behavior can be found again. 
Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) ask subjects for their minimum acceptable probabilities of 
getting money returned when they send money in a social and in a non-social setting. In their 
experiment the multiplier is 2, si  {0;1}, and kj  {0.8; 1.5}. In our model, this results in 
negative reciprocal utility of 0.49 in the case of defection, and positive utility of 0.5 in the 
case of cooperation. If senders have unbiased (slightly overoptimistic) beliefs and expect 29 % 
(up to 49 %) of receivers to cooperate, expected reciprocal utility is negative with 0.20 (below 
zero). Again, subjects are predicted to behave in a betrayal-averse way. Indeed, on average, 
higher minimum acceptable probabilities are chosen in the social setting than in the non-
reciprocal ones. A similar fit can be established for the results presented in Bohnet et al. (2008) 
and in Hong and Bohnet (2007). 
Similarly to us, Houser et al. (2010) triple the amount sent and use a continuous strategy 
space. Consistent with our argumentation, sendings increase if senders are informed about a 
probable return distribution, which reduces ambiguity (compare their treatment Trust-2 with 
Trust-1). As well, their results confirm our finding that sendings in the social setting are 
insignificantly higher than in the non-social one (Trust-2 vs. Risk-1). However, as mentioned 
in Section 1, Houser et al. (2010) only controlled for risk and social preferences, but not for 
beliefs. In addition, and opposed to us, they refrained from any theoretical analysis of betrayal-
averse behavior. 
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Summarizing, we find that our theory is in line with most of the results reported in the 
literature. This is especially noteworthy, as the literature results seem to contradict each other. 
Our model implies that the occurrence of betrayal aversion is situation dependent because the 
believed distribution of returns matters. This implication resolves the contradictions mentioned 
above to a large extent. However, a systematic proof of this assumption has not been provided 
so far. Furthermore, from the literature review, the question arises as to how preferences for 
outcomes can be disentangled from preferences for intentions. This is important, as betrayal 
aversion is a consequence of intentions, not of outcomes. The question whether the receiver is 
endowed equally to the sender before the game starts or not addresses distributional concerns. 
In contrast, this experimental design question does not affect intentional concerns, because the 
endowment is not part of the players’ kindness functions. Thus, from Johnson and Mislin (2011) 
we know that the endowment matters for the sender’s decision, but it is unclear so far how the 
experimental results, which the literature explains with the help of betrayal aversion, are in fact 
driven by such distributional concerns. Again, more research is needed to investigate this in 
carefully controlled experimental settings and to describe the results with a model which 
captures both distributional and intentional effects. 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we proposed a modified version of the Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) 
reciprocity model, which is able to predict behavior in trust games in the receiver as well as in 
the sender role. In the receiver role, no uncertainty is present and the receiver knows how 
friendly the sender is. Accordingly, reciprocal receivers will simply answer kindness with 
kindness, and return more money than is sent to them. In the sender role, the decision is more 
difficult, because friendly sendings can backfire: If the receiver is selfish and keeps the money, 
reciprocal senders will suffer twice, as the money is lost, and trust has been betrayed. On the 
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other hand, in the case of a successful interaction, reciprocal senders gain utility from money 
as well as from reciprocal utility. In total, expected reciprocal utility is small in our experimental 
setting. Moreover, as both utility from money and utility from reciprocity depend on the 
sender’s belief in a comparable way, receiver behavior only confirms the selfish decision in 
most cases, meaning that senders behave identically in a trust game compared to a non-social 
lottery offering the same returns. If the tradeoff between both utility components matters, 
reciprocal preferences increase sendings in trust games compared to non-reciprocal settings, 
implying that these subjects do not act betrayal-aversely, but should better be described as 
reciprocity-seeking. However, we also showed that in other trust game experiments reported in 
the literature, reciprocal preferences can indeed have a negative effect on sendings. 
Our findings imply that cooperation in trust-game-like situations is not fostered very much 
by appealing to reciprocal motives, which, for example, explains why social peer-to-peer 
lending only leads a niche existence compared to classical, non-social investments into bank 
accounts. In contrast, inducing high beliefs in receivers’ returns will generate cooperative and 
therefore welfare increasing outcomes. We find that people typically have overoptimistic 
expectations, and Orbell and Dawes (1991) argue that such a bias may have evolved because it 
can be evolutionary advantageous within certain cooperative dilemmas. In turn, given that 
economic interactions are apparently built on biased beliefs in trustworthy behavior, our 
economy may be more vulnerable to changes in people’s perceptions than classical economists 
might have thought.  
We predict the occurrence of betrayal-averse behavior to be strongly parameter-dependent, 
and more research is needed to clarify whether this is indeed the case. Connected to this 
question, in order to identify the role of betrayal aversion more precisely, additional research 
has to be done to disentangle non-reciprocal social sending motives, such as inequality aversion 
(which may depend on the initial endowment of both players), efficiency-maximizing 
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preferences (which may depend on the multiplier), or altruism (which can be influenced by 
using framing), from those motives which stem from reciprocal considerations.  
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Fig. 1: Graphical belief interface 
 
 
Fig. 2: Graphical interface for the lottery at s = CU 1.67 
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Fig. 3: Average profit estimations (amount kept + average belief regarding the average 
amount returned), average profits (amount kept + actual average amount returned), average 
certainty equivalents, derived from the lottery tasks, and average model predictions of average 
profits (amount kept + predicted average amount returned). 
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Variable Meaning Average value
si i 's sending in the trust game CU 4.96
i 's sending in the investment task CU 4.67
i 's belief about j 's average amount returned CU 6.031)
believed payoff in the sender role CU 10.531)
k j j 's amount returned CU 5.06
1)
i 's overoptimism parameter 1.191)
CEi
i 's certainty equivalent of payoffs in the 
investment / lottery task
CU 9.981)
# subjects: 102
   # reciprocal subjects: 78
   # free riders: 24
1) Average over all elicited data points. Thus, actual payoffs from the 
    experiment differed from these values because they were dependent 
   on the random assignment mechanism and on the senders' decisions.
Table 1 - Definitions and descriptive statistics
 ̂𝑖
 𝑖  ̃𝑗
 𝑖
 𝑖  ̃ 
 𝑖
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Table 2 - Explaining beliefs1) 
          
          
Dependent variable Estimation mistake (CU) with respect to Ei(k̃j(s)) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
          
ki(s) − E(k̃j(s))       0.32***           0.27*** 
       (0.05)          (0.05) 
          
s       0.18***       0.22***       0.15***       0.21*** 
       (0.05)      (0.05)      (0.05)      (0.05) 
          
|s − si|        -0.35***        -0.25*** 
         (0.05)         (0.05) 
          
Own sending          1.71***   
           (0.42)   
          
Constant       0.01       1.13***      -0.12       0.81*** 
       (0.20)      (0.26)      (0.22)      (0.26) 
          
Observations 5052) 
R²       0.19       0.13       0.07       0.24 
          
Significant at the 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), 10 percent (*) level.   
1) OLS regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
2) One subject excluded, due to a computer blackout during the belief elicitation stage. 
Ei(k̃j(s)): i's belief about the average amount returned, in CU.     
ki(s) − E(k̃j(s)): Difference between i's amount returned in the receiver role and the average amount 
returned in the subject pool, in CU. 
Own sending: Dummy variable being equal to 1 if i’s own sending equals the sending to which i’s 
belief refers, si = s, and 0 otherwise. 
|s − si|: Absolute difference between the sending to which the belief refers and i's own sending, in 
CU. 
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Table 3 - Explaining "amount sent" in the trust game1) 
            
            
Dependent variable si si − ŝi 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
            
ŝi         0.66***       0.76***     
         (0.10)      (0.07)     
            
Avg. amount returned       0.24*       0.10         0.04       0.04 
       (0.14)      (0.09)        (0.07)      (0.07) 
            
Avg. belief       0.37       0.18       
       (0.23)      (0.17)       
            
Avg. certainty equivalent       0.55***       0.22       
       (0.18)      (0.15)       
            
Trust              -0.24 
               (0.28) 
            
Exploitation               0.10 
               (0.11) 
            
Sex              -0.27 
               (0.65) 
           
Constant      -5.58**      -2.58*       1.40***       0.10       0.01 
       (1.51)      (1.44)      (0.46)      (0.48)      (0.97) 
            
Observations       932)       932)       102       102       102 
R²       0.33       0.63       0.57       0.00       0.01 
            
Significant at the 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), 10 percent (*) level.   
1) OLS regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
2) Subjects excluded if not a single certainty equivalent could be determined. 
Avg. amount returned: Average of "amount returned" per data point in the receiver role. 
Avg. belief: Average of "expected returns" per data point. 
Avg. certainty equivalent: Average of certainty equivalents per data point, derived from the 
lottery tasks. 
Trust, Exploitation: Selected control questions from the World Values Survey, see Section 3.1. 
  
145 
 
Appendix – not for publication, only for referees’ information 
A: Receiver’s Reaction to Sendings in the Trust Game According to Dufwenberg and 
Kirchsteiger (2004) 
The payoff to the sender i at the end of the trust game is 1 − si + kj, the payoff to the receiver 
j is 3∙si − kj. The highest monetary payoff of i which j can establish, is to send back everything 
he received, which is kj = 3∙si. Accordingly, max{πi}  = 1 − si + 3∙si = 1 + 2∙si. The unkindest 
behavior is to send kj = 0 , resulting in min{πi}  = 1 − si . Thus, the reference point which 
separates kind from unkind behavior is π
i
ej
 = 
1
2
∙[(1 + 2∙si) + (1 − si)] = 1 + 0.5∙si, and j’s actual 
kindness to i is the difference between his actual strategy and his reference strategy: κji = 
(1 − si + kj) − (1 + 0.5∙si) = kj − 1.5∙si. 
According to the utility function proposed in Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), j’s utility 
is 
Uj = 3∙si − kj + Yji ∙ [kj − 1.5∙si] ∙ [(3∙si − kj) −
1
2
∙ ((3∙si, max − kj(si, max)) − 0)]. (A.1) 
Thus, j’s utility is the sum of utility from money (which is equal to j’s earnings), and the 
reciprocal utility, which is the product of j’s kindness to i and i’s kindness to j, weighted with 
the reciprocity parameter Yji . While we have determined j’s kindness above, i’s reference 
strategy is unclear so far because it depends on j’s reaction on si. The most unfriendly strategy 
of i is obviously to send nothing. To determine the friendliest possible strategy, we define si,max, 
which is the sending of i that maximizes i’s perceived kindness λjij. The reaction of j on maximal 
kindness of i can be determined by maximizing Uj (kj(si,max)) over kj. 
Uj (kj(si,max))  = 3∙si,max − kj + Yji∙[k − 1.5∙si,max]∙[1.5∙si,max − 0.5∙kj] (A.2) 
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Utility maximization implies kj = 2.25∙si,max −
1
Yji
. Accordingly, λjij,max = 1.5∙si,max −
0.5∙ (2.25∙si,max −
1
Yji
), which is, as λjij,max is strictly increasing in si and as the domain of si is 
restricted, implying that si,max = 1. 
Thus, the reference strategy of j has been determined and (B.1) can be specified to: 
Uj = 3∙si − kj + Yji∙[kj − 1.5∙si] ∙ [(3∙si−kj) − (0.375 + 
1
2∙Yji
)]. (A.3) 
Intuitively, i’s believed kindness to j decreases in Yji, because the higher Yji, the more will j 
return (see below), which reduces j’s payoffs and therefore i’s kindness. Maximizing (A.3), one 
has to consider that kj is restricted to the positive domain. Thus, 
kj
*
= max {0; 2.25∙si − 0.1875 −
3
4∙Yji
}. (A.4) 
Accordingly, receivers always send nothing back if sendings are small, and increase kj in 𝑠𝑖 
by 2.25, whereas the starting point of reciprocal behavior is determined by Yji. 
 
B: Model Properties 
1) Proof that equation (4) is correct. 
For kj ≥ si: 
 
dUj
dkj
 = 
Yj ∙ (2∙si−kj)
√3∙si−kj ∙√𝑘𝑗−𝑠𝑖
 – 1 = 0 (B.1) 
⇒ Yj
2 ∙ (2∙si − kj)
2
= (3∙si − kj) ∙ (kj − si) 
⇔ 4∙si
2∙Yj
2 + 3∙si
2 = kj ∙ (4∙si + 4∙si∙Yj
2) − kj
2
 ∙ (1+Yj
2) 
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⇔ kj = 
2∙si + 2∙si∙Yj
2
1 + Yj
2
(+)
−
√(
2∙si + 2∙si∙Yj
2
1+Yj
2
)
2
−
4∙si
2∙Yj
2 + 3∙si
2
1+Yj
2
 
        = si ∙ (2
(+)
−
√4∙
1 + Yj
2
1 + Yj
2
−
4∙Yj
2 + 3
1 + Yj
2
) 
        = (2
(+)
−
1
√1 + Yj
2
)  ∙ si. (B.2) 
Inserting (B.2) into (B.1) gives 
dUj
dkj
 = 
Yj ∙𝑠𝑖∙(2−(2
(+)
−
1
√1 + 𝑌𝑗
2
) )
√3∙si−kj ∙√𝑘𝑗−𝑠𝑖
 – 1, 
which does not equal zero for kj =(2 +
1
√1 + Yj
2
)  ∙ si. Accordingly, kj =(2 −
1
√1 + Yj
2
)  ∙ si 
is the only valid solution for equation (B.1). As 𝑈𝑗
′ (kj → si) → +∞ > 0 and as 𝑈𝑗
′ (kj → 3∙si)
→ −∞ < 0, one can conclude that (2 −
1
√1 + Yj
2
)  ∙ si refers to a maximum. 
For kj < si: 
dUj
dkj
 = 
Yj ∙ (2∙si−kj)
√3∙si−kj ∙√𝑠𝑖−𝑘𝑗
 – 1 = 0. 
Similarly, it can be shown that extremum candidates are given by  
kj =(2
(+)
−
1
√1−Yj
2
)  ∙ si. 
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In this case, only kj =(2 −
1
√1−Yj
2
)  ∙ si can be a valid solution. The extremum exists and kj 
is positive only for Yj < 
√3
2
. As 𝑈𝑗
′ (kj → si) → +∞ > 0, and as 𝑈𝑗
′(kj = 0) =
Yj ∙ 2
√3
 – 1 > 0 if Yj < 
√3
2
, the extremum must be a minimum. Accordingly, a receiver will never return 0 < kj < si. 
 
2) Proof that equation (5) is correct. 
For kj ≥ si: 
dUj
dkj
 = 
1
√3∙si−kj
∙ (
Yj ∙ (2∙si−kj)
√𝑘𝑗−𝑠𝑖
−
1
2
)  = 0  
⇒ 2∙Yj∙ (2∙si − kj) =√kj − si 
⇔ 4∙Yj
2∙kj
2 − kj∙ (16∙si∙Yj
2 + 1) = − si − 16∙Yj
2∙si
2 
⇔ kj = 
16∙si∙Yj
2 + 1
8∙Yj
2
 
(+)
−
√(
16∙si∙Yj
2+1
8∙Yj
2
)
2
−
si + 16∙Yj
2∙si
2
4∙Yj
2
 
         = 2∙si + 
1
8∙Yj
2
(+)
−
√
si
4∙Yj
2  + 
1
64∙Yj
4. (B.3) 
As above, 2∙si + 
1
8∙Yj
2 + √
si
4∙Yj
2  + 
1
64∙Yj
4  is not a valid solution and 2∙si + 
1
8∙Yj
2 − √
si
4∙Yj
2  + 
1
64∙Yj
4 
refers to a maximum. 
Similarly, for kj < si, the extremum can be shown to correspond to 
kj = 2∙si −
1
8∙Yj
2 −√
1
64∙Yj
4 −
si
4∙Yj
2. 
Again, this defines a minimum. Accordingly, a receiver will never return 0 < kj < si. 
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3) Proof that Yj ≈ 0.5073  is the threshold which separates defection from cooperation for 
receivers with rj = 0: 
The receiver’s utility, as defined in equation (3) in the paper, is obviously maximal at kj = 0 
if Yj is low. As well, it is obviously maximal at kj
*
, as defined in equation (4) if Yj is large. 
Responders will be indifferent between these decisions if 
Uj(kj = 0) = 3∙si − Yj∙√3∙si
2 = (3∙si − (2 −
1
√1 + Yj
2
)  ∙ si)  +  
Yj∙√(3∙si − (2 −
1
√1 + Yj
2
)  ∙ si)  ∙ ((2 −
1
√1 + Yj
2
)  ∙ si − si)  = Uj(kj = kj
*)  
⇔ 2 −
1
√1 + Yj
2
 = Yj∙√3 + Yj∙√(3 − (2 −
1
√1 + Yj
2
))  ∙ ((2 −
1
√1 + Yj
2
)− 1)  
⇔ 2 −
1
√1 + Yj
2
 = Yj∙√3 + Yj∙√(1 + 
1
√1 + Yj
2
)  ∙ (1 −  
1
√1 + Yj
2
)  
⇔ 2 ∙ (1 + Yj
2) − √1 + Yj
2 = Yj ∙ √3  ∙  (1 + Yj
2)  + Yj
2 ∙ √1 + Yj
2  
⇔ (−1 − Yj
2) ∙ √1 + Yj
2 = Yj ∙ √3  ∙  (1 + Yj
2)  − 2 ∙ (1 + Yj
2)  
⇔ (1 + Yj
2) = Yj
2 ∙ 3 − 4∙Yj ∙ √3 + 4 
⇔ Yj
2 − 2∙Yj ∙ √3 + 1.5 = 0 
⇔ Yj = √3 − √1.5 ≈ 0.5073.  (B.4) 
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4) Proof that expected reciprocal utility can be both negative if E(πi) > 1  and positive if 
E(πi) < 1. 
We consider an extreme case with only two receiver types in the following. Subjects (with 
overoptimistic or unbiased beliefs) believe receivers either to be kind (the expected amount 
returned is denoted with c∙s in the following, the proportion of kind receivers is denoted with 
p), or to return nothing. If all kind receivers return the same amount, c∙s (unkind receivers return 
nothing), and if E(πi) = 1 is considered, the following equation must hold: 
 E(πi) = p ∙ (1 − s + c∙s) + (1 − p) ∙ (1 − s + 0) = 1 
⇔ c ∙ p ∙ s − s = 0 
⇔ p = 
1
c
. (B.5) 
Accordingly, expected reciprocal utility is equal to 
= s ∙ [
1
c
 ∙ √(3 − 𝑐) ∙ (c − 1) − (1 −
1
c
)  ∙ √3],  (B.6) 
which is smaller than zero for p < 
2
3
, respectively c > 1.5. Consider a receiver pool where 
reciprocal utility is distinctly negative because p is distinctly smaller than 
2
3
, but entails one 
receiver who returns slightly more than c∙s. In that case, expected reciprocal utility will be still 
smaller than zero, but payoffs will be positive on average. 
In turn, for p > 
2
3
, expected reciprocal utility will be positive in this example. It will remain 
positive if one receiver returns slightly less than c∙s, meaning that expected payoffs will be 
negative. 
Also note that one cannot conclude that reciprocal utility is always positive if the proportion 
of kind receivers is larger than 
2
3
 and E(πi) > 1: Note that due to the concavity of positive 
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reciprocal utility, a pool of kind receivers who equally return c is the most favorable 
distribution. Having a more diverse pool of kind receivers, expected reciprocal utility can 
become negative even if more than 
2
3
 of all receivers return money. 
 
C: Receivers’ Reactions to Sendings According to Fehr and Schmidt (1999) 
For the trust game, the utility function of an inequality-averse receiver, according to Fehr 
and Schmidt (1999), is the following: 
Uj(kj) = 3∙si − kj − αj ∙ max{1 − si + kj − (3∙si + kj); 0} − βj ∙ max{3∙si + kj − (1 − si  +
 kj); 0}  
       = 3∙si − kj − αj ∙ max{1 − 4∙si + 2∙kj; 0} − βj ∙ max{4∙si − 1 − 2∙kj; 0}, (C.1) 
with β
j
 ≤ αj and βj < 1: Receivers prefer equal payoffs, but they also prefer to have more than 
the sender over having less. Receivers also face a tradeoff between inequality and higher 
payoffs for themselves. 
If β
j
 < 0.5, kj = 0 is always the best reply because receivers weight utility from money more 
strongly than disutility from inequality. Money will only be returned if β
j
 > 0.5 (the receiver is 
sufficiently inequality-averse), kj ≤ 2∙si − 0,5, and si ≥ 0.25 (the receiver does not want to earn 
less than the sender). In this case, (B.1) simplifies to 
Uj(kj) = 3∙si−kj − βj∙(4∙si  − 1 − 2∙kj), (C.2) 
which is maximal at the corner solution 𝑘𝑗
∗ = 2∙si − 0.5. Thus, receivers with βj > 0.5 will 
establish equality, receivers with β
j
 < 0.5  will keep the whole sending, and receivers with 
β
j
 = 0.5 are indifferent between returning nothing and returning kj
*
. 
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Instructions For and Screenshots Of the Experiment 
In the following, we give an English translation of the instructions which were handed out 
to the subjects. As well, we show the most important extracts from the experiment, which was 
conducted in German originally. 
  
153 
 
Guidelines For the Experiment 
Please read the following instructions carefully. If you have a question, call out your seat number. Please 
also read the instructions carefully which are provided during the experiment.  
General: 
 The experiment consists of the following components: An interactive experiment, an 
estimation exercise, and selection decisions. 
 In most cases, currency units (CU) will be used instead of euros. This will allow you to calculate 
with round sums. You can convert CU into euros at any time: CU 3 are worth EUR 1. 
 Experimental results as well as your payout will not be revealed to you before the end of the 
experiment. To determine your payout, some of your decisions will be randomly drawn. As this 
will be done at the end of the experiment, any of your decisions may be relevant for your 
payout. 
 During the experiment, we will sometimes ask you test questions. We do so to ensure that you 
have understood the experiment. For each correct answer, you can earn 10 euro-cents. 
 Please use a period instead of a comma and also enter values without the currency unit. For 
example: enter “3.5” and not “CU 3,5”. 
Details: 
Interactive Experiment 
 The experiment will be conducted with two players (called A-role and B-role). Your co-player 
will be drawn randomly and anonymously by the computer. 
 The interactive experiment will proceed as follows: Player A gets CU 10, player B gets 
nothing. A can keep the CU 10, or send any portion of it to player B. The computer will triple 
the amount sent. B receives this triple amount and can keep all of it, or return any portion of it 
to A (the amount returned will not be increased). The interactive experiment is then over. 
 
 Two random examples: 
 A keeps the CU 10. In that case, B will get 0 CU. Thus, B cannot return any money. In the 
end, A will be paid CU 10, and B will get CU 0. 
 A sends the CU 10 to B. B will therefore get CU 30 (CU 10 ∙ 3 = CU 30). B decides to return 
CU 0 to A. In the end, B will be paid CU 30 and A will get CU 0. If B returns everything to 
A, B gets nothing and A gets CU 30. 
 Your input in the A-role: 
As player A, you enter into an input box how many CU you want to send to player B. 
 Your input in the B-role: 
If you are player B, you will not be informed of the amounts that A has sent until the experiment 
ends. Therefore, you have to define a return amount for each possible amount sent by A. At the 
end of the experiment, from your return amounts, the one that corresponds with A’s amount sent 
will be selected. You must enter your return amounts into a diagram. Now take a look at 
diagram 1 on the additional sheet which was handed out to you: 
 
 This diagram will be displayed to you in the B-role. When you click on the vertical lines in the 
diagram, red dots will appear which you can move up and down with the help of the 
computer mouse. This is how you set your decisions. 
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 The horizontal x-axis shows the amounts which A could send to you (you would receive the 
triple amount). If A sends CU 0 to you, you cannot return any money. The more money A sends 
to you (move to the right on the horizontal x-axis), the more you can return (move upwards on 
the vertical y-axis). If A sends you CU 10 (on the x-axis to the far right) you will receive CU 
30, and you can return any amount between CU 0 and 30. 
 A can also chose to send an amount somewhere between the labeled values on the x-axis, e.g. 
CU 6. In such cases, the computer will calculate your decision with the help of connecting lines, 
which will be plotted between the red dots later on. 
 
Estimation Exercise 
 Within the experiment, you will do an estimation exercise. The more correctly you estimate, 
the more you will earn. The estimation exercise consists of several individual estimations. 
Your earnings will be calculated on the basis of your average estimation error. In total, you can 
earn up to 2 euros. 
 For each CU that you have misestimated by, your earnings will be reduced by 1 euro. (If you 
are out by more than CU 2, you will earn EUR 0: Then, nothing will be deducted from your 
previously earned money.) For example: Your average estimation error is CU 1.5. In that case, 
you will earn EUR 0.5. 
 
Selection Decisions 
 During the experiment we will ask you several times whether you want to take part in a lottery. 
Instead of participating in the lottery, you can choose to receive a safe amount of money. Please 
now take a look at graphic 2 on the additional sheet.  
 In the presented lottery, you can win any amount between CU 0 and 10 with the same 
probability. 
 For each row you have to decide whether you want to take the safe amount, which is 
displayed in the left-hand column of the table, or whether you want to take part in the lottery. 
Example: Consider the third row in the table. Here, you have to decide whether you want to 
get CU 5.75 or to take part in the lottery, where you can earn something between CU 0 and 
10. Of course, in the upper rows of the table, Option 1 is particularly attractive, whereas in 
the lower rows, Option 2 becomes more attractive. 
 At the end, the computer will randomly choose a row from the table. Only your decision 
in this row will be paid out. Any single decision in the lottery tasks can, therefore, be the 
only payout relevant one. 
 Apart from the lottery presented to you on the additional sheet, you will take part in several 
other lotteries. In those lotteries, the exact chances of winning will be unknown to you, but 
you will be able to estimate them approximately. Further information will be provided to you 
during the experiment. Here, too, only one of your decisions will be selected randomly at the 
end and paid out. 
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Diagram 1 (Role B) 
 
 
Graphic 2 
 
  
For example, click here, and a red dot 
will appear. This dot will be selected 
later on if A sends CU 5 to you (… you 
will then receive CU 15). By shifting 
the dot vertically, you can determine 
exactly how much you want to return. 
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Add. 2: Course of the Experiment 
Control Questions 
We asked for details of sex, age, student, course of studies if student, number of siblings, 
country of birth, and wealth status. 
 
Questions associated with trust and risk attitudes: 
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be 
very careful in dealing with people? Possible answers: Most people can be trusted / You can 
never be too careful when dealing with others / do not know; refused 
Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would 
they try to be fair? Answers: Scale from 1 to 10. 
 
Now I will briefly describe a fictive person. Would you please indicate in the following on 
a scale whether that person is very much like you (1) or not at all like you (10)? 
Living in secure surroundings is important to this person; to avoid anything that might be 
dangerous. 
Adventure and taking risks are important to this person; to have an exciting life. 
[…] 
 
Test Questions 
How much will A earn in total if A sends CU 5 and B determines in his diagram that CU 15 
will be sent back? 
How much will B be paid out if A sends CU 10 and B returns CU 30? 
How much will B be paid out instead if B does not return CU 30, but CU 0 (A is still sending 
CU 10)? 
How much will A be paid out in this case? 
 
Explanation of the Investment Task (Only in the “Inverse” Treatment) 
Thank you. You have now been assigned to role A. 
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Please now note that you will take part in a modified version of the experiment. Unlike the 
version explained in the instructions, no real Person B will be matched with you. Instead, the 
computer will receive the (triple) amount sent, and perhaps send a portion of it back. How will 
the computer decide which amount to return? There are subjects in this room who are in the 
B-role and who are interacting with subjects in the A-role. The computer will randomly 
choose a return decision of one of these B-persons. With regard to your own pay-outs, the 
situation has therefore not changed from the version explained in the instructions. The only 
difference now is that other persons’ pay-outs will not be affected by your decision. 
 
First Input Stage, Role A 
In the “standard” treatment (input for the trust game): 
You have been assigned to role A for the interactive experiment! 
Please make your input now. You have CU 10. You can keep this money or you can send 
any portion of it to B. The amount you send will be tripled. B can keep this triple amount or 
return any portion of it to you. 
I want to send to B  CU. 
 
In the “inverse” treatment (input for the investment task): 
This stage was identical to the second input stage, role A, in the “standard” treatment, see 
below. 
 
Explanation of Second Input Stage 
In the “standard” treatment: 
Thank you. In the next stage you will take part in the experiment in the A-role again. Unlike 
the last stage, this time no real person B will be matched with you. Instead, the computer will 
receive the (triple) amount sent and perhaps send a portion of it back. How will the computer 
decide which amount to return? The computer will randomly choose an answer from a real 
person B in this room. If you only consider your own payments, the situation therefore has not 
changed compared to the last stage. The difference is that now payments to another person are 
not affected by your decision. 
 
In the “inverse” treatment: 
Thank you. In the next stage you will take part in the experiment in the A-role again. Unlike 
the last stage, this time a real person B will be matched with you. The situation now is as 
explained in the instructions: You send an amount to a real, randomly drawn person B, the 
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amount is tripled, person B can then return any portion of it. With regard to your own payments, 
the situation has therefore not changed compared from the last stage. The only difference now 
is that pay-outs to other persons will be affected by your decision. 
 
Second Input Stage, Role A 
In the “standard” treatment (input for the investment task): 
You have CU 10. What amount do you want to send to the computer? The computer will 
randomly select one answer from a B-person in this room and return the corresponding amount 
to you. 
I want to send an amount of CU to the computer. 
 
In the “inverse” treatment (input for the trust game): 
The stage was identical to the first input stage, role A, in the “standard” treatment, see above. 
 
Explanation and Test Questions, Belief Stage 
Thank you. At the next stage, you will have to estimate how much the Bs will return to you 
on average. The more correct your estimations are, the more you will earn. You must enter your 
estimations into a diagram, as was explained to you in the instructions handed out previously. 
Thus, at the next stage, click into the diagram several times and slide each of the red dots to the 
level of the expected return. 
Two examples: 
Consider the position 5 (15) on the x-axis. Setting that red dot as high as possible, at 15, will 
have the following implication: You expect that all the Bs, without exception, will return 
everything (CU 15), if they are sent CU 5. If you take the dot to the right of this position, at 7.5 
(22.5), and set it at a level of CU 0.1, you estimate that on average the Bs will only return CU 
0.1 if CU 7.5 are sent to them. (These examples have been chosen randomly and may therefore 
be unrealistic!) 
 
Please answer the following test questions. Note: Instead of a comma you have to use a period. 
Assume that CU 7.5 were sent to B. If (for whatever reason) you believe that half of the Bs 
will return the whole amount (CU 22.5), and the other half nothing: At which level will you 
have to set the red dot at the position 7.5 (22.5) in the next stage? 
Assume that there are 15 participants in the B-role. If CU 10 are sent and if you (for whatever 
reason) believe that 5 of these participants will return CU 0, 5 participants will return CU 10, 
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and the remaining 5 participants will return CU 20: At which level will you have to set the red 
dot at the position 10 (30)? 
 
Input Stage, Estimation Exercise 
Compare Fig. 1 in the paper. 
 
Explanation of Lottery Tasks 
For the screenshot, compare Fig. 2 in the paper. Additionally, in the “standard” treatment, 
the following instructions were displayed. In the “inverse” treatment, “in role A in the second 
variant” was replaced by “in role A in the first variant”. 
Explanation: 
Thank you. Now, as in the instructions explained, we ask for the Selection Decisions. Again, 
you have to choose between Option 1 and Option 2 in each row (look at the table on the left). 
If you choose Option 1, you will receive the payment which is displayed in that row. If you 
choose Option 2, you will participate in a lottery with an uncertain outcome. Please look at the 
bar chart on the left, which represents the chances of winning in the lottery. 
Your chances of winning can be determined analog to the winning chances in role A in the 
second variant - it depends on the returns of the B-players in this room. The red bar shows your 
minimum payout which you will receive in this lottery; in this example it is 8.33 CU. This is 
the same amount you would have earned for certain in the Interactive Experiment, if you had 
sent 1.67 CU to B, and the computer had drawn a B-player who would have kept everything. 
Accordingly, in gray it is displayed how much you can maximally earn: If there are B-players 
in this room who return everything and if the computer draws one of these decisions, you will 
earn 13.33 CU. Values in between can be determined accordingly. By estimating average 
returns of the Bs in the last stage you have already estimated how much you will earn on average 
in this lottery. The blue line in the bar chart indicates this estimation. Please consider that the 
bar does not contain information on the probability of single returns: If, for example, 
there is no B-player in this room who returns everything (nothing), it will be impossible 
for you in the lottery to win 13.33 CU (8.33 CU). 
For clarification: Again, the B-players are not affected by your decisions; only their return 
decisions are used to calculate your profit! 
You will play analog lotteries five times in the next stages. Only one of your decisions, 
meaning one of the check marks in the next five lottery stages, will be paid at the end, 
Thus, any of your decisions could be the only payout-relevant one! 
[…] 
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Explanation of the Input Stage in Role B 
Thank you. Decisions in the lottery task have been completed now. At the next stage, we ask 
you to play the interactive experiment again, this time in the B-role! Other subjects in this room 
are playing the experiment in the A-role and one of these subjects will be randomly assigned to 
you and will send between CU 0 and 10 to you. In a diagram which you will recognize from 
the instructions handed out to you, you will have to determine what amount you want to return. 
You will thereby make a payout-relevant decision which is relevant for you as well as for A! 
 
Input Stage, Role B 
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1 Introduction 
Experimental research over the last decades has left little doubt that people do have social 
preferences, meaning that they are not only interested in their own wellbeing but also in the 
wellbeing of others. Researchers have made distinct progress in describing such behavior 
theoretically: The models of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), 
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), henceforth DK, and Falk and Fischbacher (2006) are 
prominent examples. However, such models face a severe limitation: They predict (some) 
experimental results to a very good extent, but are often not able to explain individual behavior 
across different games in a consistent way. While typically consistent play can, to some degree, 
be found if the incentive structures of the games are similar, recent experiments have shown 
that individual rewarding and punishing behaviors do not correlate at all (Blanco et al. 2011, 
henceforth BEN; Yamagishi 2012). However, a positive correlation is implied by assuming a 
given reciprocity parameter in reciprocal models: Gintis (2000) introduced the term “strong 
reciprocity” to describe non-selfish behavior, meaning that people who answer kind actions 
with kindness (rewarding behavior of this kind is also denoted as “positive reciprocity” in the 
following) are also suspected of answering unkindness with unkindness (i.e., punishing, also 
called “negative reciprocity”). Similarly, with the exception of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), the 
models mentioned above use a single parameter to capture social preferences, meaning that a 
preference for kindness is inevitably connected to a preference for unkindness. Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999) differentiate between advantageous and disadvantageous inequality, but 
suggest considering these parameters to be (perfectly) correlated (p. 822 and p. 864). While 
behavior may be heterogeneous in a pool of subjects, preferences are assumed to be stable for 
single persons at least over the short run, implying that individual behavior in one game would 
have predictive power for behavior in subsequent games. 
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This paper researches three questions that are connected to the idea of strong reciprocity. 
First, we show how punishing behavior in the ultimatum game, UG, henceforth, can be 
explained by assuming reciprocal preferences. We use the reciprocity model of DK, but show 
that major modifications are necessary to be able to describe punishments. While DK can 
explain games in which positive reciprocity is present (see the examples in their paper, Breuer 
and Hüwe, 2014a for the case of the public goods game, and Breuer and Hüwe 2014b for the 
case of the trust game, TG henceforth), we will show in the following that the original DK 
model is unable to predict punishing behavior in the UG. Given that DK are frequently cited to 
justify such behavior (see, among others, Bereby-Meyer and Fiks, 2013; Boarini et al., 2009; 
Falk et al., 2005; Falk et al., 2008; Fischbacher et al., 2013; Kamas and Preston, 2012), it is 
astonishing that the exact game-theoretic solutions of DK for those games have not been derived 
so far. Exceptions are Falk et al. (2003) and Leibbrandt and Pérez (2012), who derive precise 
predictions for the responder role in the UG, but avoid many of our modeling problems by not 
considering behavior in the proposer role. 
Second, we provide additional evidence that beliefs of proposers with respect to the average 
behavior of responders are pessimistically biased. Given that beliefs are essential to 
understanding subject behavior, it is remarkable that so little attention has been paid to beliefs 
in UGs so far (see also Section 5 in this paper). Therefore, up to now, it has been unclear as to 
whether such a bias exists or not. 
Third, we complement the experimental findings of BEN and Yamagishi (2012) by showing 
in a within-subject design that rewarding behavior of second-movers in the TG does not 
correlate with punishing behavior of second-movers in a convex ultimatum game, cUG 
henceforth (Andreoni et al., 2003). Additionally, we show that further insights may be gained 
by comparing these two decisions when they are modeled in a reciprocal way. We use the cUG 
because, in contrast to the standard UG (Güth et al., 1982), it does not force responders to make 
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a binary choice between “accept” and “reject”. Instead, the offer can be shrunk over a 
continuous strategy space, allowing a precise testing of whether subjects who return a lot in the 
TG more severely punish low UG offers. In contrast, the standard UG can only measure whether 
subjects who return a lot in the TG are more likely to accept low UG offers, which is statistically 
less reliable. Furthermore, we use a graphical interface, which allows subjects to express their 
preferences in a very simple and distinct way. 
In the cUG (as in the standard UG), a proposer i is matched with an anonymous responder j 
and can offer him an arbitrary portion of her endowment ai, 0 ≤ ai ≤ 1. The modification of the 
cUG compared to the standard UG is that responders can “shrink the pie” to any extent, which 
we represent with the help of the factor mj (0 ≤ mj ≤ 1). Shrinking the pie means that both the 
offer to the responder as well as the portion that the proposer wants to keep for himself are 
reduced by the factor mj . Thus, accepting (rejecting) the proposed division corresponds to 
mj = 1 (m j = 0) – the cUG entails the standard UG as a special case. In both variants, a rational 
selfish proposer will offer the smallest possible amount if she expects the responder to be selfish 
himself and not to shrink positive offers. 
This paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we show the shortcomings of DK with 
respect to negative reciprocity, and we propose modifications which allow the modeling of 
games with punishing possibilities. In addition, our hypotheses are derived. Section 3 
introduces our experimental design. Section 4 presents the experimental results and proves our 
hypotheses. Section 5 discusses our findings and proposes avenues for future research. Section 
6 concludes. 
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2 Theoretical Background 
Why should one assume that reciprocity is the driving force behind behavior in the UG? We 
do so because other typically assumed social preferences, such as altruistic, welfare 
maximizing, or maxi-min preferences, fail to predict that most responders will reject low offers. 
More promising, behavior in UGs can be modeled by either assuming that subjects care about 
the distribution of the outcome of an interaction (see the outcome-based inequity models of 
Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), or that they care about intentions 
associated with an action (see intention-based models, such as DK). Furthermore, hybrids of 
these two approaches exist (for example, Falk and Fischbacher, 2006). Outcome-based models 
can explain UG behavior by assuming that offers which lead to unequal payments are rejected 
because zero but equal payments are preferred to positive but unequal ones. However, 
experimental results suggest that UG behavior would better be explained with the help of 
intentions/emotions than with a concern for distributional fairness (see BEN; Blount, 1995; 
Falk et al., 2003; Xiao and Houser, 2005). Interestingly, we will now show that the purely 
intention-based approach of DK fails to predict responder and proposer behavior. Therefore, 
we will make model modifications to reconcile the DK approach with the experimental results.  
The reciprocal model of DK proposes that people want to answer kindness with kindness 
(and unkindness with unkindness, accordingly). Person i’s (un)kindness towards j at a specific 
node h of the game, called κij (ai(h), (bij(h))
j≠i
), is measured by the surplus (loss) of material 
payoffs that i expects j to have gained by the end of a game (given i’s belief about j’s strategy 
bij(h)). The surplus (loss) results if i departs from a certain reference strategy by choosing ai(h) 
from her strategy space. The belief of i about j’s kindness to herself is denoted as λiji (bij(h), 
(cijk(h))
k≠j
) and may also depend on i’s belief about j’s belief about a third player k’s strategy, 
cijk(h). DK assume that the utility function of person i consists of two terms, weighted with an 
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exogenously given, non-negative reciprocity parameter Yij. Thereby, the first term πi represents 
i’s material payoff, and the second term reflects i’s reciprocity utility: 
Ui (ai(h), (bij(h), (cijk(h))
k≠j
)
j≠i
)  = πi (ai(h), (bij(h))
j≠i
)+ 
∑ (Yij ∙ κij (ai(h), (bij(h))
j≠i
)  ∙  λiji (bij(h), (cijk(h))
k≠j
))j∈N\{i} . (1) 
If λiji is positive, i can raise her utility by increasing κij (if it is not too costly). In contrast, if 
λiji is negative, i will be unfriendly herself. Furthermore, i will dislike situations where she is 
friendly and j is unfriendly (and vice versa). For further details, we refer to DK themselves. 
2.1 Reference Points, Efficiency, and Kindness 
What do subjects perceive to be a kind or an unkind strategy in the UG? DK compute the 
reference point which distinguishes kindness from unkindness as “the average between the 
lowest and the highest material payoff of j that is compatible with i choosing an efficient 
strategy”. A strategy is efficient if there exists no other strategy which assures a higher material 
payoff for some player and no lower material payoff for any player. In the UG, the only efficient 
strategy for the responder is that of not shrinking. Therefore, “accepting” is neither friendly nor 
unfriendly (called “neutral” in the following), and responders cannot be kind in the UG. In turn, 
it is unfriendly to shrink the pie. Accordingly, mj = 1 is set to be the reference strategy for 
responders. For the proposer role, we first have to define efficiency for uncertain situations. We 
assume that for the efficiency determination, all possible payoffs irrespective of their 
probabilities are considered. In our case, all possible strategies are efficient for proposers, 
because selfish responders will accept each offer. Accordingly, converging to the minimal 
offer of ai = 0 may result in the maximal possible payoff of 1, and converging to the maximal 
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offer of ai = 1 results in minimal payoffs for the proposer. Thus, ai = 0.5 is the reference strategy 
for proposers. With respect to the reference points, we leave the DK theory unaltered. 
DK measure kindness in absolute terms, meaning that they define kindness as the additional 
material payoff which is granted to the co-player: Kindness is “proportional to the size of [her] 
gift”. DK thereby differ from Rabin’s (1993) normalized definition of kindness. In the 
following, we will define kindness in the spirit of Rabin (1993) and divide the absolute 
(un)kindness-term by the maximal possible (un)kindness. We will discuss in Section 5 why 
such an approach is more suitable in the UG case. 
2.2 Uncertainty About the Co-player’s Reciprocal Inclination 
While the role of uncertainty for non-social decisions has extensively been researched, it has 
not – at least theoretically – prominently been considered for reciprocal interactions so far: DK 
and Falk and Fischbacher (2006) assume that the reciprocal inclinations of the co-players are 
common knowledge. In their papers, co-player-dependent equilibrium strategies are derived. 
Thereby, i has to consider that her kindness to j depends on j’s subsequent and initially unknown 
reaction: Assume that i considers choosing ai = 1 in the UG and anticipates that j will react with 
an uncommon but existing behavior of rejecting so-called hyper-fair offers. In that case, i’s 
offer must be seen as maximally unkind. However, assume that j is the only responder in a large 
pool of subjects who accept hyper-fair offers. How kind does i now intend to be? Given that 
acceptance is most likely, ai = 1 should be seen as maximally kind. We conclude that j should 
evaluate i’s kindness by taking into account i’s belief about a typical reaction of co-players 
(note that reciprocity models assume that people care about intentions, not about the outcome). 
Thus, j should evaluate i’s (intended) kindness independently of his actual reaction, but 
dependent on his belief about i’s belief about the expected responder reaction. If this were not 
the case, very reciprocal responders would reject hyper-fair offers to turn the offer into an 
unfriendly one (remember that “unkind”/”unkind” equilibria are preferred to “kind”/”neutral” 
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ones), a reaction which, however, is not commonly observed among subjects typically 
participating in experimental research. 
Under uncertainty, the second-mover’s behavior is not necessarily identical to the (belief 
about the) first-mover’s belief about the former’s behavior. This adds a further degree of 
complexity to the model, because players do not only need to anticipate their co-players’ 
behavior, but must also build beliefs (about beliefs…) about typical, normative behavior (for 
example, i’s belief about the average shrinkage of offers in the cUG will be denoted as mik in 
the following). However, this additional complexity creates a more powerful model, because it 
captures the fact that interactions can depend on biased information or different levels of 
information regarding normative behavior.  
The assumption that the players’ reciprocal inclination is unknown has the following 
additional implications: First, the reciprocity parameter Yij can be modeled as being independent 
of j, because subjects have no possibility to condition strategies on the reciprocity inclination 
of their co-players. Therefore, we will write Yi instead of Yij in the following. Second, if i does 
not know j’s reciprocity parameter, she must build a belief about it. Therefore, we use Yij in the 
following to denote i’s belief about j’s reciprocity parameter, meaning that Yij is utilized with a 
different meaning than in DK. Third, we must specify i’s behavior in uncertain situations: We 
assume that i has a belief about the probability distribution of Ỹj in the subject pool, and that 
she will maximize her expected utility. 
2.3 Reciprocal Utility and Equilibrium Justification 
If proposers anticipate that responders will accept ai = 0.5, a payoff of 0.5∙1 to j determines 
i’s reference point of kindness towards j, and i’s intended (un)kindness towards j equals κij = 
ai ∙ mik(ai) −  0.5 ∙ 1. Similarly, i’s belief about j’s intended (un)kindness towards her is λiji = 
(1 −  ai) ∙ mij(ai) −  (1 −  ai) ∙ 1. In the DK model (and similarly in Falk and Fischbacher 
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2006), i’s reciprocal utility is assumed to be the product of i’s (un)kindness towards j multiplied 
by j’s (un)kindness towards i, see equation (1). As each subject can be kind (k), unkind (u), or 
neutral (n), six basic strategy pairs are possible. The order within these pairs is irrelevant, 
because the kindness terms are multiplied in the DK model. Thus, for example, u/k = k/u. The 
preference order of the strategy pairs is as follows: 
k/k = u/u ≻ k/n = n/n = u/n ≻ u/k     (2) 
In cooperation games, where players pay a cost so that co-players can receive higher payoffs, 
this preference order leads to correct predictions: If the co-player is (believed to be) unkind and 
does not cooperate, he is punished (because u/u ≻ n/u, k/u). If the co-player is kind, kindness 
will be reciprocated (k/k ≻ n/k, u/k). However, the UG reveals that the preference order in (2) 
does not always match the experimental findings: Given the order u/u ≻  n/n, reciprocal 
proposers should prefer the u/u strategy pair with ai = 0/mj = 0 to the n/n one with ai = 0.5/mj = 
1. However, only very few proposers offer small amounts in the UG: Second-movers may 
punish first-movers for unkind behavior, and first-movers may be kind in order to induce a kind 
reaction, but first-movers are not unkind in order to provoke an unkind reaction: This would be 
rather a “sadomasochistic” behavior. If such behavior were common, we would observe more 
small offers in the UG. Thus, we expect that unkind offers will not be made by reciprocal 
proposers, who typically form the majority of a subject pool, but by selfish proposers (see also 
Section 4.2). 
In contrast to DK, we generally propose that subjects prefer to match their co-player’s level 
of kindness: 
k/k ≻ n/k ≻ u/k,    (3a) 
n/n ≻ k/n = u/n,    (3b) 
u/u ≻ n/u ≻ k/u.    (3c) 
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The intuition of these preference orders is that the more i’s kindness differs from that of j, 
the less preferable her decision is. This is exactly what is found in Nicklisch and Wolff (2012), 
who call such behavior gradual reciprocation and who find this type of behavior to be by far 
the most common one. The following reciprocal utility function captures this notion: 
Ui = Ui,π(πi ) − Yi ∙ (κij − λiji)
2
, (4) 
and, with uncertainty, we write 
E(Ui) = E (Ui,π(πi )) − Yi ∙ E ((κij − λiji)
2
). (5) 
In contrast to DK, reciprocal utility is not added to utility from material payoff, Ui,π, by 
calculating the product of κij and λiji. Instead, the (squared) difference between both kindness 
terms is subtracted. This assures that – holding λiji fixed – i prefers to reciprocate j’s believed 
level of kindness. Squaring the expression implies that reducing large kindness differences is 
more worthwhile than reducing small ones. Moreover, this avoids corner solutions in cases 
where utility from the payoff is set equal to the payoff, i.e. where risk neutrality is assumed. 
While risk neutrality may often be assumed, equations (4) and (5) do not rule out the possibility 
of modeling risk aversion or risk seeking behavior. 
2.4 Responder Behavior in the cUG 
According to our previous remarks, responders in the cUG are assumed to maximize the 
following utility function (if material utility is set equal to the material payoff): 
Uj(mj) = ai ∙ mj(ai) − Yj ∙ 
{
 
 (
(1−ai) ∙ mj(ai) − (1−ai) ∙ 1
|(1−ai) ∙ 0 − (1−ai) ∙ 1|
−
ai ∙ mjik(ai) − 0.5∙mjik(0.5)
|0∙mjik(0) − 0.5∙mjik(0.5)|
)
2
,              if ai ≤ 0.5,
(
(1 − ai) ∙ mj(ai) − (1 − ai) ∙ 1
|(1−ai) ∙ 0 − (1−ai) ∙ 1|
−
ai ∙ mjik(ai) − 0.5∙mjik(0.5)
|ai,max ∙ mjik(ai,max) − 0.5∙mjik(0.5)|
)
2
, if ai > 0.5.
 (6) 
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The material payoff to j is determined by i’s offer, multiplied by j’s shrinking rate. 
Additionally, if Yj is positive, j considers a reciprocal utility component: The minuend in the 
squared expression shows j’s kindness towards i: The numerator displays j’s absolute 
unkindness towards i: j actually grants i a payment of (1 −  ai)  ∙  mj(ai), which must be 
compared to i’s payoff if j plays the reference strategy of accepting the offer. Shrinking to zero 
determines j’s maximal possible unkindness of 1 – ai. As mentioned before, we consider the 
actual unkindness relative to the absolute maximally possible unkindness. In the subtrahend, i’s 
intended kindness towards the responders depends on their average reaction to i’s offer. If i 
plays her reference strategy, j will believe that i believes that responders (denoted by k) will 
accept, because this is optimal both with respect to payoffs and with respect to reciprocal utility, 
0.5 ∙ mjik(0.5) = 0.5. Offering zero is obviously maximally unkind. What is the kindest offer in 
the range 0.5 ≤ ai ≤ 1? First, assume that it is believed that hyper-fair offers will not be shrunk 
below ai  ∙  mjik > 0.5. In that case, these offers are believed to be kind and will not be shrunk at 
all. In contrast, if subjects believe that hyper-fair offers will be shrunk below 0.5, these offers 
are believed to be unkind and will indeed be shrunk (see Appendix A that is available upon 
request): Reactions to hyper-fair offers are determined by self-fulfilling expectations (see also 
DK, p. 282, for a similar result in the case of the sequential prisoners’ dilemma). The shrinking 
of hyper-fair offers can also be empirically observed in some societies (Henrich et al. 2001). 
Typically, however, societies are “stuck” in the alternative equilibrium: Hyper-fair offers are 
believed to be kind because it is believed that they will not be rejected because they are believed 
to be kind. In that case, 1 ∙ mjik(1) = 1 grants the maximal payoff to i. Equation (6) can then be 
simplified to  
Uj(mj) = ai ∙ mj  − Yj  ∙  (mj  −  
ai ∙ mjik
0.5
)
2
. (7) 
Maximizing (7) over mj yields (compare Appendix B) 
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mj
* = {
min {1; ai ∙ (
1
2∙Yj
 + 2∙mjik)}  if Yj > 0,                  
1                                           if Yj = 0 and a i> 0.
 (8) 
If only one (representative) responder type is present in the subject pool, j can believe that i 
believes that the other responders will shrink like himself, mjik = mj
*. In that case, 
m̅j
* = 
{
 
 
 
 min {1;
0.5∙ai
Y̅j − 2∙ai ∙ Y̅j
}  if Y̅j > 0 and ai < 0.5, 
1                            if Y̅j > 0 and ai ≥ 0.5,  
1                            if Y̅j = 0 and  ai > 0.    
 (9) 
 
<<< Insert Fig. 1 about here >>> 
Equations (8) and (9) will be called response functions in the following. If reciprocal 
responders shrink unfair offers, shrunk offers are convex in ai (see Fig. 1, where we have 
displayed two examples with Yj = 0.2 and Yj = 2.0). From a certain point on, each j accepts the 
offer, even if it is (slightly) below the equal split. For ai = 0, each reciprocal responder will 
reject, and for ai ≥ 0.5, each responder will accept. Therefore, our model captures typically 
observed behavior (see Andreoni et al., 2003, and our findings in Section 4). Selfish responders 
will of course never shrink a pie that is larger than zero. Equations (8) and (9) can also be used 
to (correctly) predict behavior in the standard UG: Offers equal to or above 0.5 are always 
accepted, and “small” offers are rejected by reciprocal responders, with the definition of “small” 
depending on the responder’s reciprocity inclination. To prove equation (8), we formulate 
Hypothesis 1: 
Hypothesis 1 -responder behavior-. Responder behavior corresponds to that predicted by 
equation (8). 
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2.5 Proposer Behavior in the cUG 
If proposers anticipate the responders’ reactions, they are assumed to derive their utility as 
follows:  
E(Ui(ai)) = E (Ui,π ((1 − ai)  ∙  mij
*))  − Yi ∙ E ((
ai ∙ mik
0.5
− mij
*)
2
). (10) 
i gains expected utility from material payoff and expected disutility from unequal kindness 
terms. The latter can be explained analogously to the kindness terms in (7). Some general 
comments can be made with respect to the maximum of (10): Proposers will never offer 
ai > 0.5, because such hyper-fair offers are costly and cannot be reciprocated with kindness. 
Proposers who are only interested in reciprocity will offer the equal split, because such behavior 
grants the maximal reciprocal utility level of zero. As well, the zero-offer results in zero 
reciprocal utility if all responders are expected to reject, but selfish responders are indifferent 
between accepting and rejecting zero-offers, and may therefore accept. This will cause disutility 
for reciprocal proposers, making the equal split the preferred choice. Between ai = 0 and ai = 
0.5, all offers cause negative reciprocal utility because they are unkind and are expected not to 
be shrunk to zero. Thus, reciprocal utility is only zero if both players are maximally unkind (ai 
= mj
* = 0) to each other, or if they play their reference strategies (ai = 0.5; mj
* = 1). Depending 
on the (perceived) distribution of the responders’ reciprocity parameters, selfish risk neutral 
proposers will offer an unequal split, which maximizes their expected payoff. The more 
responders (are believed to) shrink, the fairer this split will be. Risk seeking proposers may also 
offer lower portions and may even prefer to offer nothing. As already mentioned, this can also 
be optimal from a reciprocal point of view. Risk averse proposers will offer right from this 
point, as the spread of the returns decreases if unfair offers are raised. Due to this argument, 
proposers will offer more (less), the more risk averse (risk seeking) they are (see Appendix C). 
Very risk averse proposers will prefer the equal split or a slightly lower offer, where that subject 
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in the responder pool who has the highest reciprocity parameter starts to shrink. Furthermore, 
with randomly chosen combinations of Yj, it can numerically be shown that right from the 
payoff-maximizing offer, decreasing an offer always leads to higher expected reciprocal 
disutility. Intuitively, lower offers only come with higher payoffs if most responders do not 
shrink. However, being matched with such responders, reciprocal disutility increases with 
decreasing offers. Accordingly, the more reciprocal a risk averse proposer is, the more she will 
offer. The Nash equilibrium of “offer the smallest positive unit”/“accept” will be realized if 
both the proposer and the responder are all selfish. 
Finally, the more reciprocal a responder is (believed to be), the more he will (be believed to) 
shrink and proposers must compensate this with respect to payoffs by offering more. 
Our model predictions are summarized in the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2 -proposer behavior-. The more proposers expect responders to shrink, and 
the more risk averse proposers are and the more reciprocal proposers are, the more they will 
offer. 
In this context, it is an interesting question as to what degree proposers are generally able to 
correctly anticipate responder behavior: If responders are believed to be more reciprocal than 
they truly are, offers should increase, and vice versa. Based on the general notion that people 
are typically overoptimistic (compare, for example, Breuer and Hüwe 2014a and 2014b), we 
predict that proposers will have favorable views of responders’ shrinking behavior.  
Hypothesis 3 -overoptimism-. Beliefs about expected payoffs in the proposer role are 
overoptimistically biased, meaning that subjects expect responders to shrink unfair offers 
less than it is in fact the case. 
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2.6 Reciprocal Consistency 
Typically, social preference models are used to explain behavior in single games. However, 
standard economics theory assumes that preferences are given. Therefore, preferences which 
are found in one game, or more specifically, in one role of one game, should have predictive 
power for behavior in other games as well. Applying our model and assuming consistent play, 
subjects who are very unkind in the responder role ought to be less unkind in the proposer role: 
Responders are unkind depending on their reciprocity parameter, and subjects with high 
parameter values bear high disutility from unkind (accepted) offers in the proposer role. To test 
this implication, we propose:  
Hypothesis 4 -consistency of preferences between roles-. Subjects who shrink offers more 
heavily in the responder role offer more money in the proposer role. 
Furthermore, we will compare second mover behavior in the cUG with that in the TG. In 
cooperation games, such as the TG, the public goods game, or the gift-exchange game, “acting 
reciprocally” is equivalent to “making the co-player better off”, meaning that reciprocal motives 
cannot easily be distinguished from altruistic, efficiency-maximizing, or maxi-min ones. 
Contrarily, in punishment games, such as the UG, both motives are clearly distinguishable, 
because reciprocal responders would shrink the pie, while altruistic, efficiency-maximizing, 
and maxi-min ones would not. Accordingly, if those second-movers who reward in the TG do 
not shrink in the cUG, the latter preferences are supported. In sharp contrast, if rewarding 
subjects also shrink, the idea of strong reciprocity is supported. 
While we have already shown that shrinkage in the cUG can be explained by a subject’s 
reciprocity inclination, we still have to prove that in the TG, subjects with higher reciprocity 
parameters return higher amounts to the sender. This behavior has already been predicted by 
the version of the DK model proposed in Breuer and Hüwe (2014b). However, as that version 
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differs from the one presented in this paper, we will now show that such a behavior also follows 
from equation (5). According to (5), receivers’ utility in standard trust games is as follows: 
Uj(kj) = Uj,π(3 ∙ si − kj) − Yj ∙ 
{
 
 
 
 (
(1 − si + kj(si)) − (1 − si + si)
|(1 − si + 3∙si) − (1 − si + si)|
 − 
3∙si − kjik(si) − 0
|3∙1 − kjik(1) − 0|
)
2
 if si > 0 and kj ≥ si, 
(
(1 − si + kj(si)) − (1 − si + si)
|(1 − si + 0∙si) − (1 − si + si)|
 − 
3∙si − kjik(si) − 0
|3∙1 − kjik(1) − 0|
)
2
 if si > 0 and kj < si,
0                                                                       if si = 0,                 
  (11) 
with si being the fraction of the endowment which is sent to the receiver – where it is tripled 
– and kj being the amount (measured as the portion of i’s endowment) which j returns to i. In 
equation (11), it is assumed that the receiver’s reference strategy is to return the sending such 
that the sender is again equipped with her initial endowment. The reference strategy for the 
sender is to send nothing. Thus, equation (11) is based on the model proposed in this paper, 
with the exception of the reference point determination: As specified in Breuer and Hüwe 
(2014b), the reference points defined above are more suitable for the case of the TG. If Uj,π(πi) 
is set equal to πi, maximizing (11) with respect to kj yields (compare Appendix D) 
kj
*
 = 
{
 
 
 
 max {0; si + 2∙si ∙ (
3∙si − kjik(si) 
3 − kjik(1)
−
si
Yj
)}  if si > 0 and kj
* ≥ si,
max {0; si + si ∙ (
3∙si − kjik(si) 
3 − kjik(1)
−
si
2∙Yj
)}   if si > 0 and kj
*
 < si,
0                                                          if Yj = 0.                 
   (12) 
Accordingly, as we wanted to show, j returns more (above a threshold) if his reciprocal 
inclination is high. 
While we now have shown that behavior in the UG and in the TG can be described with the 
help of our reciprocal model, we first of all want to assure comparability with BEN and 
Yamagishi (2012) and therefore formulate the following hypothesis independently from any 
177 
 
modeling assumption. We simply ask whether deviations from selfish behavior in the second-
mover roles correlate between the two games on the subject level: 
Hypothesis 5 -consistency of preferences between games-. Subjects who return more 
money in the receiver role of the trust game shrink their offers more heavily when they are 
in the responder role in the convex ultimatum game. 
3 Experimental Design 
To compare positive with negative reciprocity in a within-subject design, we let subjects 
play both, a trust game and a convex ultimatum game. We described the results of the TG in 
Breuer and Hüwe (2014b), and also refer to this paper for a detailed explanation of the 
experimental design (screenshots and instructions from the cUG-part of the experiment are 
available upon request). Before we started the first part – the TG –, we ran a lottery task to 
measure subjects’ risk aversion. Subjects had to choose between ten different safe amounts and 
a risky lottery, where they could win any amount from between 0 to 10 currency units (CU, 
henceforth, CU 10 were worth EUR 3.33 or approximately USD 4.53), each with equal 
probability. For each choice, subjects had to indicate whether they preferred the lottery or the 
safe amount. The crossover points, where subjects switched from the safe amount to the lottery, 
determined their certainty equivalents. When the TG was being explained, subjects were 
informed that a second experiment would follow, but what kind of experiment was not 
disclosed. However, subjects were aware of the fact that both parts would be completely 
independent of each other. Except the fact that two different games were played, both 
experimental parts had an identical structure. Accordingly, both parts were computerized, using 
the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and were conducted in the experimental lab for 
economic research at RWTH Aachen University. As in the TG, subjects had to play the cUG in 
the proposer role as well as in the responder role. Again, proposers were equipped with CU 10. 
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They had to decide about the offer twice: In the “social setting”, they could offer any amount 
to a randomly selected responder. Also, proposers had to make an offer to the computer in a 
“non-social setting”, which determined its own shrinking behavior by using the response 
function of one responder randomly selected from the pool. Accordingly, in the social setting, 
proposers decided about both payments to themselves and to their co-player, whereas in the 
non-social setting, payments to another subject did not need to be considered. As in the 
proceeding TG experiment, in two sessions (58 participants), the social decision had to be made 
first, followed by the non-social decision. In two more sessions (44 participants), the sequence 
was inverted in order to be able to test for sequence effects. Only one of the two proposer 
decisions was selected for payment at the end of the experiment to avoid hedging 
considerations. Subsequently, proposers were asked to estimate their expected profits 
(corresponding to the expected shrinking behavior), dependent on the offer. A graphical input 
mechanism was used for this task (see the Supplementary Material). Precise estimations were 
incentivized with up to EUR 2. At the end, subjects were told that they had to take part in the 
experiment again, this time in the responder role. At that stage, the strategy method of Selten 
(1967) was used, meaning that responders had to indicate their shrinking behavior for each 
possible offer. Again, we implemented the strategy method graphically (see the Experimental 
Instructions again), which enabled subjects to determine their answers conditional on a 
continuous proposer choice set with high accuracy: In a diagram, responders indicated their 
shrinking behavior for seven hypothetical offers (ai = 0; 0.125; 0.25; 0.375; 0.5; 0.75; 1), and 
responses to offers between these data points were interpolated linearly (which subjects had 
been informed of). Information on decisions of the other players and draws of the computer 
from both parts were not given prior to the last stage, when subjects were informed about the 
course of play and about their final payments. 
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4 Experimental Results 
4.1 Preliminary Remarks 
<<< Insert Fig. 2 about here >>> 
The basic results of the experiment are shown in Fig. 2: The draw-through line in this figure 
displays the expected payoff in the proposer role, and the expected shrinking behavior of 
responders, depending on ai (again measured relative to the endowment). The vertical lines 
mark the standard deviation of individual shrinking behavior. The dashed line displays subjects’ 
beliefs about the average of such behavior. Offers equal to or above ai = 0.5 are almost never 
shrunk, leading to almost certain payoffs of about 1 – ai. For lower offers, responders shrink 
with increasing intensity, the lower the offer is. Subjects are aware of this behavior, but 
overestimate shrinking (see Section 4.3). The lower an offer is, the higher the standard deviation 
of the payoff is. Many responders accept small deviations from the equal split, leading to a 
payoff maximum at ai = 0.375. 25 % of the proposers decided in favor of ai < 0.375, but only 
8 % chose ai ≤ 0.2. Most proposers (41 %) chose the equal split, and 6 % chose ai > 0.5. In the 
analogue experiment of Andreoni et al. (2003), about one third of all proposers offered ai = 
0.01, more than 40 % chose ai ≤ 0.2 and about a third of all proposers offered the equal split or 
higher portions. Thus, substantially more extremely unfair offers were made in their 
experiment, which interestingly corresponds to less reciprocal responder behavior: The 
expected payoff for 0.01-offers is about 0.57, while it is 0.23 in our setting (to clarify: numbers 
in this paper denote a proportion relative to the initial endowment of CU 10). 
An analysis of the accuracy of payoff predictions reveals that estimations are quite 
imprecise: The average absolute error for all six estimations is 0.16. If each subject had simply 
used their own response function to estimate average behavior, the average absolute estimation 
error would have been 0.17, which is only slightly worse. This comparison shows how difficult 
180 
 
it is for subjects to anticipate responder behavior: Proposers do not make a risky, but rather an 
ambiguous decision. Accordingly, given that moving from ai = 0.5 to ai = 0.375 (1) increases 
profits only by 0.03 (actual value), or 0.005 (average estimation), (2) increases the spread of 
returns, and (3) is perceived to be unfriendly, the attractiveness of the equal split is hardly a 
surprise. 
4.2 Hypotheses 1 and 2 
We proposed that behavior in the cUG in the responder role (Hypothesis 1) as well as in the 
proposer role (Hypothesis 2) can be explained with the help of our reciprocal model. To test 
Hypothesis 1, we determine the reciprocal inclination of subjects, Yj, by calculating that value 
which minimizes the sum of squared errors of model predictions at the data points ai = 0.125, 
0.25, 0.375, 0.5, 0.75, and 1. If ai = 0 is offered, selfish responders are indifferent between all 
possible strategies. However, in our design, that data point also determines strategies for offers 
0 < ai ≤ 0.125, because these responses are interpolated. Therefore, selfish responders should 
not shrink offers of zero either. Nevertheless, we are unsure as to whether subjects considered 
this fact. Instead, most subjects who do not shrink any positive offer reject the zero-offer. We 
want to classify these subjects as being selfish and therefore omit ai = 0 when calibrating the 
reciprocity parameter. To be able to apply equation (8), mjik must be modeled. As we asked for 
subjects’ beliefs regarding expected payoffs dependent on ai, mjik(ai) can directly be computed 
from that beliefs if one assumes that responders believe proposers to have the same belief as 
themselves. We cannot calculate mjik(ai = 1), because we did not ask for that belief (i will earn 
nothing irrespective of mjik). In that case, we assume mjik(ai = 1) = 1, which conforms to our 
model prediction and is close to the actual average value of mjik(ai = 1) = 0.93. However, our 
results will not significantly be altered if we omit mjik(ai = 1) from our computations. 
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Finding 1: Using equation (8), the actual shrinking rate can be predicted with a median error 
of 7 % (root of the median of the average squared differences between actual and predicted 
mj per data point of each subject). Some large errors cannot be avoided, as some responders 
shrink offers of ai ≥ 0.5. Furthermore, some subjects do not shrink in a convex, but in a 
concave form, leading to small prediction errors. Based on the low median prediction error 
of 7 %, we conclude that Hypothesis 1 can be confirmed. 
We will differentiate between subjects with a reciprocity parameter of Yj > 0 (reciprocal 
subjects), and those with Yj = 0 (selfish subjects) in the following. In Fig. 1, we have displayed 
average actual shrinking behavior and average model predictions for the reciprocal responders. 
The graphs illustrate the predictive power on the aggregate level, and show that those rare cases 
with non-rejected zero offers by reciprocal responders and shrunk hyper-fair offers cannot be 
explained. Such behavior might be due to “confusion”. However, not shrinking to zero can be 
rationalized by assuming that kindness is not valued in a relative, but in an absolute manner, as 
is shown in Section 5. 
Next, we will analyze behavior in the proposer role. Offers are assumed to depend on 
subjects’ beliefs of (expected) payoffs/shrinkage, on their degree of risk aversion, and on their 
reciprocal inclination. First of all, we test whether the offers are influenced by a sequence effect, 
as suspected in Section 3. According to Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, neither the distribution of 
offers in the social treatment nor in the non-social treatment depends on the sequence (in both 
cases, p > 0.9). Accordingly, both treatments are merged for the following analyses. We test 
Hypothesis 2 with the help of OLS regressions, see Table 1. In Table 1, “believed profit max. 
offer” describes the offer where subjects expect the maximal payoff. “Avg. amount reduced” 
indicates the average of the three shrinking decisions for the offers ai = 0.125, 0.25, and 0.375. 
“Lottery discount” describes the difference between the expected profit and the certainty 
equivalent (transferred into a percentage of the expected profit) in the introductory lottery task. 
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ai – âi  denotes the difference between a subject’s offer in the social and in the non-social 
treatment. 
<<< Insert Table 1 about here >>> 
Finding 2: According to regressions (1) to (4) in Table 1, subjects’ beliefs, their risk 
aversion, and their reciprocity inclination have the expected effect on the proposer offer. 
However, the explanatory power is very low, and the parameters are small and only weakly 
significant or not significant at all. Thus, no significant support for Hypothesis 2 is found. 
We will analyze reciprocal influences on the offer separately in Section 4.4. The very small 
influence of subjects’ beliefs and risk aversion is in contrast to the findings of Breuer and Hüwe 
(2014b), where beliefs (and risk aversion) of the same subjects can explain sendings in the TG 
to a much higher degree. We explain this contradiction as follows: In the TG, payoffs depend 
on the sending in a u-shaped form: Low or high beliefs are often the decisive factor for either 
sending (almost) nothing or sending a lot. In contrast, in the cUG, the payoff function is 
concave: Deviating from the fair and (almost) certain outcome only results in small payoff 
gains, and only small deviations are profitable. Furthermore, subjects expect too high shrinking 
rates (see below), so that 30 % of them believe ai = 0.5 to be the expected payoff maximizing 
offer. Moreover, we have already mentioned that beliefs are very imprecise: If subjects are 
aware of this, it is reasonable to offer ai = 0.5, which almost half of the subject pool do. 
Accordingly, large influences of beliefs and risk aversion cannot be found. 
4.3 Hypothesis 3 
To test Hypothesis 3, we compare expected proposer profits – dependent on the offer – with 
the actual average profits. As Fig. 2 has already revealed, our hypothesis of overoptimism 
cannot be confirmed: 
Finding 3: Estimations are significantly pessimistic. Thus, Hypothesis 3 must be rejected.  
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According to two-tailed t-tests, we find too low estimations for ai > 0: p-values range from 
0.000 to 0.025. At ai = 0, estimations do not significantly differ from actual average payoffs (p 
= 0.136), so that we cannot confirm that those estimations are biased. Nevertheless, overall, 
expectations are too low: Whereas the average expected payoff over all data points is 0.41, the 
corresponding estimated value is 0.37, resulting in a pessimistic discount of 8.8 %.  
Fig. 2 also reveals that beliefs about payoffs at ai = 0.5 and ai = 0.75 are (significantly) 
pessimistic as well. As we see no reason for suspecting that such offers are shrunk, we test 
whether part of the discovered bias is in fact not due to pessimism, but to non-serious, random-
like inputs of some subjects. We therefore exclude 19 subjects who estimate mij < 0.8 at ai = 
0.5: The remaining subjects almost correctly predict payoffs at ai = 0.5, and as well at 0.75. 
Still, a significant negative bias is found for these subjects at offers of 0 < ai ≤ 0.375 
(0.016 ≤ p ≤ 0.029), meaning that the interpretation of the bias as resulting from pessimism is 
robust. Interestingly, we now also find a negative (but insignificant) bias at ai = 0. 
As in the TG, a distinct false consensus effect can be observed, meaning that subjects believe 
others will behave like they themselves do (Ross et al., 1977): The correlation between a 
subject’s own reduction decision and her expected shrinkage rate is, depending on ai, between 
0.65 (at ai = 0) and 0.19 (at ai = 0.75). As a consequence, selfish subjects have correct (for 
slightly unfair offers) or overoptimistic (for very low offers) beliefs, and expect the profit-
maximizing offer to be ai = 0.125 on average. Accordingly, many offers of selfish proposers 
are too low from a payoff maximizing point of view (33 % offer ai < 0.375, compared to 21 % 
of reciprocal proposers). 
<<< Insert Table 2 about here >>> 
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4.4 Hypotheses 4 and 5 
Hypothesis 4 conjectures that in the UG, subjects who punish in the responder role are less 
unkind in the proposer role. Our results are as follows:  
Finding 4: Shrinking behavior in the responder role has only a very small effect on the offer 
(compare the weakly significant effect in regression (3), Table 1, or the correlation of our 
data displayed in the “UG offer / UG responder cell” in Table 2; furthermore, the effect is 
insignificant in regression (4), Table 1). In contrast, the more reciprocal subjects are as 
responders, the smaller the difference between the social and the non-social offer is, see 
regression (5), Table 1. Thus, contradictory evidence is found, and Hypothesis 4 cannot be 
confirmed. 
Table 2 displays correlations between decisions in both roles in both games and compares 
them to the results of BEN and Yamagishi et al. (2012) (note that BEN use the sequential 
prisoners’ dilemma instead of the TG, which however has a very similar incentive structure). 
While we will comment on most correlations in Table 2 later on, we now turn to the values 
displayed for the UG offer / UG responder correlation in order to explain Finding 4. The weak 
significance of the Pearson’s correlation parameter of 0.17 (which corresponds to the weak 
significance of “avg. amount reduced” in regression (3)) is driven by two subjects who play the 
Nash equilibrium of “offering zero” as a proposer / “always accepting” in the responder role 
(and believe in a profit-maximizing offer of zero): If these two uncommon data values are 
excluded, the already low support for Hypothesis 4 from regression (3) vanishes: The 
coefficient of the explanatory variable becomes even lower and insignificant, and R² decreases 
as well.  
Interestingly, by regressing the difference between the social and the non-social decision on 
the shrinking behavior (regression (5)), we find that these two variables are negatively 
correlated. This is astonishing: On average, the social offer is 0.06 higher than the non-social 
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one, and one would expect this difference to be due to reciprocal proposers who differentiate 
between selfish and social offers. But rather, the opposite holds true. A comparison of subject 
types complements regression (5): The difference between the social and the non-social offer 
is higher for selfish subjects (0.10) than for reciprocal ones (0.04). We also find that many 
subjects (58 %) do not differ between either decision at all, which explains why R² in regression 
(5) is so low. We discuss this counterintuitive result in Section 5. 
To test the consistency of behavior in the receiver role of the TG against the behavior in the 
responder role in the cUG, we regress the “average amount returned” in the TG on the “average 
amount reduced” in the cUG. Thus, similarly to the proceeding in the cUG, reciprocity in the 
TG is measured as the average over all data points of sending-dependent return decisions (see 
Breuer and Hüwe, 2014b). As already mentioned, according to the idea of strong reciprocity, 
subjects should shrink more in the cUG, the more they have returned in the TG. 
Finding 5: Amounts returned in the trust game and shrinkage in the convex ultimatum game 
are not correlated, see Table 2, ρ = 0.11 (p = 0.269). As well, there are 13 subjects in the 
pool who return nothing in the TG, and 36 subjects who do not shrink, but only 9 subjects 
who neither return nor shrink. Thus, Hypothesis 5 must be rejected. 
Although the sign of the correlation between both games is – as expected – positive, the 
correlation is not significantly different from zero. We also point out that many “selfish” 
subjects are selfish only in one of the two games. Moreover, we test for gender differences 
between both games and do find a significant effect: In the TG, females return 0.56 on average, 
and males return 0.48 (difference significant with p = 0.087). In the cUG, females shrink by 
0.19, and males shrink by 0.29 (p = 0.006). 
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5 Discussion 
5.1 Findings 1 and 2 
According to Finding 1, behavior in the responder role in the cUG can be well explained by 
assuming reciprocal preferences. Two systematic deviations from modeled behavior are 
observed: Some subjects shrink hyperfair offers, and some subjects do not completely reject 
zero-offers. While both deviations may be due to unconscious play, they may also reveal 
information about preferences. Some subjects might prefer to shrink hyper-fair offers because 
they believe that such offers are intended to be unkind (we did not elicit beliefs at ai = 1, but 
beliefs of close-by data points are highly correlated, and high beliefs at ai = 0.75 of these 
subjects thus contradict this interpretation). Alternatively, they might show an outcome 
orientation and prefer equal but zero payoffs to extremely (advantageously) unequal ones. Not 
rejecting zero-offers may infer altruistic preferences, but it could also be explained by an 
alternative definition of reciprocity (which would, however, be opposed to the behavior of the 
large majority of subjects): Note that we defined punishing and rewarding in relative terms (see 
Section 2.4), meaning that the unkindest offer is associated with an unkindness of 100 % and is 
punished as harshly as possible. Alternatively, if one uses an absolute definition as in DK, 
offering nothing corresponds to an absolute unkindness of 0.5, which would – according to the 
concept of gradual reciprocation – be punished by shrinking i’s payoff only by an absolute value 
of 0.5 as well. 
Finding 2 cannot confirm the assumption that the parameters “risk aversion”, “expected 
payoffs”, and “reciprocity” influence the proposer’s decision. Missing support in the proposer 
role may be due to the following reasons: We find that 41 % of all proposers offered the equal 
split, meaning that this strategy was so attractive that it hid much of the variance we were 
looking for. We also pointed out that the offering decision was a very ambiguous one, making 
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data which are generated by asking for well-defined beliefs and risk aversion parameters 
unreliable. Nevertheless, on an aggregated level, our model predicts that – with some exceptions 
(more precisely: risk seeking and overoptimistic) – proposers would offer the equal split or 
slightly unfair splits, and that is exactly what can be observed. 
 
5.2 Finding 3 
Our third finding is that proposers’ beliefs are pessimistically biased. Such a bias leads to 
fairer offers, because proposers fear more punishment than will actually be the case. While this 
result is seemingly opposed to findings of overoptimism in public goods games (Breuer and 
Hüwe, 2014a) and trust games (Breuer and Hüwe, 2014b), they can all be unified by arguing 
that subjects overestimate others’ reciprocal inclination instead of their own payoffs. The reason 
for this bias in all games may be the false consensus effect: Most subjects are reciprocal, and 
they “forget” that some selfish subjects exist. When is this plausible? Johnson and Fowler 
(2011) argue that people are overoptimistic because this bias helps to claim contested resources. 
Especially in the-winner-takes-it-all situations, overoptimism is advantageous. In contrast, 
Orbel and Dawes (1991) propose that cooperators overestimate the willingness of others to 
cooperate because this can be evolutionary advantageous. Thus, overoptimism might have 
developed to foster social interactions. If this argument holds true for punishing situations as 
well, punishment games allow discrimination between these two ideas: While “the-winner-
takes-it-all” argument implies that own payoffs are overestimated, social-interaction-arguments 
imply that punishments should be overestimated. The second view is supported by our results, 
and it leads to the conclusion that – given a desired level of equality – biased beliefs prevent 
welfare-destroying punishments. Interestingly, although myriads of papers on UGs have been 
published, only very few of them investigate the accurateness of beliefs, and the few papers that 
we are aware of report contradictory results: In the UG of Suleiman (1996), beliefs are correct 
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in their “high delta conditions”, and pessimistic in the “low delta conditions”. Bellemare et al. 
(2008) find that beliefs largely depend on framing: Expected acceptance probabilities of offers 
are higher if one asks for the portion of responders who reject rather than for the proportion of 
responders who accept. We avoid this framing by preliminary asking how much one expects to 
earn (in the instructions, we also mentioned that expected earnings correspond to expected 
shrinking rates), but we cannot rule out the possibility that our design is a form of framing as 
well. Although Bellemare et al. (2008) do not comment on the accuracy of beliefs in their 
subject pool, they do report that their modeling with subjective beliefs leads to the prediction 
of fairer offers than modeling with correct expectations, which we take as evidence for 
pessimistic beliefs. In the setting of Offerman (2002), first-movers estimate the second-movers’ 
reaction correctly if the first-movers’ “choice” is determined by a lottery. In the setting where 
first-movers actually decide about their choice, they are pessimistic with respect to the second-
movers’ rewarding reactions (a reaction which is not possible in the standard UG design, where 
the proposed division can only be accepted, not rewarded), and optimistic with respect to the 
punishing reactions. Perez and Kiss (2012) report that people are not systematically biased in 
their expectations regarding the sanctioning behavior of others. In a dictator game analyzed by 
Fehr and Fischbacher (2004), a third party can punish dictators who only send small amounts 
to the recipient, and expectations of recipients about the extent of punishing behavior among 
third parties are only insignificantly too high. 
 
5.3 Findings 4 and 5 
According to findings 4 and 5, neither consistent play between the roles in the cUG, nor 
between the second-mover roles in the TG and cUG can be found. The idea of strong reciprocity 
must be rejected. As we do, BEN suspect that a correlation between proposer and responder 
behavior in the UG (see Table 2) is due to the false consensus effect, and our regression (1) in 
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Table 1 does show that belief-based effects may play a role. As BEN do not measure beliefs or 
social vs. non-social decisions, we cannot prove that the correlation found in their experiment 
can completely be explained by the false consensus effect. In our design, there is evidence 
which even seems to support a negative relationship between roles: Comparing differences in 
social vs. non-social offers between both games, we find the difference to be negatively instead 
of positively correlated with the degree of reciprocity in the responder role. Accordingly, at 
least some subjects might rather be viewed as being motivated by altruism than by reciprocity: 
For altruists, it is consistent to offer more in the social treatment than in the non-social one, and 
not to shrink offers as a responder. 
As in BEN and in Yamagishi et al. (2012), we find no significant correlation between second 
mover decisions in the TG and in the UG (see Table 2 again). Less clear evidence is reported 
by Kamas and Preston (2012), who classify subjects into different categories (self-interested, 
inequity averse, efficiency maximizing, social surplus maximizing) with the help of dictator 
allocation questions and find some degree of consistency between a TG and a UG. However, 
also in their experiment, only a minority of selfish subjects, efficiency maximizers, and social 
surplus maximizers accept low offers in the UG. Accordingly, their preferences are described 
by the categorization only to a limited extent. We also report that no correlation between 
positive and negative reciprocity related questions is found in a large survey (Socio-Economic 
Panel) conducted by the German Institute for Economic Research (Egloff et al. 2013). 
Surprisingly, although we can confirm these literature results, we simultaneously find a positive 
and significant correlation between the reciprocity parameters elicited from the second mover 
roles in both games with the help of our reciprocal model: Reciprocity parameters computed 
using equations (8) and (12) are significantly correlated with ρ = 0.21 (Spearman, p = 0.040), 
while average decisions are not (the Pearson coefficient of 0.11 reported in Table 2 corresponds 
to a Spearman rank coefficient of ρ = 0.13, p = 0.196). Apparently, a subject ranking by their 
reciprocity parameters can differ from a ranking by their average decisions: Neither can 
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shrinking in the UG, respectively amounts returned in the TG, be uniquely determined by 
knowing Yj (because mjik(ai), respectively kjik(si), matters), nor is the reverse possible (because 
mjik(ai) and ai, respectively kjik(si) and si, matter). If kjik(si) is biased due to the false consensus 
effect, subjects with a high reciprocity parameter will return less in the TG than without a bias 
(the bias implies that sendings are perceived to be less friendly than is actually the case, see 
equation (12). Similarly, highly reciprocal responders in the cUG should shrink even more due 
to the false consensus effect (believing in high shrinking rates leads to higher perceived 
unkindness of low offers, see equation (8). As a consequence, even if subjects showed a 
constant reciprocal inclination over both games, no perfect positive correlation between the 
average amount reduced and the average amount returned would be predicted: The maximal 
possible correlation in our data set is 0.89 (Spearman rank coefficient) instead of 1, which 
would result if beliefs did not play a role. It is also of interest to investigate to which extent 
beliefs can influence the correlation at all. Decisions depend on beliefs (see equation (8)), but 
their influence is limited: mjik is restricted to 0 ≤ mjik ≤ 1, meaning that – holding Yj fix – not 
every mj
*  can be reached by just adapting mjik . For example, free-riders will not shrink, 
irrespective of their beliefs. As before, we use the reciprocity parameters derived in the IG to 
compute shrinking rates in the cUG, but now assume such beliefs (deviating from the true ones) 
that minimize the correlation between the average amount returned and the average amount 
reduced: The correlation can be lowered to 0.32. Thus, beliefs can indeed distinctly affect 
decisions, but at least in our setting they cannot be the cause for a correlation of zero between 
two decisions. 
Finding 5 is remarkable because it implies that individual behavior cannot be predicted even 
if one has observed the individual’s reciprocal inclination in a preceding, different situation. 
This opens space for future research: The question arises what individual reciprocal preferences 
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look like if both negative and positive reciprocity are found on the aggregate level, but strong 
reciprocity is found on the individual level only to a very limited extent. 
On a scale, possible explanations for this finding can be sorted between the following two 
extremes: On the one hand, one may believe that it is in principle possible to find stable 
individual preferences, which can precisely predict behavior in different social interactions, but 
that research was not yet successful. In that case, future research should aim at identifying, 
describing, and modeling the true motives. In addition, more research would be needed to 
clarify whether different motives are pursued simultaneously (by weighting them), or whether 
they are processed subsequently (see Fischbacher et al., 2013, who aim in that direction). For 
example, in the case of the responder’s role in the UG, altruism and reciprocity contravene, and 
it is unclear how these two motives interact.  
On the other hand, one may believe that subjects do not have stable preferences, or, more 
concretely, that they prefer to randomize between reciprocal and selfish behavior. Being unsure 
about which strategy should be preferred, selfish behavior may be seen as a temptation which 
subjects often resist but sometimes succumb to. In this context, we mention the finding of Rand 
et al. (2012): Subjects who reach their decision more quickly (or are forced to do so) are more 
cooperative, meaning that people are predisposed towards cooperation. It would be interesting 
to know whether people are also predisposed to punish, and only sometimes deviate from that 
predisposition. Especially if a second game follows a first game in direct succession, subjects 
may feel obliged to reciprocate in the second game if they were selfish in the first one. In turn, 
reciprocating in the first game may be seen as “having done their duty”, therefore being free to 
maximize income in the second game. 
Our experiment cannot clarify why subjects prefer to “sometimes free ride and sometimes 
distinctly reciprocate” rather than to “always reciprocate a bit”. Note that almost all subjects 
prefer to either return nothing or to return substantial amounts in the TG, and to either accept 
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or to heavily shrink small offers in the cUG. As well, it is an open question as to the 
circumstances in which such randomizing behavior is evolutionary advantageous in 
environments where social image and repeated, non-anonymous interactions play a role (we are 
only aware of Szolnoki und Perc, 2013, who find that being a strong reciprocal type is 
advantageous only in very narrow and unrealistic parameter regions). However, it may be worth 
exploring the following approach in more detail: Assume that a preference to randomize has 
not developed in anonymous interactions, but in situations where the reciprocal inclination of 
the co-player is known (because the interaction is a repeated one or because subjects have 
reputation). In that case, randomizing responder behavior creates uncertainty for the proposer. 
If proposers are risk-averse, such responder behavior will on average lead to fairer offers and 
result in less shrinking than with stable preferences. Again, similarly to our explanation of the 
pessimistic bias, randomized reactions foster social interactions. Obviously, such behavior does 
not emerge from the preference structure proposed in this paper: Equation (8) uniquely defines 
a responder’s optimal behavior. Claiming to randomize in order to induce higher offers is a 
non-credible threat. However, assuming that a responder prefers to randomize, his uncertain 
reaction will increase an offer on average, compared to a situation where his reaction can be 
foreseen. Very risk averse (selfish) proposers, will then even offer the equal split. Nevertheless, 
data from our subject pool only support a very small effect: In our lottery task, the average 
certainty equivalent is only 2.8 % below the expected payoff, corresponding to a risk coefficient 
of ri = 0.016 (we assume a utility function of the form Ui(πi) = πi
1 − ri  at this point). 
Furthermore, we assume that each responder randomizes such that his behavior exactly mirrors 
that of responders in our pool. With ri = 0.016, a selfish proposer will offer ai
* = 0.36. However, 
a risk-neutral selfish proposer, whose utility is not affected by randomized reactions, offers 
(almost) the same amount. This means that an average proposer almost does not take risk 
considerations into account. With (according to Holt and Laury 2002) a “very high” risk 
aversion parameter of ri = 0.9, the optimal selfish offer increases sligthly to ai
* = 0.38. As 
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reciprocal subjects are assumed to be risk-averse with respect to reciprocal utility, uncertainty 
regarding the kindness of responders affects the reciprocal utility component similarly to the 
payoff considerations presented so far: With Yj = 0.05, the optimal offer for a risk-neutral 
proposer is ai
* = 0.42 if uncertain responder behavior is considered. In contrast, assuming that 
the reaction of the responder is certain and that it results in payoffs corresponding to the average 
payoff regarded previously, ai
* decreases to 0.39. 
Above, we presented two possible experimental outcomes: Either, one may find that 
individual preferences are stable, or one may find the contrary. These two possibilities can also 
be interpreted as not contradicting each other, as assuming unstable preferences can simply 
mean that we model behavior as being random as long as the underlying motives have not been 
completely understood. Similarly, BEN propose that the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model is an 
“as if” model, which is “qualitatively able to capture different important motives in different 
games but that the low predictive power of the model at the individual level is driven by the 
low correlation of these motives within subjects” (p. 333). Accordingly, the question is that of 
how sensitive subjects react to certain triggers and how difficult it is to discover the underlying 
motives. Having social preferences which are easy influenced may be advantageous, because it 
allows subjects to rapidly adapt to changes in the social structure of their society. 
Third, one might assume that subjects have stable and well defined reciprocal preferences, 
but differentiate between positive and negative reciprocity: Some subjects (according to our 
data: especially male subjects) punish, while others (especially female) reward. Our gender-
dependent result is supported by Burnham (2007) who finds that men who reject low UG-offers 
have higher testosterone levels than those who accept. As well, Eckel and Grossman (2001) 
find that female responders are more likely to accept an offer than male ones (contrary evidence 
is reported by Garcia-Gallego et al. 2012, who find that women reject more than men). Thus, it 
is possible to differentiate between positive and negative reciprocity in a type-specific way. 
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Also, the correlations reported in Table 2 support this view: If situations are compared where 
the reciprocal decision is kinder than the selfish decision (TG offer, TG responder, UG offer) 
significantly positive correlations are found (with the exception of the TG offer / UG offer 
comparison in BEN). In contrast, if the reciprocal decision is unkinder than the selfish decision 
(UG responder), no correlation with the other decisions is found (with the exception of the UG 
offer / UG responder, which we – see above – attribute to the false consensus effect). Such an 
explanation also conforms to the literature finding that social preferences are consistent between 
comparable games: Consistency is high if subjects repeatedly play the same game (Andreoni 
and Miller, 2002; Volk et al., 2012), and it is still substantial across similar games (Dariel and 
Nikiforakis, 2014; Yamagishi et al., 2013). 
6 Conclusion 
In this paper we showed how outcomes of the (convex) ultimatum game can be explained 
with the help of a reciprocal theory based on the model of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) 
(DK). The UG gives some interesting insights into reciprocal behavior: As proposers in the UG 
can choose between a neutral / neutral outcome with respect to proposer / responder kindness, 
or can provoke an unkind / unkind outcome, experimental evidence shows that the latter 
outcome is not preferred to the former one. In contrast to DK, we suggest modeling reciprocity 
as being gradual, meaning that not only the sign of the kindness term should be reciprocated, 
but the magnitude as well. Furthermore, we find that a model which assumes the co-player’s 
reciprocal inclination to be known cannot simply be applied to the typical laboratory situation, 
where co-players are anonymous. Instead, subjects are assumed to determine the others’ 
kindness by anticipating the belief about typical behavior of co-players. This insight allows the 
derivation of self-fulfilling equilibria in UGs. To some degree, it also explains why no 
correlation between decisions in different games is found, although behavior may to some 
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extent be reciprocally consistent: (Un)kindness is not necessarily (perfectly) connected to a 
subject’s reciprocal inclination, because one’s own (un)kindness depends on the perceived, 
individually biased belief about the (un)kindness of others. 
Our experimental design reveals that a combination of four aspects explains why the equal 
split is the typical choice in UGs. Firstly, by offering less, payoffs can only be increased by the 
small amount of 0.3 currency units (the initial endowment of 10 currency units was worth EUR 
3.33 or approximately USD 4.53). Secondly, such offers are risky, while the equal split almost 
certainly grants a payoff of 5 currency units. Thirdly, the equal split is the offer which 
maximizes reciprocal utility. Fourthly, while actual gains from unfair offers are already small, 
believed gains are even smaller: In contrast to our hypothesis, subjects overestimate the second-
movers’ reciprocal reactions instead of the payoffs granted to the proposers. This finding 
implies that fair offers are partly made because of an exaggerated fear that unfair offers are 
punished. Similarly to the findings in Breuer and Hüwe (2014a) and (2014b), beliefs and 
reciprocal preferences are found to interact. Believing in more reciprocal co-players than is 
actually the case, less own reciprocity is necessary to induce a socially desired outcome.   
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Fig. 1: Shrinking of offers with Yj = 0.2 and Yj = 2.0, average model predictions of shrinking 
behavior of reciprocal responders, and actual shrinking behavior of reciprocal responders.  
 
 
Fig. 2: Estimated and actual average profit/shrinking, depending on the offer. The vertical bars 
indicate the standard deviation of actual profits/shrinking behavior. 
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Table 1 - Offer determinants1) 
            
            
Dependent variable 𝑎𝑖  𝑎𝑖 − ?̂?𝑖 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
            
Believed profit max. offer        0.11*            0.08   
       (0.06)          (0.05)   
            
Lottery discount         0.07         0.08  
         (0.09)        (0.09)  
            
Avg. amount reduced           0.09*       0.07      -0.15*** 
           (0.05)      (0.05)      (0.06) 
            
Constant       0.38***       0.41***       0.39***       0.37***       0.10*** 
       (0.02)      (0.01)      (0.02)      (0.03)      (0.02) 
            
Observations 102 102 102 102 102 
R² 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.05 
            
Significant at the 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), 10 percent (*) level. 
1) OLS regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
ai: Proposer's offer to the responder in the social treatment 
Avg. belief: Expected return (average of data points at ai = 0.125, 0.25, and 0.375) 
Avg. amount reduced: Expected return (average of data points at ai = 0.125, 0.25, and 0.375) 
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Table 2 - Correlations between decisions in both roles of both games1) 
        
        
  TG offer TG responder UG offer 
UG offer 
0.13 (BEN2),3)) 0.49*** (BEN3),4))   
0.22** 0.17*   
UG responder 
-0.03 (BEN2),3))   0.19 (BEN3),4)) 0.40*** (BEN2)) 
-0.17 (YHM5)) -0.02 (YHM)   
  0.02   0.11 0.17* 
TG offer 
  0.43*** (BEN3),6))   
  0.325***   
        
Significant at the 1 percent (***), 5 percent (**), 10 percent (*) level. 
1) Pearson's ρ if not indicated otherwise. As in the rest of the paper, responder 
   behavior in the UG (TG) is measured by the average amount reduced (returned). 
2) BEN: Blanco et al. (2011); Spearman's ρ. 
3) Correlations to first (second) mover decision in the sequential prisoners' dilemma 
instead of to the TG offer (responder). 
4) Rank biserial correlation. 
5) YHM: Yamagishi et al. (2012). 
6) Phi coefficient. 
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Supplementary Material - For Referees’ Information 
Appendix 
A: Optimal Shrinking if Hyper-Fair Offers Are Believed to Be Shrunk Below 0.5 
For ai > 0.5 and mjik(1) < 0.5, j’s utility function is 
Uj(mj) = ai  ∙  mj − Yj ∙ 
 
(
(1 − ai) ∙ mj − (1 − ai)
1 − ai
 −  
ai ∙ mjik − 0.5
0.5 − mjik(1)
)
2
 (A.1) 
Maximizing over mj results in 
U'j(mj) = ai −
2∙Yj ∙ ((2∙mjik(1) − 1) ∙ mj − 2∙ mjik(1) + 2∙ai ∙ mjik)
2∙mjik(1) − 1
= 0  
− ai = 
− 4∙ai ∙ mjik ∙ Yj − 4∙mjik(1) ∙ Yj ∙ mj + 4∙mjik(1) ∙ Yj + 2∙Yj ∙ mj
2∙mjik(1) − 1
  
⇔−4 ∙ mjik(1)  ∙  Yj  ∙  mj  +  2 ∙ Yj  ∙  mj
= 4 ∙ ai  ∙  mjik  ∙  Yj − 2∙ai ∙ mjik(1) − 4 ∙ mjik(1)  ∙  Yj  +  ai 
⇔ mj
*  =  
ai − 2 ∙ ai ∙ mjik(1) − 4∙mjik(1) ∙ Yj + 4∙ai ∙ mjik ∙ Yj
2∙Yj − 4∙mjik(1) ∙ Yj
. (A.2) 
If only one responder type is present in the subject pool, j can believe that i believes that the 
other responders shrink like himself. If ai = 1 is offered, mjik = mjik(1) = mj
*(1). In that case, 
(A.2) can be simplified to 
mj
*(1)  =  
1 − 2 ∙ mj(1) − 4∙mj
*(1) ∙ Yj + 4∙mj
*(1) ∙ Yj
2∙Yj − 4∙mj*(1) ∙ Yj
. 
⇔ mj
*(1) = 
1
2∙Yj 
. (A.3) 
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Inserting 
1
2∙Yj 
 for mjik(1) in (A.2) gives 
⇔ mj
* = 
ai + 2∙Yj − 4∙ai ∙ mjik ∙ Yj
2− ai∙Yj
2∙Yj − 2∙Yj
2 
, (A.4) 
which equals, if mjik = mj
*, 
⇔ mj
* = 
ai + 2∙Yj − ai∙Yj
2∙Yj + 4∙ai ∙ Yj
2 − 2∙Yj
2 
. (A.4) 
According to (A.4), mj
* is decreasing in ai and in Yj for ai ≥ 0.5 and converges to zero for 
large reciprocity parameters. Accordingly, for sufficiently high reciprocity parameters 
respectively offers, subjects shrink hyperfair offers. 
 
B: Proof That Equations (8) and (9) Are Correct 
Proof of Equation (8): 
Uj(mj) = ai ∙ mj − Yj  ∙  (mj −  
ai ∙ mjik
0.5
)
2
  
Uj
'(mj) = ai −  2∙Yj ∙ (mj − 
ai ∙ mjik
0.5
)  = 0  
⇔ ai + 4∙Yj ∙ ai  ∙  mjik −  2∙Yj  ∙  mj = 0  
⇔mj = 
0.5∙ai + 2∙Yj ∙ ai ∙ mjik
Yj
 = ai ∙ (
1
2∙Yj
 + 2∙mjik) (B.1) 
Proof of Equation (9): 
mj
* = 
0.5∙ai + 2∙ai ∙ mjik ∙ Yj
Yj
, see equation (8) in the paper. 
If mjik is replaced by mj
* the following holds: 
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⇒ mj
* ∙ Yj − 2∙ai ∙ mj
* ∙ Yj = 0.5∙ai 
⇔ mj
* =
0.5∙ai
Yj − 2∙ai ∙ Yj
 (B.2)
  
C: Proof That More Risk Averse Proposers Will Offer More Than Less Risk Averse 
Proposers 
A proposer’s uncertain payoff is defined as 
𝜋𝑖 = (1 − ai) ∙ ?̃?j
*
. (C.1) 
If the responder is believed to shrink, i’s payoff can be computed using equation (8): 
?̃?𝑖 = (1 − ai) ∙ ai ∙ (
1
2∙?̃?j
 + 2∙mjik). (C.2) 
The derivative of (C.2) with respect to ai is 
𝜕?̃?𝑖
𝜕ai
= (1 − 2 ∙ ai) ∙ (
1
2∙?̃?j
 + 2∙
𝜕mjik
𝜕ai
), (C.3) 
which is positive for ai < 0.5 if we assume that 
𝜕mjik
𝜕ai
 > 0. Thus, by lowering ai, a proposer is 
always worse off if she is matched with one of the ι responders who shrink, meaning that the 
payoff decreases in all cases except the best possible ones (which are: being matched with one 
of the 𝐽 − 𝜄 responders who do not shrink). We denote 
U'(πi, j ≤ ι) =
𝜕U
𝜕πi
U(πi, j ≤ ι) =
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑎𝑖
𝑈((1−𝑎𝑖) ∙ 𝑚𝑗
∗)
(1−2∙ai) ∙ (
1
2∙Yj
 + 2∙
𝜕mjik
𝜕ai
)
  (C.4) 
and 
U'(πi, j > ι) =
𝜕U
𝜕πi
U(πi, j > ι) = −
∂U
∂𝑎𝑖
(U(1 − 𝑎𝑖) ∙ 1) (C.5) 
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Thus, increasing ai increases πi if j shrinks, and decreases πi if j accepts. If i chooses optimally 
(assume that it is optimal for i not to choose a corner solution), changing the offer must not 
result in higher utility. Thus, marginal expected utility from increased payoffs in the cases of 
“accepting” must equal absolute marginal expected disutility from reduced payoffs in the cases 
of “shrinking” (in the following, remind that it is equally probable for i to be matched with any 
of the j responders): 
∑ Usmall RA
' (π
i, small RA
*
, j
)
j=ι
j=1   
= ∑ Usmall RA
' (π
i, small RA
*
, J
)  =
j=J
j=ι+1
(𝐽 − 𝜄) ∙ Usmall RA
' (π
i, small RA
*
, J
)  
⇔
∑ Usmall RA
'(π
i, small RA
*
, j
)
j=ι
j=1
(𝐽−𝜄) ∙ Usmall RA
'
(π
i, small RA
*
, J
)
= 1. (C.6) 
Thereby, we assume that i’s utility function is differentiable at all π
i, small RA
*. Us (Ul) denotes 
the utility function of a risk averse proposer whose risk aversion is comparably small (large). 
Risk aversion (RA) is defined by −
U''(πi)
U'(πi)
, with U'(πi) > 0 and U
''(πi) < 0. Using the definition 
of RA, we can state that the following is true: 
−
Ul
''(πi)
Ul
'(πi)
> −
Us
''(πi)
Us
'(πi)
 ∀ πi (C.7) 
⇔− Ul
''(πi) > −
Ul
'(πi)
Us
'(πi)
 ∙  Us
''(πi)  (C.8) 
With respect to the right part of (C.8), we can say that: 
−
Ul
'(πi)
Us
'(πi)
 ∙  Us
''(πi) > −
Ul
'(πi,J)
Us
'(πi,J)
 ∙  Us
''(πi) ∀ πi < πi,J, if (
Ul
'(πi)
Us
'(πi)
)
'
< 0. (C.9) 
The condition in (C.9) is fulfilled, as it can be concluded from (C.7): 
! 
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−
Ul
''(πi)
Ul
'(πi)
> −
Us
''(πi)
Us
'(πi)
  
⇔
Ul
''(πi)
Ul
'(πi)
−
Us
''(πi)
Us
'(πi)
< 0  
⇔
Ul
''(πi) ∙ Us
'(πi)
Us
'(πi)2
−
Us
''(πi) ∙ Ul
'(πi)
Us
'(πi)2
= (
Ul
'(πi)
Us
'(πi)
)
'
< 0  
Thus, from (C.8) and (C.9), it follows that  
⇒−Ul
''(πi) > −
Ul
'(πi,J)
Us
'(πi,J)
 ∙  Us
''(πi) ∀ πi < πi,J (C.10) 
From (C.10), we conclude: 
−∫ Ul
''(πi)dπi
πi,J
π̂i
 > −
Ul
'(πi,J)
Us
'(πi,J)
 ∙ ∫  Us
''(πi)dπi
πi,J
π̂i
, ∀ πi < πi,J  
⇔Ul
'(πi,J) − ∫ Ul
''(πi)dπi
πi,J
π̂i
 > Ul
'(πi,J) −
Ul
'(πi,J)
Us
'(πi,J)
 ∙ ∫  Us
''(πi)dπi
πi,J
π̂i
= Us
'(πi,J)  ∙  
 Ul
'(πi,J)
Us
'(πi,J)
−
Ul
'(πi,J)
Us
'(πi,J)
 ∙ ∫  Us
''(πi)
πi,J
π̂i
dπi  
⇔Ul
'(π̂i) >
 Ul
'(πi,J)
Us
'(πi,J)
 ∙  Us
'(π̂i)   
⇔
Ul
'(π̂i)
 Ul
'(πi,J)
>
Us
'(π̂i)
Us
'(πi,J)
 (C.11) 
πi,J denotes that payoff which is received if being matched with a responder who does not 
shrink, π̂i  denotes those payoffs which are received if being matched with responders who 
shrink. Accordingly, (C.11) holds for all j ≤ 𝜄, meaning that it also holds for the sum over all j 
≤ 𝜄. Now assume that ai* has been chosen such that the expected utility of a proposer with small 
RA is maximized, corresponding to payoffs of π
i, small RA
*
, j
. In this case, it follows from (C.11) 
that 
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∑ Ul
'(π
i, small RA
*
, j
)
j=ι
j=1
Ul
'(π
i, small RA
*
, J
)
 > 
∑ Us
'(π
i, small RA
*
, j
)
j=ι
j=1
Us
'(π
i, small RA
*
, J
)
 , 
⇔ 
∑ Ularge RA
'(π
i, small RA
*
, j
)
j=ι
j=1
(𝐽−𝜄) ∙ Ularge RA
'
(𝜋𝑖, small RA, J
∗)
 > 
∑ Usmall RA
'(π
i, small RA
*
, j
)
j=ι
j=1
(𝐽−𝜄) ∙ Usmall RA
'
(π
i, small RA
*
, J
)
 = 1, 
⇔ ∑ Ul
'(𝜋𝑖, small RA, j
∗)
j=ι
j=1  > (𝐽 − 𝜄) ∙ Ul
'
(𝜋𝑖, small RA, J
∗). (C.12)  
(C.12) implies that a proposer with a large RA can increase her utility by raising the offer 
compared to a proposer with a small RA. That is what we wanted to show. 
Now assume that i’s utility function is not differentiable at 𝜋𝑖, small RA
∗. In this case, there is 
at least one responder in the pool for whom 𝜋𝑖, j(mj) is not differentiable at 𝜋𝑖, small RA
∗, because 
that responder starts to shrink exactly at this point. Thus, it may be possible that proposers with 
slightly different degrees of risk aversion are stuck at this kink, meaning that a marginal increase 
of risk aversion may not result in a change of this offer. However, with risk aversion being 
sufficiently different, or with the proportion of responders who start to shrink at the same offer 
being sufficiently small, such exceptions can be neglected. 
 
D: Proof That Equation (12) Is Correct 
Uj(kj) = Uj(3∙ si − kj)  −  Yj ∙ 
{
 
 
 
 (
− si + kj
2∙si
 − 
3∙si − kjik(si)
3 − kjik(1)
)
2
, if si > 0 and kj ≥ si, 
(
− si + kj
si
− 
3∙si − kjik(si)
3 − kjik(1)
)
2
, if si > 0 and kj < si,
0,                                               if si = 0.                
 
If si > 0 and kj
* ≥ si: 
Uj
'(kj) = − 1 −  2∙Yj ∙ (
− si + kj
2∙si
 −  
3∙si − kjik(si)
3 − kjik(1)
) ∙  
1
2∙si
 = 0 
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− Yj  ∙  (
− si + kj
2∙si
) + Yj ∙ (
3∙si − kjik(si)
3 − kjik(1)
)  = si 
kj
*
 = si + 2∙si ∙ (
3∙si − kjik(si) 
3 − kjik(1)
−
si
Yj
) (D.1) 
If si > 0 and kj
* < si: 
kj
*
 = si + si ∙ (
3∙si − kjik(si) 
3 − kjik(1)
−
si
2∙Yj
) (D.2) 
We still have to prove that 3 − kjik(1) is indeed the maximal payoff i can grant to j. Thus, 
we have to show that si = 1 is maximally kind. Assume that only one responder type is present, 
kjik = kj. For si = 1, kjik(1) = 3 −  
2
Yj
 according to (D.1). Based on this and on kjik(si ) = kj, kj
*
 
can be recalculated: 
𝑘𝑗
∗ = si + 2 ∙ si ∙ (
3 ∙ si − kjik(si) 
3 − (3 −
2
Yj
)
−
si
Yj
) 
⇒ kj
* = si + 3∙𝑠𝑖
2 − kj
* ∙ Yj ∙ si −
2∙𝑠𝑖
2
Yj
 
⇔ kj
* =  3∙si −
 2∙𝑠𝑖
2 + 2∙Yj ∙ si
Yj ∙ (si ∙ Yj + 1)
, (D.3) 
Differentiating (D.3) with respect to si gives 
𝜕kj
*
𝜕si
= 3 −
4∙si + 2∙Yj
Yj∙(si∙Yj+1)
+
2∙𝑠𝑖
2 + 2∙Yj ∙ si
(si∙Yj+1)2 
= 3 −
4∙si + Yj ∙ (2∙𝑠𝑖
2 + 2)
Yj∙(si∙Yj+1)2
 (D.4) 
Remind that the sendings to j are tripled by the experimenter. Thus, as 
𝜕kj
*
𝜕si
 < 3, j will himself 
make better off if the sending is increased, meaning that si = 1 is maximally kind. As we used 
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(D.1), our proof is only valid for kj
* ≥ si. However, si = 1 will also be maximally kind if j returns 
less than he received: By definition, in this case, j’s payoff increases in si with > 2. 
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Experimental Instructions and Course of the Experiment 
In the following, we give an English translation of the instructions which were handed out 
to the subjects. We also show the most important extracts from the experiment, which was 
conducted in German originally. 
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Add. 1: Guidelines For the Second Part of the Experiment 
Please read the following instructions carefully. If you have a question, call out your seat 
number. Please also read the instructions carefully which are provided during the experiment.  
 
General: 
You will participate in an interactive experiment again, which differs from the first one. In 
the following, the amounts will not be tripled and nothing can be sent back!  
 
Details: 
Interactive Experiment 
 Again, the interactive experiment will be conducted with two players (called player A and 
player B). Your co-player will be drawn randomly and anonymously by the computer. 
 
 The interactive experiment will proceed as follows: Player A gets CU 10, player B gets 
nothing. A can offer any portion of it to player B. Second, player B decides if he will 
accept the proposed distribution without any changes. If B accepts, players A and B get 
the proposed payoffs. B can also decide to change the payouts. However, B can only 
reduce the payoffs, and he can reduce them for both players only in the same proportion. 
The interactive experiment is then over.  
 
 Two random examples:  
- A proposes to keep the CU 10 and to offer CU 0 to B. B does not change the payoffs. In the 
end, A will be paid CU 10, and B will get CU 0. However, if B decides to reduce the payout 
by 100 %, both player A and player B will receive CU 0. 
- A proposes to keep 2.5 and offers CU 7.5 to B. B does not agree and reduces the payoffs of 
A to CU 2.17 (thus by 13 %), the payoff of B is therefore reduced by 13 % to CU 6.53 as 
well. Accordingly, A receives CU 2.17, B receives CU 6.53. 
 Your input in the A-role: 
As player A, you enter into an input box how many CU you want to offer to player B. 
 Your input in the B-role: 
If you are player B, you will not be informed of the amounts that A has offered to you until 
the experiment ends. Therefore, you have to define your answer for every possible amount 
offered by player A. Again, you must enter your answers into a diagram. Now take a look 
at the diagram on the additional sheet which was handed out to you: 
 As in the first experiment, you must click into the diagram, to let black dots appear, 
which you can move up and down. This is how you set your decisions. Exemplarily, one 
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dot is already set into the diagram. The dot indicates how your decision affects the payoffs 
to you (dark-red, left bar), and to player A (light-red, right bar). 
 The horizontal x-axis shows how much player A could offer to you. The size of the grey 
bars indicate how much you and player A will earn if you do not reduce the payoffs. To do 
so, move the black dot on the vertical y-axis to the top. Reduce the payouts by moving the 
black dot downwards. Thereby, both your payout and player A’s payout is reduced to an 
equal proportion. The position of the black dot in proportion to the size of the grey bar 
indicates how much you reduced the payouts. Thereby the top position indicates “no 
reduction” while the bottom position (on the x-axis) indicates an “entire reduction”. Now 
take a look at the case in which player A offers CU 2.5 to you (pair of bars, that is labeled 
with 2.5 on the x-axis): There, A keeps CU 10-2.5=7.5. If you decide to reduce the payouts 
by 48 % in this (“arbitrary”) example, you will receive CU 1.30 instead of CU 2.5. The 
payout of player A will be reduced by 48 % as well A will receive CU 3.89 instead of CU 
7.5. At every bar you can make your decision in an analogue way. 
 Again, A can chose to offer an amount somewhere between the labeled values on the x-axis 
(e.g. CU 6). In such cases, the computer calculates your decision with the help of connecting 
lines, which will be plotted between the black dots later on. 
 
Estimation Exercise and Selection Decisions [Note: “Selection decisions” refers to lottery 
tasks (see Breuer and Hüwe, 2014b), which were also asked in this experimental part, but which 
are not discussed in the paper due to length restrictions] 
Again, you will have to do an estimation exercise and make selection decisions, which are 
similar to those in the first part of the experiment in their structure. Annotation: Perhaps, you 
noticed in the first part of the experiment that the fifth line of option 1 in the selection decisions 
always corresponded to your estimation of the expected payoff. Hence, option 1 was 
individually tailored to you. This will no longer be the case in the following experimental part 
such that you cannot raise the option-1-amounts by estimating high expected payoffs. 
Accordingly, it is optimal for you to estimate as precisely as possible. 
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Diagram for the Second Part of the Experiment (Role B) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Me 
A 
Me 
A 
Me 
A 
Me 
An arbitrary example: If A offers CU 2.5 to me, 
A keeps CU 7.5. I reduce this amount to CU 
3.89. Accordingly, my payoff is also reduced by 
48 % to CU 1.30. 
A 
Me A 
Me 
A 
Me 
A 
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Add. 2: Course of the Experiment 
Also compare the supplementary material of Breuer and Hüwe (2014b), where the 
control questions are displayed and where the course of the experiment is described (both 
experimental parts had the same structure)!  
Test Questions 
How much can A maximally earn if A offers CU 0 to B? 
At which level must B place the black dot if B wants to earn as much as possible and is offered 
CU 2.5? 
How much will A earn in that case? 
How much will A earn if B halves an offer of CU 2.5? 
 
First Input Stage, Role A 
You have been assigned to role A for the interactive experiment! 
Please make your input now. You decide how much you want to offer to B. Player B is a person 
in this room who is randomly assigned to you.  
I want to offer to B an amount of CU  (accordingly, I will keep CU 10 minus 
this amount if B does not reduce the amounts). 
 
 
Explanation and Test Questions, Belief Stage 
Thank you. At this stage, you will again have to estimate by how much players in this room 
in the B-role will reduce the offers on average. Put differently: How much will you earn in the 
A-role on average (depending on the offer)? In this estimation task, you can earn up to EUR 2. 
Look at the diagram displayed below. Setting a red dot at the left-most bar at CU 10 will 
have the following implication: You expect that no B, without exception, will reduce the 
payoffs if CU 0 is offered to him. Now look at the value 1.25 on the x-axis. There, A offers CU 
1.25 to B and wants to keep CU 8.75. For example, you may believe that 50 % of the Bs will 
not reduce at all, and 50 % will reduce to zero. Accordingly, you should estimate 50 % * 8.75 
+ 50 % * 0 = CU 4.38, and you should mark this value with a red dot.  
 
Please answer the following test question. 
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Look at an offer of CU 7.5 to B, meaning that you would like to keep CU 2.5 At which 
position do you have to mark the bar with a red dot if you believe that half of the Bs do not 
reduce the offer at all, and the other half reduces to CU 0?  
Now click on “Next” to proceed to the estimation stage. 
 
Input Stage, Estimation Exercise 
 
[…] 
 
Explanation of the Input Stage in Role B 
Thank you. Decisions in the lottery task have been completed now. At the next stage, we ask 
you to play the interactive experiment again, this time in the B-role! Other subjects in this room 
are playing the experiment in the A-role and one of these subjects will be randomly assigned to 
you and will offer between CU 0 and 10 to you. In a diagram which you will recognize from 
the instructions handed out to you, you will have to determine to what degree you want to 
reduce the payoffs. Thereby, you will make a payout-relevant decision which is relevant for 
you as well as for A! 
 
Input Stage, Role B 
Compare the diagram displayed in the experimental instructions. 
